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Preface 
 
First of all I must thank my friend and colleague Bruno Centrone 
for asking me to hold this round of lectures at the Department of 
Philosophy and Human Sciences at Pisa University. This has en-
abled me to achieve two results.  
To begin with, the invitation to speak at such an esteemed uni-
versity before so many eminent scholars and students keen to dis-
cover a subject matter in many ways “new” to them, has “prompted” 
me to examine more closely and review a whole host of data I had 
been poring over for some time. These elements are outlined here 
first, and are dealt with in more depth in response to the important 
issues arising from the debate.  
Secondly, this opportunity has allowed me to appear in the series 
of Lecturae Platonis that I have been holding in Macerata for years, 
and which has had the privilege to host esteemed scholars such as C. 
Rowe, D. Sedley, G. Ferrari and (next year) S. Scolnicov. I would 
have never done a Lecture in my “home turf” as one of the main 
goals of this exercise is to foster debate and discussion among 
scholar and students that are used to other approaches. Only away 
from Macerata, then, would I be able to deal with this Lecture 
“fairly”. I am happy to say that the experience in Pisa has further 
strengthened my belief that only when in terra infidelium – so to 
speak for a joke, can the resilience of one’s own interpretational 
framework be truly put to the test.  
The reader may appreciate this himself in the closing pages of this 
book, in the hefty section aptly entitled Exchanges with the Author. 
At least, a special thanks to Marilisa Cannarsa for her help in ed-
iting work and to Alex Bygate for his kind assistance in the com-
plete revision of the translation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Lecture 
Plato’s Writings and Dialectical Dialogues 
 
To some extent my reading of the Sophist differs from tradition in 
both form and content. It is common knowledge that Plato’s writing 
technique represents one of the central issues any Plato commentator 
will have to deal with at some point. It is both restrictive and mislead-
ing for the whole debate on the need for a fresh new interpretation on 
Plato to be merely confined to the, albeit crucial, question of his Un-
written Doctrines. The Athenian thinker has certainly “not written” his 
philosophy, as he claims himself in the Seventh Letter, 341 C: a simple 
effort to reconstruct his doctrine of ideas thoroughly will reveal this. 
Nonetheless, he has also written for sure about philosophy, and exten-
sively to boot. It therefore becomes essential to understand the how, 
why and wherefore of his writing. 
1. A necessary premise 
An author is read in accordance with the way he writes. Hence, if 
he writes in prosody and is not read accordingly, much of what he 
has said is lost; if he writes to be read aloud, as Plato certainly does, 
and he is read mentally, much is also lost. 
I “discovered” this aspect while studying Parmenides: after poring 
over the classification of arguments in the second part of the dialogue, I 
understood that Plato provides us with a clear suggestion that, once put 
into practice, helps reconstruct the framework of the arguments while 
leaving only a couple of residual issues (as proof that the model works). 
The suggestion is to be found in the answers of young Aristotle (who will 
become one of the Thirty Tyrants): mainly phrased as pauses (yes, for-
sooth, why not?) they sometimes turn into proper questions (what are you 
saying? What do you mean?). In this second instance they hint at prob-
lematic passage or a crucial issue. The point is that, reading the text in our 
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minds, we skip the youth’s speech as it adds nothing to the furtherance of 
the reasoning and turn our attention to Parmenides’ line of thought; by 
doing this we are unable to appreciate how the question interacts “theatri-
cally” with the thread of the enquiry.  
This example alone gives rise to a first suggestion: Plato is as good a 
teacher as he is master of the written form, maintaining that a writer is 
responsible for his works not unlike a father1, and consequently never 
abandons his reader. In this sense we can talk of writings with a 
“protreptic” goal. I have already grappled with these thoughts before 
and laid them down in a more articulate and, hopefully, convincing 
manner in two essays2. Here, I shall briefly put forward those key ar-
guments that can shed some light on the Lecture I suggest. 
2. An extreme example 
At times Plato is commonly known to perform operations in his 
dialogues that (seemingly) lack sense and anyway escape (immedi-
ate) logic. This often gives rise to random critical sniping: it is rather 
commonplace, then, for Plato scholars to chance upon interpreta-
tions whose baffling and unbearable “licence” demonstrate just how 
little reverence the original text is afforded.  
Nonetheless, it is also fair to say that Plato himself does undertake 
some extreme deeds, such as, notably, making wilful mistakes 
(which he then points out, as all fine teachers do). For us to talk of 
“wilful mistake”, I think three conditions need to be met first: 
                                                     
1 Cf. Phaedrus, 257 B, 261 A, 275 E, 278 A. 
2 Tra polifonia e puzzle. Esempi di rilettura del “gioco” filosofico di Platone, in La 
struttura del dialogo platonico, a cura di G. Casertano, Loffredo, Napoli 2000, pp. 
171-212; Comment Platon écrit-il? Exemples d’une écriture à caractère “protrep-
tique”, in La philosophie de Platon, sous la direction de M. Fattal, II, L’Harmattan, 
Paris 2005, pp. 83-118; Italian version: Come scrive Platone. Esempi di una scrittu-
ra a carattere “protrettico”, «Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia 
dell’Università di Macerata», 37 (2004), pp. 249-277. 
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1. the mistake must be manifest and not something we have 
inferred as a result of critical reasoning; 
2. the mistake must be manifest from the viewpoint of Plato’s 
logic; in short, the evidence must spring from the Author’s 
words; 
3. to establish the mindset we seek to illustrate, the text must 
contain a hint whose sole purpose is to allow the reader, 
who has meanwhile caught on to Plato’s “game”, to solve 
the mistake or at least understand its root cause. If this 
were not so we should think that, for all his preaching 
about educational caution, Plato is actually an irresponsible 
teacher for putting the philosopher reader in a position 
where he will be exposed to misleading information. 
These three conditions are met in a passage in Philebus, 33 C - 
35 C, which deals needlessly necessity with a pivotal concept in Pla-
tonic philosophy: namely, anamnesis. 
Socrates seeks to stress the paramount role of the soul in all its 
affections, even those that are normally regarded as pertaining to the 
body; his argument aims to prove that the soul is the seat of desires, 
even physical ones such as hunger and thirst. To reach this conclu-
sion, Plato must expound a treatment on forms of knowledge, draw-
ing a distinction between 1) weak affections that escape the soul, in 
which case we experience no sensations, and 2) affections that seep 
from the body into the soul, thus giving rise to sensations. The con-
servation of such sensations is known as memory. 
The first “oddity” is that Plato has embedded within such a 
straightforward discussion a wholly different issue, which seemingly 
lacks any connection whatsoever with the reflection underway here. 
Indeed, by taking on memory the boundary with reminiscence can 
be drawn (Philebus, 34 B 2 - C 2): 
SOCRATES – But do we not distinguish memory from reminis-
cence? 
PROTARCHUS – Perhaps. 
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SOCRATES – And is this the difference? 
PROTARCHUS – What? 
SOCRATES – When the soul alone by itself, without the body, 
lives again and completely the sensations which she experienced 
in company with the body, we say that she has reminiscence. Or 
not? 
PROTARCHUS – Certainly. 
SOCRATES – And when she recovers again of herself the lost 
recollection both of some consciousness and of knowledge, 
those acts we must term reminiscences. 
Socrates thus suggests a deep rift opens between memory, purely re-
ceptive and passive, and reminiscence, active and autonomous: this is an 
action undertaken by the soul alone; a strong feat, a “reliving”, that is ex-
perienced at a sensorial plane and on an intellectual level in the empty 
space caused in this case by forgetting. 
This analysis also seeks to explain the nature of pleasure and desire 
and their origin (34 C-D). An announcement of this kind seems baf-
fling in this context. 
The treatment below establishes that the seat of desires is the 
soul, for what is desired when the body is empty differs from what 
the body feels: namely, to be filled. Desire thus resides in the soul, 
which acts on the strength of sensation and memory (Philebus, 35 A 
3 - C 1): 
SOCRATES – Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the 
opposite of what he experiences; in fact, he is empty and desires 
to be full. 
PROTARCHUS – Clearly so. 
*** 
SOCRATES – And yet we say that he who desires, surely desires 
something. 
PROTARCHUS – Of course. 
SOCRATES – He does not desire that which he experiences; in 
fact he experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness, and he desires 
replenishment. 
PROTARCHUS – True. 
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SOCRATES – Then there must be something in the thirsty man 
which has some connection with replenishment. 
PROTARCHUS – There must. 
SOCRATES – But that cannot be the body, for the body is empty. 
PROTARCHUS – Yes. 
SOCRATES – The only remaining possibility is that the soul itself 
has some connection with replenishment by the help of mem-
ory; as is obvious, for what other way could that be? 
Obviously, the text is plainly simple and straightforward. Unfor-
tunately, though, it features a bizarre section that we have removed 
and marked with asterisks. This part raises an issue, the “first time”, 
which appears not only “worthless” here but also unsolved. Yet, we 
shall see that it will be instrumental in spotting the slip Socrates 
makes at the end of the passage: 
SOCRATES – But how? Can a man who is empty for the first 
time, attain either by perception of replenishment or by memory 
to any apprehension, of which he has no present or past experi-
ence? 
PROTARCHUS – How can he do it? 
Logically, the text rules out that memory may be resorted to. 
This claim is as unrequired by this reasoning as it is irrefutable, al-
though it is expressly at odds with the solution put forward at the 
end of the section quoted. Having dismissed the idea that the soul 
may draw upon memory for the first time, Plato stresses that mem-
ory is the only way to explain desire.  
Let us first say, however, that we are not looking at an unwitting 
mistake on Plato’s part. Indeed, it is only thanks to the section 
marked with asterisks that our attention has been drawn: this is what 
forces us to acknowledge that the suggested solution is incorrect, as 
it does not apply to the “first time”. Yet Plato also utters the rueful 
statement about «the only remaining possibility» and the question 
«for what other way could that be?». The underlying question is 
this: given that there is a “first time”, if memory alone cannot al-
ways underpin the spiritual nature of desire, what else can we appeal 
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to? The watchful reader, who far from browsing the text is actually 
philosophizing along with it, ought to recall the “worthless” empha-
sis placed on the difference between memory and anamnesis, know-
ing that Protarchus can and must provide another answer based on 
the soul’s active function. 
This kind of process reveals a style of writing bent on urging the 
reader to do philosophy rather than learn philosophy. This goes 
some way towards explaining the framework of this otherwise ab-
surd section. 
Other examples of this seemingly paradoxical approach are to be 
found in the articles quoted. My interest at present is to show that 
we are witnessing a radically different style of writing from what we 
are used to: a writing that confronts the reader with “issues” while 
nonetheless providing the necessary tools to tackle them. 
3. Neither True nor False 
I now wish to put forward a second kind of observations to show 
that Plato is not lying, for sure, but is failing to tell the truth; rather, 
he speaks the truth to the extent and with the clarity that behoves his 
argument. This time I draw my examples from the Apology, a so-
called “early work” in which Plato displays the cunning and drive of 
a skilled master, however. 
This stands out with regard to the character of Socrates chiefly: 
Plato endeavours to defend him against charges of haughtiness and 
portrays him in such a manner that one speaks of a “Platonic” Socra-
tes. At the same time Plato must adhere to the “historical truth”, as 
handling a trial that resulted in a conviction required due care and 
attention. Hence, the pressure applied to his theatrical twist is such 
that it ultimately gives rise on a contradiction (though undetected by 
most, a testimony to the author’s skill). 
We are now in the second phase of the trial: once sentenced the 
defendant could propose an alternative punishment to the one re-
quested by the prosecution, which in this case had called for the 
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death penalty. Diogenes Laertius3 tells us that Socrates first pro-
posed a 25 drachmae fine. When confronted with the judges’ anger 
at the meagreness of his proposal, he then claims he ought to be kept 
at State expense. The outcome of this clash is that while Socrates 
had been found guilty by a vote of 280 to 220 in the first round, after 
his speech the judges voted massively in favour of the death penalty: 
360 against 140. The narration is perfectly logical and convincing. 
Things don’t quite take this turn in the Apology, however, as 
Plato makes some low-key yet important changes. Socrates starts 
with reflecting on what is good and what is not, reminds the court of 
his merits, and finishes off by claiming that though penniless he is a 
benefactor to the city and should al least have more than the Olym-
pic victor’s reward of maintenance in the Prytaneum. As for the 
penalty, his position is clear-cut and ethically grounded: 
As I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assur-
edly not do myself an injustice and I will not say to my preju-
dice that I deserve any evil and will not propose any penalty 
against myself (37 B 2-5).  
Socrates is therefore unable to propose an alternative penalty as 
he would do an injustice. Plato thus provides the “true” motive be-
hind what could be mistaken for haughtiness in Socrates: his master, 
a true philosopher and upright man, could not perform an unrighte-
ous deed, and certainly not directed against himself. The facts, how-
ever, took a different turn and Plato cannot ignore them. Indeed, the 
contradiction looms at the end of this speech: 
Also, I have never been accustomed to think that I deserve to 
suffer any harm. Had I money I might have suggested an of-
fence that I was able to pay, because I would not have been the 
worse, But I have none, unless you proportion the fine to my 
means. Perhaps I could afford a mina, and therefore I propose 
                                                     
3 Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 41-42. 
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that penalty. But here are Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollo-
dorus, who bid me say thirty minae, and they will be the sure-
ties. Let thirty minae be the penalty; for which sum they will be 
ample security to you. (38 A 8 - B 9). 
The contradiction is out in the open, yet it could not be avoided for 
Plato had only two alternatives to choose from: he could either tell a lie 
but jeopardize his future credibility, as many eyewitnesses to the trial 
were still around, or he could refrain from defending his master at his 
own theoretical level. As the narrative of the story lends itself to this 
manoeuvre, Plato switches the order of the factors, placing the bid of 
maintenance at State expense on a theoretical level and reducing the 
counter-penalty of a fine to little more than a concession to friends. Yet 
the contradiction stands: the very unrighteous deed Socrates still ends 
up committing against himself is the one he had strictly ruled out be-
forehand. Anyhow, since most readers fail to notice this, Plato’s literary 
and philosophical genius remains unvanquished (as is mostly the case). 
Interestingly, this dialogue features another elaborate switch of 
data, this time pertaining to the actual charges. Diogenes4 and Xeno-
phon5 record the wording of the indictment as based on two ele-
ments: Socrates 1) does not believe the gods of the state but intro-
duces new divinities, as well as 2) corrupting the youth. Here Plato 
performs a dual operation. First, he keeps the indictment (obviously) 
but changes the order of the factors. The education issue thus be-
comes foremost, and thereon hinges Socrates’ defence. In confirma-
tion of the true state of things, though, the text says the charge of 
harming youth flows from the other, i.e. not believing in the same 
gods as the city (26 B). Plato then mentions in passing that the order 
in the indictment was: you do not believe in the gods of the city and 
thus you corrupt the youth; still, this does not alter the fact that the 
                                                     
4 Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 40. 
5 Memorabilia, I, 1. 
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charge pertaining to religion ranks lower in the defence framework 
(26 B - 28 A). 
Plato actually pulls this off, also thanks to another operation he 
performs in this field. Socrates rightly recalls that old charges have 
been laid against him: even the judges have heard them since their 
earliest years, and Socrates fears them more than the accusations of 
Anytus and Meletus. Notably, mention is made of the Clouds by 
Aristophanes, first put on 24 years earlier in 423 BC, when the phi-
losopher was 45 years old. There, Socrates is represented with two 
main traits: as a person who searches into things under the earth and 
above the heaven, and as one who turns the worse case into the bet-
ter. In short, he is portrayed as a physicist and a Protagorean. The 
text does not say this is the actual accusation of Meletus, merely that 
it is rooted therein, but it does say this view breeds the conviction 
that, along with physicists and sophists, he too does not believe in the 
gods (23 D; cf. 26 D).  
The consequence being that his defence is wholly grounded upon 
the blatant contradiction inherent in the charge of atheism (this is 
not the accusation raised by Meletus, though, but is the fruit of 
widespread public opinion), while stressing how Socrates sees his 
philosophizing as a kind of service to the gods (30 D - 31 A). The 
point here is that had Plato made Socrates deal with issues such as 
the relationship with God, holiness and unholiness, quite a different 
array of arguments would have had to be displayed. Moreover, these 
indictment elements were far too relevant to be left unaddressed: in-
deed, Plato put them on the agenda in Euthyphro, surely written at a 
time close to when the Apology was completed. 
In short, this “minor” operation allows Plato to defend his master 
whilst preserving the substance of both prosecution and defence, all 
the while steering clear of issues he could not handle in the context 
of a public speech and would leave until a later dialogue. Judging 
from his mindfulness as to what can and cannot be said, his appre-
ciation of the “how and when”, and the freedom and skill he dis-
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plays in weaving arguments and factual truths together, one is hard 
pushed to view this as an “early” work. 
4. A Flaunted omission 
One last observation centred on Euthyphro allows us to grasp an-
other stock element of Plato’s writing technique, albeit in its heightened 
form: the omission6. 
The dialogue is said to contain many definitions of holy. The first 
round of so-called definitions, though, is actually a sequence that by 
subsequent changes reaches back to a formula, first mentioned by 
Euthyphro, and later amended and revised: what all the gods love is 
holy, and what they all hate is unholy (9 D-E). However, this defini-
tion does not hold up against the overriding objection based on the 
alternative: is holy that which is loved by the gods or is it loved by 
the gods because it is holy? Perhaps too forcibly Plato puts forward 
an argument (10 A - 11 B) based on a distinction that will turn out to be 
decisive also for our reading of the Sophist: the difference between ac-
tive and passive, between doing and suffering. The conclusion is 
that being loved is a mere attribute, a consequence that sheds no 
light on the nature of what is holy, which, in turn, is so in itself and 
thus is loved by the gods for what it is. 
At this point, Socrates delivers a speech teeming with mathematical 
and geometrical references, odd for an “early” work, in which he sug-
gests a diairesis, a speculative tool that we therefore encounter in 
Plato’s works much sooner than scholars traditionally recognize. Justice 
is then divided into a part that attends to men and one that attends to the 
                                                     
6 I do not confront again the issue of Plato’s manifest decision not to “de-
fine” the Good; cf. on this subject M. Migliori, Sul Bene. Materiali per una 
lettura unitaria dei dialoghi e delle testimonianze indirette, in New Images 
of Plato, Dialogues on the Idea of the Good, edited by G. Reale and S. 
Scolnicov, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2002, pp. 115-149. 
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gods. This type of attending (a further diairetic passage) does not im-
prove or benefit the recipients of such care, as this is impossible in the 
case of the gods, but amounts to partaking in the attainment of a result, 
such as servants do to their masters.  
This leads us straight into the key issue: what work must men 
partake in for their actions to be holy? In other words, what are the 
results the gods seek to attain by the help of our services? Euthy-
phro’s answer “they are many and fair” is idle as it can apply to 
other activities, such as war and husbandry. A specific answer must 
be sought that explains what these many and fair results the gods 
strive towards are. But this is where the dialogue stalls:  
SOCRATES – And of the many and fair things done by the gods, 
which is the chief or principal one? 
EUTHYPHRO – I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all 
these things accurately will be very tiresome. Nevertheless let 
me simply say that: if someone is able to please the gods in 
word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices, these are holy actions, 
that are the salvation of private houses and public goods of the 
state; just as unholy actions, which are contrary to those loved 
by the gods, are the ruin and destruction of all (14 A 9 - B 7). 
Significantly Euthyphro has plainly reverted to a previous defini-
tion: pleasing the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifice. 
Rather than ask himself what goal might the gods urge men to at-
tain, he repeats that holy is what is pleasing to the gods, while for-
getting that this tells us nothing about the nature of holiness. 
This could be regarded as a token of the deep-seated weakness in 
the traditional view of God, and it would not be farfetched. But Soc-
rates’ comeback is truly shocking: 
You could have answered in much fewer words the chief 
question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen to. But 
I see plainly that you are not willing to instruct me: indeed 
even now, just as you were about to, you drew back. Had you 
answered me I should have fairly (ƒkanîj) learned of you 
what is the holiness. Now, as the loving follows necessarily 
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the beloved, whither he leads, what you think is the holy and 
the holiness? (14 B 8 - C 5). 
If we really seek to understand what is going on, we must with-
stand the spell of the dialogue and remind ourselves that neither 
Socrates nor Euthyphro exist, and that Plato’s hand has wrote the 
words we are poring over; be it Euthyphro’s error or Socrates’ re-
buke, when he retorts that another answer should have been given; 
this answer was possible and it would have clarified the definition of 
holiness fairly. The author knows this answer, indeed he makes Soc-
rates say that had it been uttered, i.e. if Plato had written it, he 
would have known, i.e. the reader would have read, what holiness 
is. Yet the author is unwilling to say so! Still, he does suggest the 
whereabouts of the error responsible for bringing the dialogue to an 
“aporetic” conclusion. 
5. An early conclusion 
The examples could keep rolling in, but we must stop and think 
as to why Plato does all this. Here is not the place to reassess the 
whole question of Platonic writing. Let us simply record that he de-
vises a style of written communication, which he refers to as unseri-
ous and playful activity both in Seventh Letter and in Phaedrus, go-
ing on to claim that a philosopher is 
the man who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily 
much that is playful, and that no written discourse, whether in 
prosody or in prose, deserves to be treated very seriously 
(Phaedrus, 277 E 5-8)7. 
And in Seventh Letter, 344 C 1 - D 2: 
So, every serious man must carefully avoid writing really seri-
ous things, lest thereby to prey those to the dislike and stupidity 
                                                     
7 Cf. Phaedrus, 276 C 2-3; 278 D 3-6. 
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of the people. In one word, our conclusion must be that when-
ever one sees a man's written compositions – whether they be 
the laws of a legislator or anything else in any other form – these 
are not most serious things for him, if he is serious: rather those 
abide in the fairest region he possesses. If, however, he put into 
writing these as really serious things, “then surely” not gods, but 
mortal men “have bereft him of his senses”8 
For sure such amusements are not futile but most fair (Phaedrus, 
277 E 1-2), written as reminders but also as treasure for others who fol-
low the same path (Phaedrus, 276 D 4); the engagement is such that 
one’s whole life can be dedicated to their pursuit (Phaedrus, 276 D 7-
8). And yet they are only amusements. Being Socratic, Plato thinks that 
philosophy consists in both teamwork and personal discovery. 
This always requires, and therefore warrants, great “educational 
forbearance” on the master’s part, as he does not want to stifle the 
learner’s (in our case the reader’s) quest for truth by revealing it out-
right. This gives rise to a manner of teaching that (especially in its 
written form) always hints at the truth without disclosing it, divulg-
ing information that is true without being the all-out truth; instead, 
the reader’s involvement is needed for processing and building on 
the information given. Plato makes use of the fabrications of his nar-
rative technique to lay out a game that must be engaged in, if one 
seeks to do philosophy, i.e. if the text is to be thoroughly understood. 
From the viewpoint of this “serious game” the Platonic corpus ap-
pears truly “protreptic” in that philosophy is put forward to urge the phi-
losopher reader to discover the truth himself with few suggestions9. It fol-
lows that submitting ever more intricacies as the works progress will 
cause the selection of “true philosophers”. 
Written Platonic philosophy, then, can at the same time be said to 
be unwritten: notwithstanding its “accomplished” body of thought, 
                                                     
8 Homer, Iliad, VIII, 360, XII, 234. 
9 Cf. Seventh Letter, 341 E. 
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Plato never truly “states” his theories, not even those universally as-
cribed to him such as the theory of Ideas. 
6. Our dialogue 
Having established that I intend to read the dialogue against this 
backdrop, what is the first, immediate follow-up to this argument? The 
answer is the necessary classification of the Sophist within an inter-
linked body of dialogues. 
We are aware that Plato’s writings are bound by no common thread, 
with an important exception: namely, Parmenides, Theaetetus, and the 
first two texts (Sophist and Statesman) of an “unfinished” trilogy that 
was meant to include the unwritten Philosopher. These dialogues have 
a great deal of common elements. 
A. Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman feature the same characters 
and run in a sequence, a unique trait in itself: adjournment is a com-
monplace practice in Platonic dramaturgy, but a promise to rendezvous 
the next day (as in the closing lines of the Theaetetus) has never been 
followed up by an actual meeting (as in the opening of the Sophist). 
B. The dialogues expressly refer to one another. This fact cannot 
be underplayed, not merely for its uniqueness but also because the ci-
tations often seem to have little inner justification and appear “self-
serving”. The fictional encounter in the Parmenides is quoted in the 
Theaetetus, 183 E, and in the Sophist, 217 C; the Theaetetus is re-
corded in the opening of the Sophist, 216 A, and twice in the States-
man, 257 D, 258 A; the Sophist is repeatedly recorded in the States-
man, 257 A, 258 A, 258 B-C, 266 D 5, 284 B 710, 284 C and 286 B. 
C. All these works tie in with Eleaticism, with one key footnote: no 
reference has been made to this school prior to the Parmenides. A “na-
ïve” reading of the Platonic text would suggest either a complete lack of 
                                                     
10 Particularly, this ™n tù sofistÍ seems a cross-reference to a text, not to 
a previous discussion. 
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interest or gross ignorance on the Author’s part; unlikely for a thinker 
who has travelled Italy, knows Gorgias, and has fully grasped the con-
nection between Eleaticism and Sophistry11.On the other hand, if we are 
reasoning in terms of an extremely well-crafted form of writing, intent 
on measuring the information the bare necessities, one understands why 
this school is only introduced formally – starting with the dialogue in 
praise of its master and founder – when the issue of “dialectics” is to be 
made explicit. Eleaticism is recalled later on in Theaetetus but the ar-
gument is conducted along the Heraclitean-Protagorean axis and the 
Eleatic question is “adjourned” (183 C - 184 B). Indeed, a stranger from 
Elea plays the role of master both in the Sophist and the Statesman. 
Then, all falls silent: on the subject of Eleaticism Plato goes from total 
silence to mighty praise in the dialectic works, only for it to sink into 
oblivion anew. 
At this point, if we consider these dialogues as a single bloc, the rea-
sons for their peculiar cross-referencing become clear in the light of that 
unwritten Philosopher, which seems to be the true destination of this 
“Eleatic” development. The Parmenides amounts to a preface, instru-
mental in showing the complexity of Platonic dialectics, which has its 
own early Eleatic origin. Then the Theaetetus sets out the theme of sci-
ence, although dealt with from a chiefly “Socratic” viewpoint; the inter-
locutors consider the outcome far from unsatisfying:  
SOCRATES – But if, Theaetetus, you should ever want to be preg-
nant again of something else after those, and you will become so, 
you will be full of better things for the present investigation, and if 
not, you will be more sober to other men and gentler, because you 
wisely don’t fancy that you know what you don’t know. Indeed, 
                                                     
11 Cf. M. Migliori, La filosofia dei sofisti: un pensiero posteleatico, «An-
nali della Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia dell’Università di Macerata», 33 
(2000), pp. 9-30; Gorgia quale sofista di riferimento di Platone, «Giornale 
di metafisica», NS 21 (1999), pp. 101-126. 
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this is all my skill can do; I can no further go... Tomorrow morn-
ing, Theodorus, let us meet again here (210 B 11 - D 4). 
It appears that, having taken Protagorean relativism apart and 
struck down certain definitions of science – deemed unsatisfactory 
and inadequate – the work done so far would still be highly es-
teemed even without further progress; however, in the event of an 
added treatise its true worth would emerge. Still, one cannot go any 
further with Socrates: this is as far as his art will go. In fact, he 
agrees to meet the next day Theodorus, the man responsible for 
bringing along the Eleatic philosopher who will take them beyond 
Socratism towards the Philosopher. 
While upholding the logical-dramatic scheme of the Parmenides, 
this combination of Eleaticism and Socratism becomes essential in its 
“negative” version for defeating the foe. A philosophy that can beat 
Sophistry can only be framed if the its original instruments are em-
ployed. This requirement is expressed at the very beginning of the 
Sophist, embedded in a paradoxical question by Socrates, who wonders 
whether the Stranger from Elea is not perhaps a god in disguise. Theo-
dorus takes this question seriously, stating that his friend is not of the 
disputatious sort and is not a god at all, but a philosopher (Sophist, 216 
A-C). In this way Plato stresses that Elea yields as many terrible dispu-
tants as great philosophers: both Gorgias and Plato tap into Eleaticism 
with two widely diverging outcomes. 
As evidence of the writing technique we have pointed out before-
hand, our dialogue continues the thrust of the foregoing Theaetetus, al-
beit tacitly. The issue of science is taken up once again, though differ-
ently from the previous discussion, as this time it is an enquiry into the 
figure of the philosopher, which seemingly takes its cue from the fact 
that Theodorus actually refers to the Stranger from Elea as a philoso-
pher twice (Sophist, 216 A-C). In reality this conceals some “trickery” 
as Plato believes science to coincide with dialectic philosophy. Thus the 
enquiry of Theaetetus is pursued, and diairesis is therefore employed to 
distinguish the figure of the philosopher from kindred ones: first one 
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must tell whether sophist, statesman, and philosopher are regarded as 
one and the same or separate figures. Purposefully, the Stranger’s first 
claim is that they are regarded as three distinct figures (Sophist, 217 B), 
and by quite a length. As if to confirm the deep-rooted bond among this 
set of dialogues, Socrates mocks Theodorus at the beginning of the 
Statesman for rating the three issues all at the same value and placing 
them in perfect sequence, as if in an arithmetical ratio (1, 2, 3). Instead 
they are actually three separate concepts that are more detached from 
one another than in an arithmetical ratio (1, 2, 4) (Statesman, 257 A-B). 
At the same time, these terms often overlap and merge: it is no 
accident, then, that as the Sophist progresses we shall come across 
both the Statesman and the Philosopher, just as the Sophist and the 
Philosopher are also encountered in the Statesman12. 
In short, a clear design can be said to emerge from the set of dialogues: 
– after an historically accurate introduction that provides an outstanding ex-
ample of dialectic philosophy (Parmenides) 
– the issue of science is confronted, thereby ousting Protagorean 
relativism (Theaetetus), 
– and the dialectic process is first employed to mark out the Sophist’s 
opposite character (Sophist), 
– then to highlight the features of a character that has much in com-
mon with the Philosopher (Statesman), 
– and, ultimately, to attain the Platonic solution (the unwritten Phi-
losopher)13. 
 
                                                     
12 About the presence of the philosopher in the Statesman, cf. M. Migliori, 
Arte politica e metretica assiologica. Commentario storico-filosofico al 
“Statesman” di Platone, Vita e Pensiero, Milan 1996, pp. 349-354. 
13 About the reasons for not writing this dialogue, cf. Arte..., pp. 369-371. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second Lecture 
The Sophist’s Manifold Nature 
We have already said that this set of dialogues is marked by a com-
mon bond. Even the very existence of the Sophist is only fully grasped 
as from the Theaetetus. In dealing with the figure of the scientist, i.e. 
the philosopher, it is necessary to proceed dialectically. In fact, the sci-
entist must be set apart from other figures by means of a double ma-
noeuvre from those whom it is detached and opposed to, and from 
those whom it is close to and may resemble. Evidently, the diairetic 
process takes effect even before it has been laid out as a theme. 
We find evidence of this just as the enquiry starts to show signs 
of strain: in fact, with regard to the true, not fake, philosophers (216 
C 5-6): 1) some think nothing of them and others can never think 
highly enough; 2) sometimes they appear as statesmen and some-
times as sophists; 3) sometimes they seem no better than madmen. 
As we can see, the distinction surrounding their nature calls at once 
upon the sophist and the statesman. 
1. Introduction to the Diairetic Method 
Let us briefly go over the narrative context of the dialogue. The 
encounter involves a set of characters with markedly different roles. 
Two of them are as important in their own right as they are inconse-
quential to the narrative flow: Socrates, now elderly and nearing his 
sentence, and his dear friend Theodorus, a distinguished mathemati-
cian from Cyrene. The latter is responsible for drawing the other two 
interlocutors into the dialogue.  
Having made his first appearance in the dialogue bearing his 
name, young Theaetetus is set to become one of the greatest mathe-
maticians of his time. He has the same age his friend and future 
Academy master Young Socrates, whose character is quiet in the 
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present and in the foregoing dialogue, but is set to become the 
Stranger’s sole interlocutor in the following dialogue, the Statesman. 
The second character is the mysterious Eleatic visitor, a disciple 
of Parmenides and Zeno (216 A), an unlikely third-generation 
Eleatic heretic. Speaking of him, Theodorus claims he is a true phi-
losopher (216 A 4) and that he is not a god at all, although like all 
philosophers he is divine (216 B 8 - C 1). For this reason he may 
speak of philosophy and thus allow us to further our enquiry on 
episteme. This conceptual context differs radically from the Socratic 
one in Theaetetus, as it is also locked in lively contest with Eleatic 
philosophy whose dialectical framework it nonetheless exploits.  
The problem is presented in a classic Platonic manner, as an issue 
regarding the link between names and things: given that there are three 
names (sophist, statesman, and philosopher) one must establish whether 
there are also three genera (t¦ gšnh, 217 A 7). The issue revolves 
around defining the nature of the sophist, since Socrates claims there is 
understanding about the name. Let us see, then, whether such under-
standing also exists about the thing itself through a logos1. 
We ought always for every subject reach an agreement about the 
thing itself through a definition, and not merely about the name 
without the definition (218 C 4-5). 
The next issue to decide on relates to the method of inquiry, its 
alternatives being the development of a lengthy speech or a dialogue 
with an interlocutor. Significantly, the model evoked for this pur-
pose is the one from the second part of the Parmenides, i.e. the al-
leged dialogue conducted by Parmenides before a much younger 
Socrates (217 C). This reference can help us to grasp a number of 
key factors more easily. 
                                                     
1 Though normally untranslatable, we shall translate this term with “defini-
tion”, but “reasoning” or “explanation” can also apply. 
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First off, the Eleatic master is on no accounts handed the opportu-
nity to develop a Socratic maieutic practice. As extensively laid down 
in the Theaetetus, the specific nature of this method lies in inquiry 
through discussion. 
Secondly, the methods set out here as alternatives do not differ 
that radically: the first one is expressly presented as “talking to one-
self” (aÙtÕj ™pˆ sautoà, 217 C) while the second as proceeding by 
the method of question and answer (217 C). Plato clearly believes 
that the dialogue as a method for inquiry does not necessarily imply 
conducting conversations out loud. 
Thirdly, the master from Elea replies consistently with this for-
mulation (217 D - 218 A). He claims to prefer to talk with another 
when he responds pleasantly, otherwise he would rather talk to him-
self (tÕ kaq'aØtÒn, 217 D 2-3). He then goes on to explain himself 
better still. He can either spin out a long soliloquy (kat' ™mautÒn, 
217 E 2) or engage in conversation with another, but feels ashamed 
lest he gives the impression he wants to show off. Yet there would 
be a valid reason for this: regardless of how the matter has been 
framed, the problem will certainly require a very long speech. At the 
same time, he feels that refusing the courteous request of persons 
whose society he is a newcomer to, especially after what Socrates 
has said, may seem rude and worthy of a savage. For this reason the 
question and answer method shall be chosen and young Theaetetus 
should respond. 
Groundbreaking issues are clearly not at stake here, and neither 
are we faced with a clash between sophistic and Socratic methods. 
The choice merely hangs on reasons of “social” opportunity. 
The Stranger suggests starting from the Sophist but, given the 
complexity of the matter, the method to be applied had better be 
tested beforehand on some simple, easier and well known thing, 
such as the angler. This choice is not accidental, though, as the 
opening sequence is akin to the one in the sophist’s first diairesis for 
they are both hunters. 
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The diairesis of the angler is not devoid of interesting elements. 
Plato, for one, claims that productive art includes powers which ma-
terially produce things, along with imitative art, for both cause pre-
viously non-existing things to exist. Plato has thus succeeded in 
drawing our attention to a distinction that is most useful in the way 
the sophist diairesis is actually structured. Indeed, sophistry as imi-
tative art is finally going to appear, in the more philosophically rele-
vant and conclusive diairesis as productive art. 
In that occasion, this passage, along with the definition of pro-
ductive art as an activity that yields new things, will be expressly re-
called (265 B). 
At the start of the diairesis, furthermore, the whole class of knowing 
and learning, along with trade, fighting, and hunting, are placed in the 
sphere of acquisitive art (217 C). Lastly, Plato has already raised the is-
sue he will tackle throughout the dialogue, when he speaks of a transi-
tion from not-being to being. 
Let us now consider the example of the diairesis2 of angling. 
 
   art 
productive acquisitive 
 by exchange by conquest 
    struggling  hunting 
       lifeless  living things 
         on land   in liquid 
             air  water 
             by nets  by strokes 
                at night  by day 
                 from above from below 
 
                                                     
2 To make the trees easier to read, the subsisting diairesis element is in ital-
ics, the discarded one in bold. 
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The outcome of the diairesis is that the angler possesses an ac-
quisitive art: that of acquiring by conquest hunting water animals, 
fishing by strokes in the daytime upwards from below. 
The nature of this diairesis shows that we are talking, at one, of a 
concrete art and the Idea thereof. The distinction here is manifestly 
impossible. Without empirical knowledge, however, this process 
would even be unable to start, yet the point of arrival is a definition 
surrounding an Idea. Besides, Plato draws our attention to one of the 
problems that besets a diairesis, i.e. the limits of language; the text 
itself emphasizes that hunting after lifeless things has no appropriate 
word (220 A). 
Finally, with his repeated emphasis that the attributes stated rep-
resent a mere half of those yielded by the analysis, the Author intro-
duces a set of methodology problems that will be clarified in the 
Statesman, as we shall see in the Fifth Lecture: 
a) that the division must be twofold, insofar as possible; 
b) that the sundered and cast off part must never be forgotten. 
This procedure has not only brought about an understanding of 
the name, but also the logos of the object itself has been suitably 
grasped (221 B 1-2). On this basis, one can move on to the next 
diairesis of the sophist.  
The procedure is made gradually more intricate, though, as we 
come across four variants of the diairetic tree, whence a total of 
seven definitions spring forth. Bearing in mind that Plato’s final 
diairesis is not only new and radically different, but also turns out to 
be dual, one can see how the complexity of the procedure is great, a 
fact that cannot be stressed enough.  
For his part, Plato keeps addressing the complexity of the topic: 
he forthwith speaks of this art as many-sided (223 C), often making 
the point again (226 A; 240 C); this also explains the repeated 
claims about this figure that is so hard to “catch” (218 C-D; 231 C, 
236 D, 241 C, 261 A) yet arouses such wonder (tÕn qaumastÒn, 
225 E 4, 236 D 1). 
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2. The First Three diairesis of the sophist 
The first diairesis (221 C - 223 B) provides us with the first 
definition: the sophist is a hunter after rich young men. 
Sophistry is an acquisitive art that conquers through hunting liv-
ing-land-domestic animals, using persuasion in private, claiming to 
do it for virtue but actually aiming at payment in money.  
This is his diairetic tree: 
 
   art 
productive  acquisitive 
by exchange   by conquest 
    struggling   hunting 
        lifeless  living things 
           in liquid  on land 
                tame   wild 
            by violence  by persuasion 
               in private    in public 
          for recompense   as a gift 
      with pleasure    claims to do it for virtue 
     for maintenance    but aims at payment in money 
      art of flattery    sophistry 
 
In developing this diairesis we have abided by the pace of Pla-
tonic exposition. Notably, if set against the foregoing diairesis, Plato 
appears to have switched the order between animals dwelling in liq-
uid or on land, thus allowing the right-hand line to keep forth. Even 
so, the progression thereafter is not straightforward and does not al-
ways continue in the same direction.  
The problem is that Plato later suggests always taking the part to the 
right (Sophist, 264 E). Rather than being driven by theoretical motives, 
this suggestion rests manifestly on technical and formal grounds. The 
figure above clearly shows that, although the use of italics does provide 
some assistance, the framework is much harder to fathom if any other 
process is pursued.  
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Besides, in this diairesis Plato begins to wake us up to the truth that 
the diairetic process ought to be much more complex in practice. When 
discussing the hunt of tame animals the Stranger outlines several prob-
lems; these include man not being a tame animal or not being hunted. 
Theaetetus obviously puts forward a solution that speeds up the process, 
but it is easy to see that any other answer would have doubtlessly raised 
other different considerations (222 B).  
The truth is that here we encounter a concise summary of a lengthy 
analysis and discussion, which Plato has conducted orally and certainly 
could not render in the dialogue. Anyhow, the first sophist’s definition 
displays a number of negative features, such as his yearning to seize (let 
alone “kill” as in hunting) or his nature as a sham educator, wilfully deceiv-
ing for the sake of material gain from this fraudulent activity. 
The second diairesis (223 C - 224 E) provides us with four defini-
tions that are variants of the sophist merchant and manufacturer of 
cognitions for the soul. Sophistry is an acquisitive art whereby goods 
are exchanged by selling both own products and those of others, taking 
place in the city or trading with another city (wholesaler), and such are 
cognitions for the soul and about virtues. 
 
   art 
productive  acquisitive 
   hunting  exchange 
     of giving selling 
     direct selling  mercantile 
       own products   products of others 
             retailer   wholesaler 
              for the body for the soul 
               pleasantness  cognitions 
                 of other arts  of virtues 
 
The development of this diairesis is far more complicated than this 
scheme suggests, though. First we are told this is the “second” definition 
after the one of the sophist as hunter of rich young men (224 C 9 - E 4), but 
a third definition is made to follow thereafter (tr…ton, 224 D 4), emphasiz-
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ing that products may be exchanged as well as self-made and this is re-
peated twice (224 E). As it is, we are faced with two different steps on the 
same diairetic tree: 
 
5a   direct selling       mercantile 
6a          own products   products of others 
 
5b   direct selling       mercantile 
6b          own products   products of others  
 
These are thus the second and third definition, in Plato’s own 
words. However, he presents three models of trader in the end sum-
mary: 
In the second place, he was a merchant in the cognitions of the 
soul … In the third place, he has turned out to be a direct seller 
of the same sort of cognitions?… Yes; and in the fourth place, 
he sold the cognitions which he himself manufactured (Sophist, 
231 D 5-10). 
It appears, then, that the “second” one is indeed the merchant, 
without distinguishing model A (trading in other people’s products) 
from model B. Moreover, another two models (c and d) are added: 
the third has become the direct seller of other peoples’ notions while 
the fourth is the direct seller of his own products, warranting the 
diagram below:  
 
5c    direct selling        mercantile 
6c own products   products of others  
 
5d    direct selling       mercantile 
6d own products   products of others  
 
It seems then that Plato’s own text contains four variants of the 
same diairetic tree, all arranged in a “wilfully” untidy manner. Still, 
contrary to appearances, all the terms of the variants are laid out, al-
though the reader alone can reconstruct the four models by working 
on the text. 
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Plato may well partake in this “game” as he had forewarned the 
philosopher reader of the scant importance of these variants: 
In the third place, I believe it’s impossible to call by any name 
other than that used just now he who settles down in a city, and 
by purchasing or by making himself some cognitions about 
these items, intends to live by selling them… the part of the ac-
quisitive art which exchanges, by retail or selling own products, 
both ways, whatever the selling of notions about these subjects, 
you will always, evidently, call it sophistry (224 D 4 - E 4). 
It is clear that, in the same diairetic diagram, small adjustments 
may yield different kinds of definitions. 
Also, when we talk about “game”, we are justified by Plato him-
self, for he 
a) ultimately presents us as second definition the one he had yet defined 
as second; 
b) he presents as third and fourth variants he has not previously 
mentioned; 
c) he leaves out the third variant of the first list in the final sum-
mary, which is restricted to the main three models; 
d) but the models are four, and they cannot be otherwise, for the 
reason that the relation is between two couples of intertwined 
terms. 
As for the resulting figure, it is a far more positive sophist than the 
previous one who, as we have seen, was a hunter and a fraudster. There is 
no harm in selling useful products at the right price, quite the opposite. 
Nonetheless, it is a “servile” activity also because this “own production” 
is solely performed with sales in mind. 
Another point of note is that in this diairesis Plato replaces the 
“exchange-conquest” pair presented in the first diairesis with the 
immediate pair “hunting-exchange”, using the second term in “fight-
ing-hunting”. These are also signals as to how the diairetic process 
ought to shun pointless formalisms. The modus operandi is some-
what akin to equations: a good teacher, while urging his pupils not 
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to leave out any passages, duly skips the more elementary ones dur-
ing a lecture. Plato himself confirms this to be the case in the 
Statesman, where he draws attention to the techniques of the 
diairetic method and the pitfalls of an exceedingly hasty process: 
STRANGER – We had better not cut off a single small part from 
many larger parts nor act without reference to Ideas, but the part 
should be also an Idea. To separate off at once the subject of in-
vestigation, it is fine if only this separation is rightly made; and 
just before you thought you were right and hurried the steps, be-
cause you saw that you would come to man. But chip off too 
small a piece, my friend, is an unsafe procedure; it is safer to cut 
through the middle; which is also the more likely way of finding 
Ideas, that is the principle in our philosophical enquiry. (States-
man, 262 A 8 - C 1). 
Also in this case we are clearly confronted with technical advice, 
aimed at preventing senseless risks of error. 
The third diairesis (224 E - 226 A) provides us with the sixth 
definition (fifth in the final summary, though, for we know Plato to 
skip one): the sophist is an eristic. Sophistry is an acquisitive art of 
conquest that, by struggling fought in controversies and carrying out 
disputations about justice and injustice in private and with Eristic 
art, yields monetary gain. 
 
   art 
productive  acquisitive 
  by exchange  by conquest 
     struggling    hunting 
  competition  fight 
     violent  controversy 
       forensic   disputation (in private) 
  about many subjects informally about justice / injustice (eristic) 
            chatting           sophistry 
 
The difference is that, while “chatting” affects all subjects and is done 
for pleasure, wasting time and money, this sophistry takes an interest in 
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private disputations, deriving great wealth from them. Two things are em-
phasized here: on the one hand the skilfulness, itself amplified throughout 
the diairetic proceedings in the prominence awarded to the possessor of 
Eristic techniques, who is juxtaposed to those lacking them (225 C); on the 
other hand is the issue of money-making, further heightened in the wording 
of the definition that sets off from this very point (226 A). 
One must draw attention to the Author’s expository learning, for 
he separates the two diaireses “by conquest” (the 1st and 3rd) with 
one of exchange, so as also to underscore its distance. In fact, not-
withstanding the money-making, the first sophist is an “educator”, 
this one is a kind of antilogy expert who, rather than practicing in 
courts of law, favours private disputations, handling fundamental is-
sues such as justice and injustice. 
3. The Fourth Diairesis 
The fourth diairesis (226 B - 231 B) provides us with the sev-
enth definition: a sophist of noble stock, purifier of the soul. But we 
cannot place it along with the others sequentially. 
It is fair to say that all evidence indicates that Plato seeks to steer 
us towards another frame of reference. Indeed the Stranger begins 
by quoting a proverb to say that this “many-sided animal” cannot be 
caught with one hand only. Yet, if it is to be caught, another track 
must be tried in its pursuit (226 A-B). It is clear that the object here 
is not the same as with the foregoing diaireses: another hand is re-
quired; there is a likeness to be found.  
Another factor supports this break: the fourth diairesis is very 
long, taking up the same space as the other four put together. If this 
factor alone does not make it the most important, it is certainly the 
one that concerns the Author most. Indeed, the diairesis opens with 
a sunagogè, an example that groups sundry activities together, 
seemingly different but with a common feature: they are all exam-
ples of the art of distinguishing. And it is this factor from which the 
diairetic model sets off, not from art as in the other diaireses. 
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            art of distinguishing 
 the good from the wicked (purification)      like from like 
the body         the soul 
     for evil chastisement   for ignorance teaching 
             education      instruction 
   for whom supposes that he knows      of handicraft arts 
admonition          refutation 
 
Here, Plato also explains through a parallel body-soul reflection 
that disease is a kind of disagreement occurring in kindred elements, 
whereas ugliness as a class – unique class, it is emphasized – is a 
lack of measure and a deformity. 
Indeed, in the souls of bad men all opinions, desires, pleasures, 
angers, and reason are always in contrast whilst the Stranger be-
lieves that they are necessarily akin (228 A-B). In this picture, igno-
rance amounts to an “involuntary” want of measure, as the mind is 
bent on truth but misses its mark, so it appears ugly, ungainly, and 
lacking in measure. Instead, intemperance and vices are akin to a 
disease of the soul (228 C-E). 
The main thing, though, is that we are here presented with an art 
which seems not to fit into the pattern outlined so far, to the extent 
that we are hard pushed to state clearly if it belongs to the acquisi-
tive or productive art. Actually, one simply needs to go back to the 
idea of “transition from not-being to being” seen in the angler’s 
diairesis (219 B) to understand that it is a productive art3. This con-
clusion, however, must be attained by the reader himself through his 
own reasoning, as the text makes no reference to it. The reason for 
                                                     
3 In the light of the clarifications made in the first diairesis in the Statesman 
(258 B - 260 B), perhaps it had better be placed in the diairesis of critical 
theoretical science. This is merely a thought as to what is “possible”, 
though, which we cannot develop here. 
SOPHIST’S MANIFOLD NATURE  
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
 
41
this will become clear after the last diairesis, where we shall witness 
shortly how the productive art become that of reference. 
Meanwhile, the distinctiveness of this odd strain of sophist ap-
pears somewhat flaunted: this character tackles the decisive kind of 
ignorance: 
this sort of ignorance is separate, large and bad, and may be 
weighed up against all other sorts… to suppose knowing some-
thing that is not known (229 C 1-5). 
These sophists 
seem to think that all ignorance is involuntary, and that who 
thinks himself wise will not learn any of those things that he 
supposes to know (230 A 6-8). 
Besides, they employ a method of refutation to handle the matter, 
in the belief that a fatherly warning does not go far enough: 
They ask questions about subjects that a man thinks he is saying 
something but is really saying nothing, then easily test the in-
consistent opinions of these men who are wandering here and 
there; these they then collect by reasoning and comparing them 
to one another, show that they are in contradiction with them-
selves in the same things about the same issues and in the same 
respect. They, seeing this, are angry with themselves and grow 
gentle towards others (230 B 4-9). 
It is noteworthy how this last sentence closely recalls the conclu-
sion in the Theaetetus on Socratic maieutics (210 B 11 - D 4) quoted 
in the First Lecture above. The final assessment is very clear-cut: 
just as physicians consider 
that the body will not receive benefit from taking food until the 
internal obstacles have been removed, so they thought the same 
about the soul. It will not receive benefit from the offered 
knowledge until someone, with a refutation, induces the refuted 
man to feel ashamed and purging him of opinions that hinder the 
learning purifies him and makes him think that he knows only 
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what he knows, and no more… For all these reasons, 
Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and 
more effective kind of purification; and we must think too that 
he who has not been refuted, even if he happened to be the Great 
King himself, being unpurified in the greatest things, is unin-
structed and disgraceful in those things in which he who would 
be truly happy ought to be purest and fairest. (230 C 4 - E 3). 
Further evidence of this character’s oddity can be found when the 
Stranger of Elea is worried of ascribing this purifying art to the 
sophists, lest they are assigned too high a credit. He therefore points 
out that these activities are much kindred, though the likeness is 
reminiscent of that between a wolf and a dog, namely between the 
fiercest and gentlest of animals. Still, great care is called for in this 
sort of comparisons, seemingly tenuous, as likenesses can be mis-
leading (231 A-B). Only with these provisos does the Stranger ac-
cept such a character as the sophist of noble stock (231 B). Unlike 
the previous ones, he indeed seems a true educator, chiefly inter-
ested in elevating the pupil’s soul and laying down the conditions 
for the attainment of knowledge and virtue, while paying no heed to 
money. 
Dwelling on all these qualms and reservations has shaped a 
Sophist figure whose features are distinctly chiselled out, namely: 
 
– he is an educator who deals with knowledge; 
– he believes firmly that ignorance is involuntary; 
– he shows pupils their own limits; 
– he brings out the contradictions in their own statements, 
– so as to purify them with the discovery of their own “not knowledge” 
– thus making them more demanding of themselves 
– and more understanding of others. 
 
All this cannot but bring Socrates to mind. 
On the strength of its “painful” nature, this presence must lead us 
to think that Plato knew he could not avoid this positive and celebra-
tory reference to his master, friend and truly disinterested educator. 
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We have found only one reason to explain this “necessity”: in this 
first section the Author seeks to present a somewhat exhaustive clas-
sification of the sophists operating in his day. 
We may then assume that for his contemporaries every one of these 
figures had to correspond to a distinct character. Nonetheless, given the 
dearth of our sources, this kind of name game is downright hazardous 
for us, if not impossible4. 
Were this argument, quite legitimately, rejected, one should then 
undertake to identify the reasons that led Plato to deploy an “odd soph-
ist” such as Socrates. 
If it is accepted, however, this passage can be seen as evidence of the 
Author’s fairness: driven by his will to recreate the “types” of sophist, he 
cannot earnestly leave his master out. At the same time, in an attempt to 
steer clear of any confusion that would have been unbearable to him, he 
repeatedly underlines (again, in the final summary in 231 E) the problems 
this odd presence evokes: from the wolf and dog comparison, via the op-
position of functions, to the diversity of the diairesis, everything points at 
the need to set apart this character from the previous ones. 
Finally, as evidence of the absolute anomaly of this subject, 
when shortly before the last diairesis Plato recalls the previous ones 
belonging to the acquisitive art, only the hunter, the fighter and the 
merchant (265 A) are cited. 
There is one last, important observation to be made. We have 
omitted from the diairesis a number of passages that have little bear-
                                                     
4 For instance, I used to believe (quite wrongly) that Hippias might be among 
those importing and selling all kinds of wares; now I am quite sure it is Prota-
goras, since a practically identical definition is found in the dialogue bearing 
the same name (313 C-E). As for the first subject, it could be Prodicus, notori-
ous for his greed (Philostratus, Vitae Sophistarum, I, 12, DK 84, A 2; Greater 
Hippias, 282 C; Cratylus, 384 B). It is clear, though, that the terms of reference 
are too weak for us to construe verifiable theories thereupon.  
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ing with the sophist, and deal more with the need to tell soul and 
body apart 
 
            the body 
      animate           inanimate 
  inward      outward     bathing  adornment 
ugliness  disease    arts of bath-keeping 
gymnastic  medicine 
 
A first reading shows that a well-structured diairesis cannot be 
constructed by relying on the instructions in the text. This may not 
amount to a problem since the references to the body are subordi-
nate to the main explanation, the one regarding the purification of 
the soul. 
More importantly, Plato already states here that the separation 
need not always be twofold. Indeed, the many purifications of the 
body are grouped together under one name (226 E) and then the 
names of the variety of techniques relating to bathing and those of 
inanimate bodies are withheld (227 A). 
This case is not alone. Also with regard to the forms of education, 
they are said to be of many kinds and only the two main ones are 
quoted (229 B). Furthermore, when speaking of vices (228 E), three are 
mentioned: cowardice, intemperance, and injustice (which are later 
joined by haughtiness in 229 A); ignorance too is also said to be of 
many guises (228 E). Actually, this point had arisen earlier still, steeped 
in the long array of examples Plato often submits in the more ramified 
passages of the diairesis: at the very beginning, when speaking of the 
productive art, he groups together agriculture, any art tending to the 
body, the arts of constructing artificial objects, and the art of imitation 
(219 A-B). 
That a diairesis may not always necessarily be dichotomic can also 
be inferred from the long list of activities constituting the unique art of 
distinguishing (226 B). This is expressly stated later, when the topic of 
the art of disputation informally is approached, recognized as being di-
vided in many small parts and taking various shapes (225 C). In short, 
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Plato already hints at a methodical aspect that he will later manifest in 
the Statesman, as we shall see in the Fifth lecture. 
Ultimately, we also find methodological instructions: this process 
aims to grasp what is and not kindred in the arts and disregards other 
elements, such as ridicule for example (227 A-B). 
4. The “final” diairesis  
After such a painful admission, Plato shows he has completed his 
“roll call” of the sophists of his day, highlighting this with a sum-
mary of six forms of sophistry and with a departure from the direct 
diairetic form in favour of a clear statement of the problems ahead. 
The procedure undergoes changes, too: the development is no 
longer done by defining and classifying, but point-by-point and also 
somewhat tortuous. We are approaching the fundamental issue – 
which must evidently be illustrated, understood and then resolved – 
ultimately to bring about a diairesis and a conclusive definition that 
is radically different from the previous ones. 
After a lengthy treatise that we will address in the next two Lec-
tures, in the end the fifth diairesis (264 B - 268 D) provides us with 
the eighth definition: the sophist is a conscious dissembler. Sophis-
try is a human productive art, which produces apparent images us-
ing the body, mimetic art based on opinion, work of a conscious dis-
sembler who operates privately with debates.  
 
   art 
acquisitive  productive 
   divine   human 
      things imagines 
       likeness  appearances 
     through instruments through body (mimetic) 
       with scientific knowledge  with opinion 
            of a simple imitator  of a dissembler 
                  demagogue   sophist 
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The demagogue dissembles in public in long speeches, while the 
sophist makes conversations in private. 
In this diairesis Plato gives us robust evidence as to the complexity 
of all diairetic processes, which cannot always necessarily be traced 
back to a simple twofold division. Indeed, having divided productive 
activity into human and divine, he claims another twofold classification 
is needed before any more ground is covered. Thus a vertical division is 
added to the lateral one already made, such that both species (human 
and divine) are evenly cleft (265 E - 266 A). The outcome of this opera-
tion may be summed up graphically with a cross-like model: 
 
things 
human       divine 
imagines 
It should be noticed that Plato himself is responsible for compli-
cating the model in such way, maintaining that in his model there is 
a twin division of productive art (266 B). In all fairness, nothing 
seemed to stop him from proceeding in a more basic and straight-
forward manner, separating the diairesis in the traditional manner. 
 
       art 
 acquisitive    productive 
      divine      human 
    things  imagines  things  imagines 
 
Yet, had this pattern been adopted, firstly, he would have been 
unable to utter indications as to the method, and, more importantly, 
the interweaving of divine and human activities would have been 
lost. Plato is very keen on this latter aspect, though, inasmuch as it 
drives him to make examples quoting dreams and freakish optical 
phenomena (266 B-C). 
Nonetheless, this diairesis is utterly different from the earlier ones, 
first of all because a productive art is identified. Plato displays this 
breakaway, without expressly laying it out as a theme, because, for no 
apparent reason, first he recalls that previous diaireses were peculiar to 
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acquisitive art, then he says that productive art must now be separated 
since imitation is a form of production (265 A-B). This is all the more 
important because, if we accept this definition of productive sciences as 
causing “not previously existing” things to exist, we are faced with two 
outcomes: 
1. this type of sophistry, being radically detached from the forms 
submitted in the phenomenological-descriptive cadre made up by 
the first three diaireses, is of a kind that the philosopher only is ca-
pable of expressing after a long theoretical treatise; yet it gives rise 
to something new, thus it is “useful”, albeit as a negative occur-
rence, which philosophy must measure itself against;  
2. this is all the more true since philosophy itself falls into this 
classification of productive arts and sciences. Plato himself 
bears this out somehow: in the final reiteration of the diairesis 
he unexpectedly stresses that this sophistry imitates the art of 
raising contradictions, being a convoluted expression wherein 
dialectic, i.e. philosophy itself, can be sighted (268 C). 
In fact the Author does stress that we are operating in a very serious 
environment. The evidence for this is that a parallel has been drawn 
with the analogous divine capacity. Moreover, it should not be for-
gotten that a distinction is made between imitation with science and 
imitation with opinion (267 E 1-2). 
All this confirms the sense and value of this diairesis when set against 
the three foregoing ones5. As we have said before, the first ones possess an 
eminently descriptive feature, inasmuch as they mirror the image of how 
sophistry has been historically perceived, amounting to a kind of self-
consciousness of sophistry itself. In this sense, far from producing any-
thing, sophists can be said to have had a technical role at best: they have 
                                                     
5 I maintain they are three because the “socratic” one must be kept well 
apart: if the sophist is a conscious dissembler, that sophist of noble stock 
whose aim is to purify certainly falls outside the scope of this definition. 
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circulated a number of ideas concerning virtue commercially. But this im-
age cannot satisfy the philosopher. The shift to the new, different diairesis, 
in actual fact, takes place when the Stranger raises a classic “Platonic” 
problem: since the sophist is identified by different notions, he should ei-
ther be given many and sundry names or a common element containing all 
the different definitions should be found. 
A research of this kind is typically a philosophical one, all the more so 
in this case. The unifying element is soon established and is based on the 
assertion that, as the sophist claims to have the power of disputing of all 
things (232 E), he clearly has only an apparent art and not the truth (233 C-
D).When a man says he knows all things and can teach them to others at a 
small cost, in actual fact he possesses a purely imitative art, he is an en-
chanter and a worker of wonders (234 A - 235 A). Yet, before the sophist 
can be dislodged and this definition pinned upon him, a grave philosophi-
cal problem needs to be addressed first: that of falsehood and not being. 
Only once the Eleatic position has been overcome, for it always provides 
the sophist with a loophole, will it be possible to frame a definition of the 
conscious dissembler that is theoretically sound and well-grounded. 
Hence we can say that this “other” definition, hailed by both the Stranger 
and Theaetetus in the closing lines of the Sophist (268 C-D) and subtly but 
clearly upheld by Socrates and Theodorus in the opening passages of the 
Statesman (257 A), may only be truly attained by the philosopher. 
As evidence of Plato’s downright unusual communication tech-
nique, neither in this case does he miss a chance to “game” with the 
reader. This diairesis, in fact, ultimately presents us with two expressly 
cited figures: the demagogue and the sophist. The “game” is that they 
are both “sophist” characters, since the former is none other than the 
Political sophist outlined far more precisely and powerfully in the 
Statesman. At any rate, more on this in the Fifth Lecture. 
5. Annotations 
I would like to go back to a number of elements contained in the 
passages we have examined, illustrating above all how Plato repeatedly 
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draws our attention to the shortcomings of the terms, and thus to the in-
herent weakness of the names. 
As early as the angler’s diairesis, hunting after lifeless things is said to 
have no appropriate word (220 A), then a hitch is recorded about the 
hunting by nets and by strokes, and Theaetetus says not to bother with 
names (220 D). In the second diairesis the two arts dealing with the sale 
of products for the soul are said to have ridiculous names (224 B); more-
over, in the third diairesis the art of disputation informally is wilfully left 
without a name (225 C); ditto for the art of distinguishing like from like, 
which is acknowledged as having no name (226 D). Once again, the 
many names for the arts of adorning inanimate bodies are deemed ridicu-
lous (227 A). 
The Stranger goes as far as to say that, from the point of view of dia-
lectic it is irrelevant what names are given to the many arts of purification 
for animate and inanimate bodies: what matters is for purification of the 
soul to be distinguished from other forms of purification (227 B-C). Fi-
nally, even in the final diairesis, first we witness that someone else is 
lumbered with the task of “making a class” and giving a fitting name to 
the art which produces appearances through instruments (267 A-B). Then 
the ancient predecessors are berated for their idleness, which prevented 
them from making clear distinctions. This, in turn, has begotten a certain 
dearth of names, as exemplified by the trickiness of designating imitation 
with opinion and imitation with science (267 D-E)6. 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 All this constitutes the backdrop to the all-round judgment expressed in the 
Seventh Letter. With regard to the use of names – a first step on the stairway to 
science (342 A-B) – Plato underlines both their instability and utterly acciden-
tal nature (343 A-B), which causes all discourse based on mere names to be 
built on shaky foundations indeed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third Lecture 
The driving force of Plato’s Philosophy 
 
It is normally held that it is ontology which is at the heart of the 
Platonic philosophy which emerges from the Sophist. Here we shall 
endeavour to show that such a heart is explicitly located elsewhere 
by the very words of the Stranger of Elea. 
As we have already indicated in the previous Lecture, following 
the summary which in some way closes the series of the first diaire-
ses (231 C-E), Plato presents us with a new point of departure of a 
sort which is initially introduced without diaireses, neither in law 
nor in fact. Instead a line of reasoning is developed which (and Pro-
tagoras is quoted in this long section), by defining the unifying ele-
ment in the various activities of the sophist in the art of disputing of 
all things, allows us to come to an immediate conclusion: namely, 
such a technique is devoid of real depth, and only rich in apparent 
knowledge (232 D). 
Plato’s objection to this is less naive than it might appear. He 
does not deny that one may learn to dispute everything, with an ex-
pert too, but excludes that this may be done on a “scientific” plane, 
as he indeed affirms (233 A 5-6): 
But how can anyone who is in himself ignorant contradict he 
who knows, saying something valuable ? 
This affirmation renders explicit the basic reason for the Platonic 
rejection of this practice which would be permissible only if one 
knew everything, which is impossible. In this respect, it may imme-
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diately be made clear that theirs is only an apparent science and not 
a real one1: 
Exactly; and what we now have said is probably the best thing 
that has been said about them (233 D 1-2). 
The wonder is how these people manage to engender in the young 
the conviction of knowing everything and being wiser than everybody 
else. Otherwise, they would not be able to get paid by their pupils (233 
A-B). Yet, to an intelligent young man, it ought straight away to seem 
incredible that they claim to teach everything about all things and, what 
is more, in a short time and charging so little with regards to the prom-
ised results. Obviously it is a joke (234 A). 
Thus, via the joke, it is a short step to that art which can truly hope 
to do and produce everything, and requires great ability – the mimetic 
art. In order to explain it, there is the example of the painter who really 
does produce everything, but in images, and can even make naive 
youngsters believe that a picture seen from afar is reality. Likewise, the 
sophist, by bewitching them with words, succeeds in deceiving young 
people who are still far from the truth, and in showing images of every-
thing based on words in such a way as to seem true, and to appear 
knowledgeable about everything himself. Then, obviously, the facts 
will demonstrate to the young when they become adults that things are 
not as they had been led to believe (234 B-E). 
We are then looking at a mimetic joke, like that of a conjuror 
(tîn go»twn ™st… tij, 235 A 1), a kind of conjuror and imitator 
(gÒhta mn d¾ kaˆ mimht¾n, 235 A 8), which imitates what is true and 
real (mimht¾j ín tîn Ôntwn, 235 A 1), which belongs to a class of 
game (tîn tÁj paidi©j metecÒntwn, 235 A 6), and needs to be classi-
                                                     
1 It should not go unnoticed that this confirms the haughtiness of the sev-
enth kind of “sophist”, the one who cleanses from the presumption of 
knowledge.  
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fied among the “wonder workers” (toà tîn qaumatopoiîn tij eŒj, 
235 B 5-6). 
It would be necessary then to proceed to the diairesis of imitative 
art, as has been done previously, for 
neither this one nor any other class shall ever boast of having es-
caped the method of those who are able to inquire into both each 
individual thing and all (235 C 4-6).  
In effect, one can make a division of imitative art, but the 
Stranger himself declares that he does not know in which of the two 
divisions the sophist should be placed, whether in that of one who 
produces an exact copy of the object, or in that which creates the 
appearance, in the sense that it causes a thing to appear in an appro-
priate fashion precisely because it does not do so exactly. Here the 
sophist's’ strength emerges for the first time, as he has taken refuge 
in a class which is extremely difficult to explore (236 D). This is 
immediately corroborated by revealing the basic theoretical reason: 
My dear friend, we are certainly engaged in a very difficult in-
quiry; for how a thing can appear and seem but not be, how a 
thing can appear and seem but not be, how a man can say a thing 
which is not the truth, all that has always set many problems, in 
the past as in the present. How must one speak to say or think that 
falsehood really exists, and avoiding c contradiction saying this 
sentence, Theaetetus, this task is a difficult one... This sentence 
has ventured to assume that “not-being” is, for otherwise false-
hood would not come into being (236 D 9 - 237 A 4). 
Therefore, the problem ties in with the position of Parmenides, 
quoted here, and his denial of not-being 2. 
                                                     
2 Nevertheless, in confirmation of the argument that Plato is “playing”, a passage 
is cited in which the difficulty (or the impossibility, even) of avoiding the aporia 
clearly emerges: here, the Goddess says that one ought to shun the path of re-
search wherein “are the things that are not”, enai m¾ ™Ònta. As one can see the 
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There follows an introduction to his reflection on being and non-
being, which will be the subject of the next Lecture. We now want 
to recall attention to the fact that, at a certain point, 242 B, Plato 
presents a long digression (or so it appears) right at the point of ask-
ing how to commence the research. For this reason the Stranger calls 
for an analysis of the antecedent positions. 
1. An Introduction to the Presocratics (242 C - 243 C) 
It is necessary to recommence from Parmenides and the 
Presocratics in order to put them to the test, inasmuch 
each one appears to me to narrate some kind of myth, as if we 
were children (243 C 8-9). 
Indeed, all it takes to expose their inconclusiveness is to run through 
the sundry positions: one3 draws together three beings – at times jarring, 
at others fitting; another draws two together – dry and humid or hot and 
cold – and they fit neatly; while the “Eleatic Family” (a lovely expres-
sion denoting the existence, not of a school, but of a common mental at-
titude prior even to Xenophanes) unites all in one. 
In a final, definitive confirmation of an eminently theoretical re-
construction of the historical picture, Plato quotes certain Ionic and 
later Sicilian Muses, namely Heraclitus and Empedocles, who in-
terweave the two positions, so that being is both one and multiple, 
both united and divided by Love and Hate: in his opinion, the most 
rigorous is Heraclitus (242 E), of whom he offers a paraphrase of 
fragment 10: “accord always via discord”. 
                                                     
crime of assigning a positive predicate to the negative one has been committed, 
and this should have been avoided. 
3 Given the elements to our knowledge, I believe these philosophers are 
unlikely to be identified; by withholding the names, Plato himself must 
have considered this information of secondary importance after all. 
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All are to be respected, but it must be emphasised they have failed to 
show respect for their readers, in as far as they haughtily bring their rea-
soning to a close whilst sparing themselves the trouble of adequately 
clarifying the terms used. Thus, the Stranger, who also believed in his 
youth he had grasped the meaning of the discourse on not-being, finds 
himself once again in an awkward situation. It may be, then, that being 
could also undergo similar trouble, though not evident right away, 
while the problem with not-being is quite clear (243 B-C). 
In this way, Plato has managed to place the reflection on not-being 
in a sphere that belongs not to a logical-terminological but to a “meta-
physical” reflection. Such intention is stated outright in the text: 
Many problems we shall examine after this, if it seems good, 
but now we must consider the first and greatest of them (243 
C 10 - D 2). 
2. The Fundamental Problem (243 C - 245 E) 
The nature of this fundamental problem is, seemingly4, simple to de-
termine: 
You clearly think that we must first consider the ‘being’. (tÕ ×n) 
(243 D 3-4). 
The Stranger suggests asking all those who uphold a dual princi-
pal, such as hot and cold, what this “being” signifies for them5. In-
deed, he rolls two problems into one question: when they say that 
both “are” and each one “is” 
                                                     
4 The fact is that the term “being” is particularly ambiguous as it can either 
mean “being” as a specific concept and “reality” in general, namely that 
sweeping category wherein all is contained, and whose nature is defined by 
something else. This is the underlying issue and must be borne in mind to 
avoid gross error. 
5 243 E 2, tÕ enai toàto; the question will be submitted again, using Ôn 
(243 E 8, 244 A 6, 244 B 11), tÕ Ôn (244 B 7). 
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- do they mean that being is something else other than the two pro-
pounded principles? In this case the all would turn out to be con-
stituted of three principles and not two; 
- indeed (243 E 4, g£r), if the two terms are both qualified as “be-
ing”, they cannot be described as two but only one anyway. 
It must be made clear that Plato is posing two questions here. We 
need not be misled by the use of “indeed”, for it explains why the plu-
ralistic principle is prevalent in those who do not belong to the “Eleatic 
Family”. In the first case, the two terms become three and we thus have 
a kind of outburst of pluralism; in the second case the two principles are 
traced back to a monist position. 
That such is the case the text in itself is proof: indeed, the Stranger 
from Elea maintains that the question must be legitimately posed both 
to the pluralists and to the monists (244 B). In other words, to those 
who multiply the terms of reference as well as to those who trace them 
back to oneness. Besides, the second passage is justified in so far as the 
argument will mainly concern the “monist” position (243 E-244 A), 
which is thus immediately brought to the fore. 
A note on Parmenides 
There is a second and very interesting reason, which can justify this 
heightened attention on the pluralists: the objection raised here fits very 
well, that is to say it is a theoretically winning argument, against the Par-
menidean doxa, which one can suitably apply inasmuch as it is easy only 
for Parmenides to affirm that the sole possible predication is that both are 
and are alone. This point escapes most commentators for they do not see 
that, as Reale rightly observes, there is a kind of “third way” in Par-
menides: his doxa does not expound the pure not-being but submits a 
plausible view of appearance, condemning the error of mortals who have 
admitted two principles, though regarding one as being and the other as 
not-being: «Mortals have thus made the mistake of failing to grasp that 
the two forms are hardwired into a higher and necessary oneness, that is 
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the oneness of being»6. In what sense, then, can the two terms, in that 
they are and are alone, be said to be “two”?7 
Lastly, even though the Platonic argumentation is more widely 
applicable, it seems to go against this anomalous and improbable 
“pluralistic” attempt to uphold monism, which this position inexora-
bly goes back to. That such is the case appears both confirmed and 
made clear in the discussion that follows. 
The all, the whole and the parts 
It must be understood, then, what is meant by this word “being”. 
The monists are addressed here, those who argue that one thing 
alone is, and that something is being (×n, 244 B 1). The obvious 
question is if this “Being One’’ is one or two things. The first obser-
vation, off the cuff, is that the answer is not easy for them (244 C-D) 
- because applying two different names while affirming that the 
thing is one is ridiculous; 
- because the name itself is something for which duality is implied 
in the same moment it is given; 
- because a name cannot be said to be identified with a thing, otherwise 
it is either the name of nothing or just the name of a name. 
Clearly, the treatment is actually anti-Eleatic and highlights how 
such a theoretical position may express an inconsistent monism, not 
                                                     
6 G. Reale, Storia della filosofia antica, 5 voll., Vita e Pensiero, Milan 
1975-1980, numerous editions, 19929, I, p. 129. 
7 That such is the state of things is also confirmed in a number of otherwise 
ambiguous Aristotelian passages. One example for all: Metaphysics, A, 
wherein the Stagirite first recalls how Parmenides refused to accept a not-being 
alongside being (5, 286 b 28-30), then, having come round to acknowledging 
phenomena, he lay down two causes and two principles (986 b 30-34); what 
follows thereafter is the misconstruction of this position (one term would gain 
the function of being and the other of not-being) that undoubtedly owes to a 
theoretical interpretation. 
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only because two names (being and one) are brought into play, but 
simply for having to give a name to reality. 
The “one” theme takes on such a leading role that it later allow Plato’s 
attack to become more direct and more relevant theoretically aided by a 
typically Platonic topic: the relationship between one and whole, and the 
co-related problem all-parts. This fact is particularly noteworthy as the 
Stranger suddenly asks a question that is almost a “red herring”: 
Shall they say that the whole is other than “being one” (tÕ Ólon 
›teron toà Ôntoj ˜nÕj), or the same with it? (244 D 14-15). 
It addresses a theme which the Author has drawn much attention 
upon in the Parmenides and the Theaetetus. As I am unable to 
broach these issues here, for this would break the flow of the analy-
sis of this text, any further reference to these other two dialogues is 
dealt with in Appendix I. 
The identity between the two terms, and the fact that this being-
one is a whole, means the whole (Ólon) can be tackled head on. The 
attack is then more clearly directed at Parmenides, whose passage 
from fragment 8 on the “Sphere” is recalled and much criticized. 
The Sphere has parts; what is divided into parts can surely partake 
of the One in all its components. For this reason, it can be both an 
all (p©n) and a whole (Ólon); thus it is one, but it cannot be the One 
in itself, which cannot have parts (244 E - 245 A). Hence, if the 
Eleatic One is a Sphere, it is not the One in itself. 
Having thus extended the discourse to the parts, one may ask the deci-
sive question on being-one, in its relationship with the one, the being, the 
all, the whole. As this passage is crucial, we shall analyse it piecemeal. 
 
1. The question (245 B 4-10) 
STRANGER – Then shall we say that being, which is affected by 
One, is both one and whole, or we must not say at all that being 
is a whole? 
THEAETETUS – You have put forward a difficult choice. 
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STRANGER – Indeed you speak most truly; if being having been 
affected is one in any way, appears not the same as the one, and 
the all (t¦ p£nta) will be more than one. 
THEAETETUS – Yes. 
The question is very straightforward: can the being that partakes 
of the one, understood as a whole, to be one and whole8? The query 
may seem odd for Plato had claimed only a few lines earlier:  
nothing prevents that which is divided in parts suffers the 
One’s action in all its parts and in this way, being an all and a 
whole, may be one (245 A 1-3). 
Some variations apply but the question remains unchanged; even 
though this sentence seems to imply that the all is a whole and also one, 
in that it partakes of the one. Now, conversely, the issue is taken up once 
again, assuming that this one is also multiple, and turning the question of 
the whole into a problem. Hence, the all is one and many, while the being 
(understood as the reality) is one-many, a unified multiplicity. 
But is it necessarily a whole, too? Plato puts forward a series of 
arguments to demonstrate that it is impossible to claim the opposite. 
 
                                                     
8 As one can see, the terms to be deployed are three and not two, as is often the 
case; on this, see for instance the treatise by G. Sasso, L’essere e le differenze, Sul 
“Sofista” di Platone, pp. 57 ff., above all pp. 62-63; by failing to grasp the differ-
ence between sum of the parts and whole, and therefore between a total of parts 
“abstractly” lacking true unity and a “whole” that is truly unified by a principle of 
order, he believes that the being all already implies partaking of the One. The up-
shot being that the difference in wording which Plato showed such keenness for, 
as we shall also see in Appendix I, has been lost. Perhaps this depends on the type 
of approach adopted by the author, which is overtly theoretical (see p. 7), and 
therefore causes him to express surprise that Plato does not “establish” «the con-
cept of all as “total of parts”, as “unity of parts”, as an organic “interweaving” 
thereof» (p. 64). Yet the very reference to the “organic” should allow the differ-
ence to arise between a corpse (total of parts) and a living body (endowed with an 
organic principle of order). 
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2.1. First argument against the separation of being and whole (245 C 1-7). 
STRANGER – And if being is not a whole, through having been 
affected by this, but the whole itself exists, being lacks some-
thing of itself. 
THEAETETUS – Certainly. 
STRANGER – Upon this argument, being, deprived of itself, 
will not be being. 
THEAETETUS – True. 
If the being is not whole and the whole is, the being is not really 
existent because it lacks the wholeness that is. 
 
2.2. Second argument (245 C 8-9). 
This argument takes up the foregoing premise, the separation be-
tween being and whole, applying it to the all, which no longer 
emerges as one. Not in the one-many sense, though, but in the sense 
that we would be confronting two different and mutually incommu-
nicating realities. The first one shaped by the fact of being, the sec-
ond marked by the concept of wholeness: 
STRANGER – And, again, the all becomes more than one, for be-
ing and the whole have each separately their own nature. 
THEAETETUS – Yes. 
 
2.3. Third argument (245 C 11 - D 2). 
This one starts off with the outright negation of the whole, thus 
affecting the being and the becoming: 
STRANGER – Besides, if the whole does not exist at all, these 
things themselves come into being and this, besides not being, 
could never become being. 
THEAETETUS – Why so? 
STRANGER – That which becomes always becomes as a whole, 
so that he who does not put the whole among the existing things, 
cannot speak neither being nor becoming as existing. 
THEAETETUS – Yes, that certainly seem to be true. 
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First of all, it is emphasised that, whereas realities belong to the be-
ing, if whole is not then it must follow that, ultimately, the being is not. 
Secondly, the becoming is also dismissed. In a nutshell, once the whole 
is removed, being and generation also fall away: what becomes does so 
as a whole, so if the whole is not existent, neither are being and genera-
tion. The pivotal function of the concept of whole and, consequently, 
of the whole-parts game, as a necessary pre-condition for the admis-
sibility of some sort of ontology must not be underestimated, espe-
cially if it is placed in relation to those principles cited early on in 
the Timaeus: 
Thus this concisely is my thought, by my opinion. There were 
three separate things, being and space and generation, also be-
fore the generation of the heaven (52 D 2-4)9. 
Evidently, the whole-parts game comes prior to these “first elements”. 
One might further add an irrelevant observation for the current 
treatise, in as much as it is affirmed that the not-whole (tÕ m¾ Ólon, 
245 D 8) cannot just be any quantity, as it would amount to the 
whole of that quantity. This means that what is set against the whole 
as the dimension which has influence on ontology itself must be in-
definite. One’s thoughts immediately turn to the many references to 
the Non-one (as radically opposed to the One) throughout the Par-
menides10, in the conversations between Peras and Apeiron in the 
                                                     
9 On this point, please refer to our Ontologia e materia. Un confronto tra il 
Timeo di Platone e il De Generatione et corruptione di Aristotele, in Gigan-
tomachia, Convergenze e divergenze tra Platone e Aristotele, edited by M. 
Migliori, Morcelliana, Brescia 2002, pp. 35-104; the analysis of the Timaeus 
has been taken up and developed in Il problema della generazione nel 
Timeo, in Plato Physicus, Cosmologia e antropologia nel Timeo, edited by 
C. Natali and S. Maso, Adolf M. Hakkert, Amsterdam 2003, pp. 97-120. 
10 See our analysis in Dialettica e verità. Commentario filosofico al "Parmenide" 
di Platone, Vita e Pensiero, Milan 1990, 20002, pp. 463-466. 
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Philebus11, and to all the indirect testimonies on the subject of the 
polarity of One – Great-and-Small12. 
At this point the Platonic analysis comes to a halt. This is a con-
scious choice on the Author’s part, in so far as he states that both the 
dualistic and the monist position are affected by a host of other 
problems. The job is far from done, not all the speakers of being and 
not-being have been lined up for inspection, but let what has been 
said suffice (245 E). 
Early findings 
This incompleteness does yield one piece of data, though. If the be-
ing, tÕ ×n, is the matter under scrutiny, this does not imply that ontol-
ogy is the foundation of reality, in as much as the text clearly states that: 
a) The Eleatic error does not arise simply by applying two con-
cepts, being and one, but from the mere use of a name; Plato 
therefore strikes on the strength of the impossibility of an abso-
lute and consistent monism; 
b) the problem raised immediately thereafter is that of the identity 
between this being-one and the whole; 
c) those realities (i.e. the Sphere) that have parts can be all and whole – 
and therefore one, but not the One in itself, which cannot have parts; 
d) consequently, the being which partakes of the one will be both 
one and many; 
e) furthermore the being is whole, on pain of not being; 
f) if being and whole are sundered, the all would be twofold and no 
longer one; 
                                                     
11 See our analysis on this subject in Arte…, pp. 331-349. 
12 See G. Reale, Per una nuova interpretazione di Platone. Rilettura della 
metafisica dei grandi dialoghi alla luce delle “Dottrine non scritte”, CUSL, 
Milan 1984, new edition passed on to Vita e Pensiero, repeatedly reviewed, ed-
ited and integrated with new indexes, Milan 199110 (“final” version), 199720 (in-
tegrated with several appendixes, new indexes and updates), pp. 214-227. 
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g) if the whole is not, there can be neither being nor generation; 
h) the not-whole must be indefinite. 
In short, it has been demonstrated that the issue of being is intrin-
sically bound to other questions affecting it in a variety of ways. 
Above all, it has been stated that being is one-many and that the di-
mension of the whole affects the ontological dimension. 
3. The Gigantomachy (245 E - 249 D) 
The Stranger claims that the discussion should proceed, confronting 
those who reason in a different way. Actually the interpreter’s stand-
point here changes, as the object of scrutiny shifts from the number of 
principles at stake to their nature. What actually begins now is the gi-
gantomachy between, on the one side, the materialists who identify 
body and being and trace the whole dimension of being back to contact 
and resistance and, on the other, those claiming the existence of eide, 
intelligent and bodiless forms, and place the physical world not in the 
dimension of being but in that of an “ongoing becoming”. A first dis-
tinction between these two positions is thus established; and it is an im-
portant one for, if unchallenged, it will then be subject to relativization 
throughout the argument. It must therefore be understood well. The 
proponents of Ideas take a softer line, while the materialist standpoint is 
more difficult and all but impossible to grasp.  
The materialists (246 D - 248 A) 
The text clarifies from the outset that the mindset of the materialists 
is crude and blinkered; hence it can and must be enhanced in its reason-
ing. In a nutshell, Plato acknowledges that the position under discussion 
now is not the current one historically, but one better adjusted to ensure 
the juxtaposition is as civilized as possible. With this mind he con-
cludes these observations by saying 
We are no respecters of these persons, but we look for the truth 
(246 D 8-9). 
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“These” materialists are then asked whether they would admit to the ex-
istence of a mortal animal and, if so, whether it would be a body animated 
by a soul. They are then asked to say if they accept that the soul is just be-
cause it possesses justice and bad due to the opposite presence. Then, if re-
alities such as justice and wisdom are capable of overhauling the soul with 
their presence, they are patently something, albeit neither visible nor tangi-
ble. Herein lies the strength of Plato’ argument: the mere acknowledgment 
that any given being is bodiless is enough to bring down such a mindset. 
While these people may claim the soul in itself is material, they cannot do 
the same for the virtues. Consequently, saying virtues do not exist is just as 
embarrassing to them as maintaining they are bodies. Plato naturally claims 
this argument is only valid for those materialists who have improved, be-
cause the others would have stubbornly asserted that nothing which they 
are unable to squeeze in their hands can exist (246 E - 247 C). 
At this point, the Platonic reasoning takes a sudden and, in some 
ways, extraordinary turn. The Stranger seems concerned by the 
situation in which his objection has landed the “improved” material-
ists. Indeed, they find themselves in the impossible position of de-
fining reality with a term common to the material and the non-
material alike. They are, that is, in grave difficulty. For this reason 
the Stranger utters a proposal that is seemingly directed to them, but 
turns out to be a metaphysically decisive assertion in the end (Soph-
ist 247 D - 248 A 3 
STRANGER – … Perhaps they may be in difficulty; and if they 
suffer such a case, consider a possibility that they may accept 
and agree our proposal, i.e. that a being is of such a sort … I say 
that anything which possesses any sort of power or can naturally 
either affect (poie‹n) anything, or suffer (p£scein) in the small-
est way by the slightest cause, even if only once, all this actually 
exists; for I offer a definition; the beings are nothing else but 
power (dÚnamij). 
THEAETETUS – They accept this definition, having nothing 
better at present than this to say. 
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STRANGER – Very good; perhaps something other may later 
appear to us, as well as to them; for the present, this definition 
may be regarded as abiding by consent between them and us. 
THEAETETUS – It abides. 
Let us not underestimate the conclusion which somehow pinpoints 
this assertion: reality is nothing else but dynamis. Even though a differ-
ent opinion is assumed here, this definition will be immediately submit-
ted in the next treatise, moreover quite needlessly in fact.  
The friends of Ideas (248 A - 250 D) 
In fact, the discussion continues by taking on the supporters of 
Ideas, starting from what probably amounts to the main point of con-
vergence with Platonism: the distinction between being and becoming:  
STRANGER – And you say that with the body we participate 
in becoming through perception, but with the soul we par-
ticipate through reasoning in actual being; this you affirm to 
be always the same and in like manner, whereas becoming is 
different at any time? 
THEAETETUS – Yes, we say that. 
STRANGER – But, excellent men, what do we say is this 
“participation”, in relation to both? Is it not what we have 
spoken of just now? 
THEAETETUS – What?  
STRANGER – A suffering or doing by a certain power (p£qhma À 
po…hma ™k dun£meèj tinoj), which proceeds from things 
meeting with one another. Perhaps you, Theaetetus, may fail to 
catch their answer to these questions, and I recognize probably 
because I have been accustomed to them. 
THEAETETUS – And what is their speech? 
STRANGER – They do not concede what we were just now 
saying to the earthborn about being. 
THEAETETUS – What was that? 
STRANGER – Didn't we offer as an adequate (ƒkanÒn) definition 
of the beings whenever the power of suffering or doing 
(p£scein À dr©n) is present even in the slightest things? (Soph-
ist, 248 A 10 - C 5). 
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Plato tells us a lot in this passage: 
a) he presents his frequently recurring theory of the separation of 
the two dimensions of reality: there is a dimension of being 
which remains identical and attainable from the logos and a con-
stantly changing dimension of becoming which, being bodily, 
we reach with the body through the sensation; so far we are in 
the realm of Platonism; 
b) his attack on the Friends of Ideas actually stems from this shared 
platform which, in Plato’s view, implies what has already been 
defined as the hallmark of all beings – a doing and suffering; 
c) the Stranger of Elea is also in a position to foresee what the 
Friends of Ideas will think of this for, unlike Theaetetus, he has 
a certain familiarity with them. This information is clearly theo-
retical since everything here, starting with the character of the 
Stranger himself, lacks any realistic-descriptive value: these 
Friends of Ideas are “eleatising”; 
d) they do not feel undermined and therefore will not agree to the 
definition which, on the other hand, the materialists accepted. In 
short, their position is better but, whereas once the materialists 
have been engaged (namely, rendered less crude) they are also 
easier to undermine, this proves much more difficult with those 
with whom the discussion ought to be easier and more direct, 
given the common premises; 
e) the key point, though, is the actual wording of the definition, 
which is even more radical than the first; in fact it is claimed to 
be an adequate definition that manifests itself in even the slight-
est degrees: beings are the power of doing or suffering. 
This then is Plato’s vision of what is real: a dynamics, i.e. a dialec-
tic, not a static ontology. 
In reality, Plato has called our attention to these processes right 
from the beginning. In the angler’s diairesis, as he speaks of the 
productive art, for no apparent reason he hastens to emphasise that 
what brings into existence something that did not exist before pro-
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duces, while what is brought into existence is produced (219 B). In-
deed, by reason of its profound importance, this theme recurs with 
even greater bearing in a series of other texts that we cannot analyse 
here. For further reading please go straight to Appendix II. 
It remains, however, that Plato has twice defined the power of 
doing or suffering as a fundamental hallmark of the whole reality. 
On this matter he debates fiercely with the Friends of Ideas who ac-
knowledge the power of doing and suffering, but confine it to the 
sole dimension of becoming, while excluding it from being. Natu-
rally, Plato’s position contemplates the power of doing-suffering 
even in the upper sphere. To be fair, the objections raised by the 
Stranger affect Philosophy at all levels (248 A – 249 B): 
1. on a psychological plane, the fact that the soul knows and the 
being is known implies doing and suffering, something that they 
will deny lest they contradict themselves; 
2. on a gnoseological plane, they would have to admit that a being 
(known by a cognitive act) is in motion by reason of being known; this 
is unfeasible for the motionless reality such as the one they envisage; 
3. on a cosmic plane, features such as movement, life, soul and in-
telligence cannot be allowed to go missing from a reality which 
is all, and that, steeped in its sanctity, would be devoid of intel-
ligence and immobile; even less bearable is the idea that it may 
possess intelligence but not life, or that it may feature both but is 
devoid of a soul. Ultimately, it would be nonsensical to endow it 
with a soul but make it immobile. 
It must then be recognized that what moves as well as movement are real13. 
                                                     
13 Note that moving things as well as movement itself are entities (kaˆ tÕ ki-
noÚmenon d¾ kaˆ k…nhsin sugcwrhtšon æj Ônta, 249 B 2-3). This is no odd-
ity. In the aforementioned articles we have tried to underline how in the Ti-
maeus Plato places much emphasis on the position of “generation” as a freely 
existing reality among the original actions behind the formation of the cosmos. 
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The Stranger draws the broad theoretical consequences from 
what has been said, barring the two extreme positions (249 B-D): 
1. if all beings were immobile, there would be no knowledge of 
anything for anything whatsoever. There would be no life, soul, 
intelligence, and even no discourse; 
2. if everything were in motion, nothing would remain as it is, namely, 
in the same relationship and in the same fashion. Nothing would be 
stable and constant so the mind would be unable to function. 
At this point it can be stated once and for all that the adversaries 
contemplated in this category are both the proponents of the One and 
those of multiple Ideas who claim that the all is immobile. It behoves us 
to polemize against this “Eleatising” position and those who set every-
thing in motion, insofar as both terms must be admitted: a philosopher 
cannot accept these views that do away with knowledge, reason or 
mind (249 C 7, ™pist»mhn À frÒnhsin À noàn), but 
as children pray, that everything that is immobile also is in mo-
tion, he must say that both the being (tÕ Ôn) and the all (tÕ p©n) 
are both the things (249 D 3-4). 
I do not believe there is any need to point out how Plato once 
again underlines the being-whole pair. 
Theaetetus thinks that it is over, whereas at this point true ignorance 
reveals itself: by saying that the being is both motion and stillness, one 
is confronted with the same objection raised against those claiming that 
everything is hot and cold: are there two terms or three? It is necessary 
then to decide and examine in depth the question of the being itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fourth Lecture 
Ontology and Meta-ideas 
 
We are now faced with the problem of connections. Motion and 
rest are in utter opposition to one another, yet they both are. Being is 
a third thing, which binds them together on the strength of a shared 
asset, namely, the fact of being. However, this allows neither both 
nor each one to be in motion or at rest. Being is neither the two 
things together nor one of the two, but is a third one when rest and 
motion are said to be. 
But if being is a third thing, there is a problem: it seem impossi-
ble that the being cannot be neither in motion nor at rest. This shows 
how being and not-being are beset by the same troubles, and thus we 
should endeavour to salvage them both (250 E - 251 A). Shortly af-
ter, in fact, it is stressed that an attempt must be made to attain the 
notions of both being and not-being (254 C 5-7). 
1. The problem of Predication (251 A - 253 B) 
The first issue under scrutiny is the classic problem of the rela-
tionship between the unity of the subject and the multiplicity of its 
predicates: every thing may be addressed in many ways and with 
many names. This lends credit to those who deny that many are one 
and one is many. Hence, the unskilled, young and old late learners1 
are led to believe they must state that “man is good” cannot be said 
(for this would mean that the one is many) but only “man man” and 
“good good”. 
An attack is unleashed against this position, which runs along 
two lines of reasoning. The first consists in demonstrating that three 
                                                     
1 We are not interested here in dealing with the identity of these thinkers. 
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possibilities, three alternatives, exist: each idea is not connected to 
the others, all ideas are connected to one another, some ideas are 
connected and others are not. The complexity of the issue is not 
dealt with from the outset, though. A theatrical device is employed 
(Theaetetus is lost for words) to evaluate, firstly, the logical conse-
quences flowing from the three different positions. This way, only 
one position is proven possible, and hence the dialectics of genera 
may be introduced, through which the issue of not-being can be 
solved. 
Advocates of the incommunicability of ideas are presented with 
two objections. 
1. The first one is of a broader nature (251 E - 252 B). If the utter 
impossibility to communicate is declared, then motion and rest can-
not be said to participate in being. In this case all those philosophers 
whose arguments we have assessed beforehand are proven wrong: 
those maintaining that the all is in motion, those who reckon it is at 
rest by virtue of its being One, and even those claiming that things 
exist on the strength of ideas that are always the same. By the same 
token, even those who in some way mingle and separate sundry ele-
ments would be proven wrong. In short, while rendering discourse 
impossible, this sort of statement would also invalidate any kind of 
philosophy.  
2. The second one (252 B-D) is ad hominem. Those denying all 
sorts of predications and connections, even just to make such claims, 
must use expressions such as “in itself” or “separate from”, even 
though these highlight the opposite of what their users seek to assert. 
The argument against those who believe everything communi-
cates with everything else is easier to frame. Theaetetus himself re-
marks that, if this were true, motion would be said to be at rest and 
rest in motion, which is utterly impossible (252 D). 
Thus the third possibility remains, namely that some things may 
mingle and others may not. The explanatory parallel, recurring often 
in Plato, employs letters of the alphabet. Indeed, at times they con-
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nect with one another, and at other times do not, and vowels make 
up the common thread that binds them together. This inevitably 
points us towards those arts, such as grammar and music (art of 
sounds), where the possible connecting links are known. 
2. The dialectics 
The issue of science that knows the connections of genera is 
raised alongside that of the types of possible connecting links: 
Then what? Since we have agreed that the genera also have the 
same condition of mixing with one another, then is it not neces-
sary that he who would correctly show what genera will join and 
with which they can unite and what others exclude one another, 
proceed by the help of a specific science (™pist»mhj) in the path 
of argument? And also know if there are specific kinds who 
through all of them connect them together so that they are able to 
mingle and again, in divisions (™n ta‹j diairšsesin), whether 
there are others, which through wholes are causes of the division? 
(253 B 8 - 253 C 3). 
A number of elements in this passage must be singled out. 
Firstly, the need for a science of connecting links. Secondly, and 
“above all”, some classes lead to unity just as others divide. Thirdly, 
the broad wording of the connecting link is specified by an explicit 
reference to genera, which wind through all the others thus enabling 
the connection. Lastly, there is an outspoken call for the diairetic 
method, i.e. divisions. 
A number of elements are swiftly brought forward to shape this 
science: Theaetetus deems it the “very greatest of all sciences” (253 
C 5), while the Stranger sees it as the science of free men (253 C 7-
8), adding that the philosopher has been met in the process, thereby 
manifesting the identity between dialectics and philosophy that is 
overt in Plato and displayed here. First it is said that the philosopher 
has been chanced upon (253 C), then that  
FOURTH LECTURE 
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
 
72 
the division according to genera and believing neither that the 
same Idea is other nor that the other is the same, is the business 
of the dialectical science (253 D 1-3). 
Dialectics is thus qualified as the science of discerning, mainly 
grounded on the Same-Other pair; then, the Stranger points out that  
you will not give the power of dialectic to anyone else, but the 
one who philosophizes purely and justly (253 E 4-6). 
Finally, lest any doubts remain, this is said to be the seat of the 
true definition of the philosopher: 
Indeed, we shall find the philosopher now and later in a place of 
this kind, if we look for him (253 E 8-9). 
Notice this truly puzzling addition: just as Plato provides an ac-
curate description of the nature of the philosopher, he quips that the 
definition thereof will be found in this sphere, if there is a will to 
look for him. The oddity is manifest: this search is triggered by the 
question on the definition of science raised in the Theaetetus; it then 
takes on the Stranger’s recommendation on how to catch the phi-
losopher (i.e. the scientist) when set against figures like the sophist 
and the statesman. And how could one then pass up the chance to 
deal with the philosopher himself? The truth is that Plato famously 
never actually drafted the Philosopher dialogue, and not for want of 
time. Readers like me, who are utterly convinced of the unique na-
ture of Platonic writing, will see no problem with that. Plato’s own 
protreptic style of writing cannot but be based on references and 
omissions, in a word “games”. For sure Plato did not intend to write 
the Philosopher, but sought to draw his reader as close as possible to 
this level of reasoning. Thus he scatters warnings here and there, 
such as the one above, which foreshadows the possibility that inter-
locutors may cut the debate short just when it gets interesting.  
But we know and recall that there are no interlocutors and there 
is no debate: this is fiction. In actual fact there is only one great mas-
ter, a philosopher gifted with true writing genius, who can lead us 
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wherever he wants. He also tells us a great deal, though... for exam-
ple that he will never write the Philosopher. 
Having given an accurate description of the nature of the phi-
losopher, Plato cannot refrain from specifying the different connec-
tions that can be established by 
the one who is able to do this, to distinguish clearly <1> one 
Idea extended in all ways through many, each one lying apart, 
<2> and many Ideas differing from one another encompassed 
from without by one Idea; <3> and again, one Idea put into one 
pervading many such wholes, <4> and many Ideas separate and 
utterly apart. This is to distinguish according the genera, to 
know in which way each genus is able to establish connections 
and in which way not (253 D 5 - E 2). 
It follows that dialectic science, the art of separating what is 
unlike and joining what is alike, must deal with a variety of connec-
tions. Indeed, it must tell apart: 
1. a single Idea extending anyhow through many other Ideas, 
which remain distinct units; clearly an analytical activity in 
search of a pervasive idea but fails to bring the other ones to-
gether, which in fact remain distinct; 
2. many Ideas encompassed from without by a one Idea; it is a 
matter of grasping a connection here that somehow remains ex-
trinsic, in the sense that it amounts to a mere container wherein 
other Ideas find a location and unity; 
3. a single Idea running through many others, unifying them while 
maintaining its own unity; in this case we have a strong unity 
abiding within single Ideas that are thence unified; 
4. many separate and distinct Ideas; some terms then fail to 
achieve true unity. 
As we can see, the following processes are valorised: a) two uni-
fication processes, one is just as weak and pervasive as that of meta-
ideas, omnipresent but hardly amounting to unity (take, for example, 
the idea of “rest”), the other is strong and connotative of the same 
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unified Ideas; b) two diversification processes, the first maintains an 
extrinsic unity whereas the second states that the concepts are inca-
pable of connection. Therefore 
- some genera acknowledge connection with one another, while others 
do not; 
- some genera acknowledge connection narrowly, others more 
broadly; 
- some genera connote Ideas, others gather them in a single frame-
work. 
We should then add that both the philosopher and the sophist are 
hard to track down, for opposite reasons to do with their “dwelling 
places”: while the sophist is shrouded in the darkness of his abode, the 
philosopher bathes in such light that  
the soul’s eyes of the many cannot endure the vision of the di-
vine (254 A 10 - B 1). 
Still, we must continue to enquire upon the sophist. To let us pro-
ceed, Plato presents us with a reflection on possible connecting links 
between supreme genera. A number of meta-ideas are selected for the 
purpose of assessing, firstly, the nature of each one and, secondly, its 
chances of connection with the others. In dealing with being and not-
being in this manner, even if we were to fall short of a clear-cut solution 
thereof, we would still be in a position to justify those who, like the two 
interlocutors, assert that not-being is not-being (254 B-C).  
This takes us back to the fundamental question whence it all be-
gan. Let us then start afresh.  
3. The Problem with saying “is not” 
The sophist, master of the art of conjuring misleading images has 
got into a most troublesome place to explore (236 D), that of Not-
being. Plato goes further than merely quoting Parmenides; indeed, to 
illustrate this struggle he sets out a slew of arguments in support of 
the impossibility to state and, consequently, deny not-being.  
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First aporia (237 C - 238 A): Not-being is not applicable to any 
being, and neither to something; in fact, “something” is not a word 
that can stand alone for it is always referred to a being. Moreover, 
this “something” may be one, two, or many. Whoever does not say 
“anything”, then, must say absolutely nothing; yet, as it is impossi-
ble for a man to say and say nothing, he must be said not to say at 
all. Hence, if we claim that someone says “not-being”, then we are 
acknowledging that who says not says anyway. 
There is a strong case underpinning this argument: any kind of 
argument refers to an ontological dimension: it is always a matter of 
“being that is said”. There is a significant point to be mentioned, 
however, as it is patently non-Eleatic: along with the ontological 
dimension Plato calls attention to the numerical one. 
Theaetetus believes the argument can go no further, but an even 
greater aporia lies in wait, and it deals with the same principle of the 
discourse.  
Second aporia (238 A-D): whereas “that which is” may be at-
tributed to some other things “which are”, on no account can any-
thing which is be attributed to “that which is not”; indeed, this will 
be neither singular nor plural in number. In this case, however, it 
cannot be expressed in words, as we use the singular or plural when 
we speak, even of “not-being”. Hence, if it cannot be defined by 
number, we must say that not-being is unutterable.  
This argument clearly bolsters the authoritativeness of the nu-
merical dimension in the sphere of predication. With yet another 
twist the Stranger admits that he was mistaken in reckoning this 
aporia as the graver one, for an even more serious case lies ahead. 
Third aporia (238 D - 239 A): this very much deals with an Eleatic 
philosopher who seeks to confute not-being: he is forced to contradict 
himself. He spoke of not-being, in fact, and meanwhile he has said it is 
unutterable and unspeakable. In order to refute not-being, he has spoken 
of it as existent, in the singular, and implying a form of unity, all the 
while maintaining that it is unutterable. 
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In short, if we want to speak of not-being in the right way, it 
must not be mentioned, but how can it be refuted then? The rout, a 
kind of self-defeat of Eleaticism, is manifest and both historically 
and logically motivated: 
Then, what might anyone say about me? For a long time and 
even now one would find me defeated in the refutation of not-
being. And therefore, as I was saying, we must not look to the 
right way of speaking about not-being in my speech but come, 
let us look at yours (239 B 1-5). 
The Eleatic concedes defeat, as he himself has laid it out and ac-
knowledged it in his argument, but also recognises it as ongoing for 
quite some time. It is indeed hard, impossible even, not to think of 
Gorgias and his brilliant pamphlet On Not-being, which Plato has 
shown to abide by in his dialogues2. In that essay, driven by anti-
Eleatic rather than nihilistic intent, the best rhetor among the first-
generation sophists wields against the Eleatic school the same tools 
that Eleaticism had crafted.  
The argumentation has come to a close, and Plato confirms this with 
a classic move by recalling the starting point of our discussion: the 
Sophist has most shrewdly dug himself deep into his inaccessible hole 
(239 C); from this position he will easily outsmart interlocutors by ask-
ing them what is meant by image. 
4. The Need to overcome Eleaticism 
Plato underlines that the answer is not to be sought in Eleaticism 
itself. The Stranger indeed claims it must be sought in the words of 
Theaetetus, who must endeavour to speak of not-being in the right 
manner. Given that the time for this task is still not ripe, one must at 
                                                     
2 Cf. On this point my arguments in Dialettica…, pp. 385-390 and in Gor-
gia quale sofista…, passim. 
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least venture to answer the Sophist’s question as to what is meant by 
“image” (239 B-D)3. 
Theaetetus’ first reply takes the easy route of phenomenological 
evidence: one should point to water, looking glasses and paintings to 
show that images exist. The Stranger, however, stresses forthwith 
that the solution is not so simple: this Sophist will not let himself be 
beaten by such examples. By developing the argument exclusively 
along the lines of reason, he will spurn any empirical reference, 
mockingly deny everything, and even pretend he knows nothing of 
sight at all (239 E - 240 A)4. 
To illustrate what an affray of this kind entails, Plato presents us 
with a new, brief display of sophistry, in which the Stranger leads 
the onslaught and Theaetetus digs in (240 A-B). Although schema-
tized, the development still unfolds rather rigorously: 
 
Q. What is meant with “image”? 
A. An image is something other of the true thing but fashioned in its like-
ness. 
Q. But is this something some other true thing? 
A. It is certainly not true, but only a resemblance thereof, because the true 
thing is other. 
Q. The true thing really exists? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the not true one is the opposite of the true? Then the like object is 
not real if it is “not true”? 
A. But it is in a certain sense, at least as an image (e„kën, 240 B 11). 
Q. Then an image (e„kÒna, 240 B 13) is in reality, although it is not really? 
                                                     
3 As rightly emphasized by D. O’Brien, Le non-être, Deux études sur le 
Sophiste de Platon, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 1995, p. 10 n. 1, this 
is where the “eleatic” part of the discussion ends and the more “sophistic” 
consequences of concepts such as image and falsehood are dealt. 
4 Once again, the treatise in the second part of Gorgias’ On Not-being 
springs to mind.  
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A. It seems we are forced to admit the existence of this highly unusual in-
termingling.  
 
Plato immediately explains the strength and pertinence of this ar-
gument. To begin with, the Stranger points out that the sophist has 
compelled them to acknowledge the existence of not-being, and this 
has consequently made the sophist’s art nigh impossible to define. 
Hence, if his art is art of illusion, then it leads the soul of the be-
guiled to think what is false. This means thinking “that which is not” 
not as something which does not exist, but as something which ex-
ists in a certain sense, as well as thinking that things which certainly 
exist do not exist at all. Clearly, though, no rational man can accept 
such conclusions (240 C - 241 A). 
In brief, the sophist is set to win for he prompts those who some-
how speak of falsehoods to fall into contradiction, as they link being 
with not-being. On the other hand, one cannot give up on the idea of 
seizing the sophist. Plainly, an altogether entangled inquiry lies 
ahead, and Plato has unsuccessfully sought to clarify its nature 
straight away. Indeed, at this stage, the Stranger makes Theaetetus a 
most unusual appeal, bidding him (241 D 3) 
not to regard me as a kind of parricide. 
We stand before a plea and a denial. The Stranger fears he may 
deemed a parricide, i.e. a negator of Eleaticism, and therefore urges 
that he be spared this wrongful charge. These words are wasted on 
the reader: this “parricide” is one of the ugliest misrepresentations of 
Platonic thought. It is a question of how to save philosophy and be-
ing, in other words, Parmenides himself. The only way to reach this 
twofold goal is to urge not-being to somehow be. Without this de-
vice no one can avoid falling into contradiction 
when he speaks of false speeches, or opinion, or images, or cop-
ies or imitations, or appearances of these things (241 E 2-3). 
In order to confront all these issues, and falsehoods in particular, 
not-being must to some extent be acknowledged. This way only can 
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the sophist be vanquished and philosophy restored, while truly gain-
saying absolute not-being without contradicting oneself. Parmenides 
may only be saved by urging him to entertain a different view of be-
ing and not-being. This is no parricide, but a process of overreach-
ing and fulfilling of Parmenides’ positions. 
Lastly, the Stranger beseeches Theaetetus for one last thing, 
which Plato intends as a further warning to the reader to bear in 
mind throughout this reading: he says he should not be deemed mad 
if he appears to turn things on their heads. This is then what lies 
ahead of us! 
5. The Dialectic of Meta-ideas 
Two points must be fully clarified before we resume and take in 
the play of comparison among the meta-ideas set forth by Plato with 
an eye on necessarily asserting the existence of not-being. 
First of all, Plato provides us with neither a detailed nor theoreti-
cally warranted list, but merely mentions the meta-ideas he deems 
more suited to his ends. The text clearly states that such ideas are se-
lected by taking 
a few of those which are considered most important (254 C 3-4). 
The fact that fundamental concepts such as Whole-Part or One-
Many are left outside this analysis tellingly illustrates how this list 
neither is, nor seeks to be, exhaustive; instead, it is merely put to-
gether for operational purposes.  
Besides, Plato performs here one of his greater games: he repeatedly 
states that there are five ideas, while there are surely six or, better still, 
eight. All this may be seen in a paradoxical light, even by those accepting 
the idea that Plato may engage in a protreptic game with the reader. None 
too subtly, however, the text itself urges us to dwell upon the number, 
since this is unduly highlighted. I shall merely quote the lines in which 
the numerical reference is outwardly explicit.  
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The first genera are tackled: Being, Rest, and Motion. It is af-
firmed that two (254 D 7) of these, R and M, are incapable of con-
nection with one another, while B surely has connection with both 
of them, for both of them are; that makes three classes (254 D 12). 
Each one is other than the remaining two (254 D 14) and the same 
with itself; therefore we have two more genera (254 E 3). Same and 
Other, in addition to the previous three (254 E 3). We must then 
lead the inquiry into five kinds (254 E 4) and not three (254 E 5), 
given that the newly added ones cannot be mistaken for any of the 
others. 
Furthermore, Same will later be deemed a fourth genus in addi-
tion to of three (255 C 5) and Other is a fifth (255 C 8), this being an 
utterly unnecessary inference, reinforced by remarking that Other is 
the fifth Idea (255 D 9). It follows then that one speaks of five gen-
era (255 E 8), while Other is both other than the three (256 C 11) 
kinds and than the fourth one (256 C 12), since they have been reck-
oned as being five in all (256 D 1). For his part Theaetetus immedi-
ately reasserts this to be the case, for their number cannot feasibly 
be less than what has been recorded. 
In our view, there are two reasons for this redundant emphasis on 
the numerical dimension. The first is of a theoretical nature. The fact 
of doggedly keeping tally of meta-ideas demonstrates how numeri-
cal structures pre-exist this dimension of supreme Ideas. 
The second reason ties in with this game. Plato has hinted at, urging us 
to dwell on the actual number of these five Ideas, which are six, but more 
truthfully eight. There is no gainsaying that they are six, considering that 
for some reason the list surprisingly does not include not-being, the real 
driving force behind the whole discussion and its very raison d’être. Thus 
speaks Plato, while repeatedly recalling that the treatise is directed at being 
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and not-being alike5. As it happens, when Theaetetus (quite pointlessly) 
steps in to say they are five, he adds that their number cannot feasibly be 
less than five (256 D 3-4). This is an artful turn of phrase to confirm the na-
ture of the “protreptic game” Plato is engaged in. Ultimately, they are 
bound to be eight, as the end of the treatise will show, and its very signifi-
cance will revolve around this. 
The discussion then continues in a highly schematic manner, 
dealing with a range of possible relations. 
Distinction between the genera (255 A-E) 
Those reasons for discerning between various genera must first 
be established. This is achieved both by reaffirming that partaking 
of something does not amount to being that thing, and by highlight-
ing the significant outcome of a possible identification of the terms.  
 
I.  Motion, Rest, Same (255 A-B) 
If M = S, then R, partaking of S, would partake of M and thus be 
in motion. The same reasoning goes for R; M and R thus partake of 
S and O but are neither S nor O. 
 
II.  Being, Same (255 B-C)  
If B = S, then when we say that R and M are, we should say they are 
identical6. 
 
                                                     
5 As we have pointed out in the Third Lecture, for example, as early as 243 
B-C it is stressed that the same problem with being also applies to not-
being, albeit more poignantly. 
6 O’Brien, Non-être…, pp. 64-65, needlessly complicates the issue, in my view. 
He asks himself why an identity of being and same makes every thing “same as 
itself” as well as “same as all others”. His answer hinges on an argument centring 
on the opposition between same and other. I believe the explanation is even sim-
pler: if some things are defined by one term only, i.e. they coincide with it, they 
are consequently the same as each other. And this applies regardless of the term 
used to affirm the identity, and not just to the Same. 
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III. Being, Other (255 C-E) 
If Plato has so far exercised “logical common sense” in his do-
ings, the conceptual distinction he adopts to establish the nature of 
Other, however, is of crucial importance in his philosophy. The dis-
cernment is between realities in themselves and by themselves (kaq' 
aØt£) and those which are relative to some other (prÕj ¥lla). The 
first kind includes substances and Ideas as to species, whereas all 
sorts of relatives such as small/great and master/servant fall within 
the second category. 
One must distinguish between realities in themselves and by 
themselves and relative realities. Then, O is always relative to some-
thing else, that is some different O, while B refers to relative reali-
ties and those in themselves alike. Hence, if O = B, then we would 
have an O that is relative to some other as well as in itself.  
Another point immediately is stressed: the Other is pervasive as it 
spreads to all Ideas; in fact, all these differ from one another not on 
the grounds of their nature but because they partake of the idea of O.  
Relations between the genera (255 E - 256 E) 
Once the five kinds have been decided, we go back to the start 
and thence evaluate the possible instances of connection.  
1. M is not R, it is other than R; the two concepts do not seem to en-
visage a mutual participation of one another;  
2. M is, thus partakes of B; 
3. M is not S, it is other than S, but it is the same for everything par-
takes of S; hence, M must be said to be the same and not the 
same for the terms are not applied in the same sense; 
3.1. M is the same in the sense that it partakes of S; 
3.2. M is not the same in the sense that it partakes of O, thus it is 
other and not the same; 
4. And if M partook of R in any way, there would be no absurdity in 
calling it stationary. 
We must necessarily dwell upon the Stranger’s bizarre hypothe-
sis, which seems to run against the opening statement. This urgency 
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rings in Theaetetus’ words, which tell us we stand before a momen-
tous passage: 
It would be most correct, if we shall concede that some of the 
genera are willing to mix with one another, and some not (256 B 
8-9). 
The answer all but beggars belief. Surely, the second part of the 
sentence can be construed as some kind of warning, reinforcing the 
conviction that R and M cannot mingle. But the text plainly makes 
no such claim, especially if we consider that the Stranger has merely 
enquired whether M can be said to be at rest. 
One is warranted in inferring that, this way, Plato is trying to 
steer the reader’s attention towards a particular situation. In reality, 
insofar as their definitions R and M have been reckoned incompati-
ble; however, insofar as partaking they are compatible but cannot be 
coexistent (an object cannot be at one and the same time in motion 
and at rest). With regard to the Same, though, we have just war-
ranted the need to assess matters from two different perspectives, 
which may give rise to seemingly contradictory assertions. This can 
be a patently undeveloped example of a like situation, to which it is 
directly linked; a situation in which a thing may most certainly be 
said to be moving yet at rest. If we take a man seated on a train we 
can truthfully claim he is both at rest and in motion. Moreover, if we 
take a motion that is steady and equidistant from a given point, how 
does it relate to that point? 
In confirmation of this view, Plato immediately sets forth another 
example of a seemingly contradictory statement7. 
5. M is other than O, as it is other than S and R, thus it can be said to 
be other and not other.  
                                                     
7 Another famous, even obvious, example applies. Plato ultimately claims 
that all realities partake of the same and of the other, which surely is not a 
problem, unless these terms are tinkered with indiscriminately (259 C-D). 
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6. M is other than B, therefore it is and is not. 
Not-being as Other 
Plato is now capable of drawing the end conclusion from previous 
arguments: as this issue finds widespread use we shall be able to say 
that, due to the Other, all classes are not, yet are. Every one of them is 
in itself, and is not in relation to all the other possible genera. 
For every Idea, then, a lot is the being but an infinity quantity is 
the not-being (256 E 5-6). 
The intrinsically dialectic nature of this statement must not go 
unnoticed, in that it upholds the universality of relations as the 
founding element of reality. Failing this, Platonic dialectics and 
diairesis would lack any philosophical worth. Indeed, the Stranger is 
swift to state that even being in itself (257 A 1), which in itself is 
one, is other, and thus is not an infinite number of times. Moreover, 
before any further progress is made, Plato reaffirms that there must 
be agreement on the fact that to have connection with one another is 
in the nature of classes. 
Nonetheless, from the standpoint of the present enquiry, one 
must start from the notion that, far from something in opposition to 
being, this not-being is merely other than being. This always holds 
true: the negative particle applies just to the negated term and surely 
speaks of nothing in the positive sense: not-big can mean both the 
same and the small8. 
                                                     
8 Cf. O’Brien, Non-être…, p. 14: «Briefly, Plato distinguished in this page 
of the Sophist (257 B-C) between the great, the not-great, his negation, and 
the small, his opposite. “Opposite” and “negation” have not the same sense, 
even if the opposite is “indicated” by negation. The negation (“not-great”) 
points out the otherness (“other than …”), but does not point out the oppo-
site (even if it can replace it)». O’Brien later (p. 59) distinguishes three 
senses of negation: absence of identity (as between Motion and Same), ab-
sence of participation (as between Same and Greatness), and presence of an 
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we shall not concede that it is said that the negation signifies the 
opposite, but this only, that the negative particles put before 
words, reveal something other than the words which follow, or 
rather than the things represented by the names, which follow 
the negation (257 B 9 - C 3). 
The negation therefore does not indicate a thorough opposition, 
be it contrary or contradictory, and neither does it refer to an indefi-
nite opposite. Instead, it constitutes an overture to a range of possi-
ble positives. This dialectical stance is radically different from 
Hegel’s. Whereas the German thinker traces all differences back to 
the contradiction, Plato’s manoeuvre is diametrically opposite: nega-
tion is at first neither contradiction nor opposition but expresses a 
difference, which is specified by the term it applies to, but unspe-
cific in terms of what it may signify in the positive. 
In confirmation of Plato’s game, this clarification is quickly fol-
lowed by the next treatise, which he performs on the negative terms 
only. Still, his words by no means deny the statement expressed 
above, as these negatives are always used to speak of what is other 
and not of what is contradictory. Indeed, the inference is once again 
that otherness is the underlying element upon which reality is 
framed. The Stranger, then, maintains that (257 C - 258 B) the Other 
is structured like science, which to some extent is one, yet it features 
various parts with particular names according to the thing it is ap-
plied to. Nonetheless, they are all equally part and being, just as 
beautiful is part of the things which are to the same extent as not-
beautiful. All the same the Other that is features many parts that are, 
                                                     
opposing element (as between Motion and Rest). But O’Brien is also con-
vinced that opposites can never contemplate participation (pp. 62-63). If 
this were always true, then the Other would not be the same as itself and 
the Same would not be unlike others. Indeed, O’Brien is then forced (p. 65) 
to discuss the fact that Same and Other are not as in opposition to one an-
other as Rest and Motion. 
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so that part of the Other which is in opposition to being is by no 
means a less real being: every thing is an other. 
Ontologically, then, this negative is not lesser than the positive it 
negates: an opposition arises between two kinds of being, one de-
fined in the positive and one defined as other than it. Others exist in-
asmuch as they are an effect of a determined negation. Indeed, it is 
reasserted: 
Then, as it seems, the opposition of a part of the nature of the 
other, and of a part of the nature of being, opposed to one an-
other, is no less, if I may venture to say so, real of being in itself, 
for it implies not the opposite of this, but only this much, an 
other than being (258 A 11 - B 3). 
Three issues must be carefully assessed here.  
First off, that part of the other opposed to being is relative not-
being, which must be distinguished from absolute Not-being; just as 
relative being must be distinguished from absolute Being. We can 
now see how the number terms in question is eight: 1. Absolute Be-
ing; 2. Absolute Not-being; 3. Relative being; 4. Relative not-being; 
5. Rest; 6. Motion; 7. Same; 8. Other (demonstrating greater overall 
significance as the bedrock for the framework of relations reality is 
grounded upon). 
Secondly, this relative not-being cannot be said to have less exis-
tence than being, for it is opposed to it, viz. being, in a partial way. 
The conclusion is as follows, then: 
Clearly this is the not-being, which we were seeking on account 
of the sophist (258 B 6-7). 
Thirdly, there is a need to highlight the statement saying it is a 
part of the other. One should steer clear of the belief that relative 
not-being is identical to the Other. The Other is a composite system 
that says not-beautiful, not-good, not-being; the degree to which 
these classes are far-reaching varies according to the negated term. 
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On the other hand, that part of the Other which is in opposition to 
being is utterly far-reaching and applies to all classes and realities9. 
6. The Dialectics of Being and Not Being 
Without expressly saying so, Plato displays this assortment of 
meanings in the conclusion, which only becomes clear if the reader 
applies the distinctions therein, yielded by the development of the 
discourse: 
<1> Let not any one say, then, that while affirming the opposi-
tion of not-being to being, we venture to assert the being of not-
being; for we long ago have said goodbye to a contrary of being, 
whether it is or not, and whether it is possible or not to reason 
about it. <2> But, as for what we have now said to be Not-
being, either let someone convince us with a refutation that we 
do not speak beautifully, or, so long as he cannot, he too must 
say, as we are saying, that there is mingling of genera, and that 
being and other have gone through all genera and one another, 
so that the other, even if it partakes of being, is not, by reason of 
this participation, that of which it partakes, but other, and being 
other than being, it is necessarily not-being. <3> And again, be-
ing, partaking of the other, would be other than the remaining 
genera, and since it is other than all of them, it is neither each 
one of them nor all the rest but itself alone. <4> So that being 
undoubtedly is not in countless cases and for countless reasons; 
the same also applies for other genera, individually and all to-
gether, that in many respects are, but in many respects are not 
(258 E 6 - 259 B 6). 
In short, Plato has maintained that: 
                                                     
9 This gives rise to a very peculiar couples relationship. Whilst Being and 
Same are distinct in terms of nature and semantics, i.e. they cannot be used 
in the same sense, relative Not-being and Other are distinct in terms of na-
ture (they do not feature the same opposite) but not of semantics, in that 
they may be used in a specific sense to mean the same. 
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1. his discourse does not reintroduce absolute Not-being, the one 
contrary to Being, which cannot be and must only be negated 
(which means rejecting arguments in the first part of Gorgias’ 
treatise); 
2. with regard to the being of not-being 
2.1. unless the reasoning expressed above can be refuted, it will 
stand true (the paradigmatic approach, so typical of Platonic 
epistemology, is thus stressed)10; 
2.2. the Other and Being must be acknowledged as utterly pervasive; 
hence they necessarily connect with one another too; 
2.3. the Other, while surely partaking of the Being, is not Being; 
namely, it is other than Being; 
2.4. in this sense, it also is not; namely, it expresses that meaning of 
Other which coincides with relative Not-being; 
3. Being is only one of the meta-ideas. It is neither each one of 
them nor all of them together, but it is itself only;  
4. each class, such as Being, in many ways is and in many more is 
not. 
The last two statements are the most poignant and significant. 
Plato essentially asserts how despite its importance and pervasive-
ness Being is not the category that defines the All or other meta-
ideas (neither as single entities nor as a group), even if all reality ac-
                                                     
10 For an exhaustive explanation of this statement, please refer to my two papers on 
dialectics in Plato: Dialektik und Prinzipientheorie in Platons Parmenides und 
Philebos, in Platonisches Philosophieren, Zehn Vorträge zu Ehren von Hans 
Joachim Krämer, herausgegeben von Thomas Alexander Szlezák unter Mit-
wirkung von Karl-Heinz Stanzel, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New 
York 2001, pp. 109-154 (there is a Italian version: Dialettica e Teoria dei principi 
nel Parmenide e nel Filebo di Platone, «Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia 
dell’Università di Macerata», 34, 2001, pp. 55-103); Pervasività e complessità della 
dialettica platonica, in Platone e Aristotele. Dialettica e logica, M. Migliori e A. 
Fermani Editors., Morcelliana, Brescia 2007, pp. 187-241. 
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knowledges being and not-being (that is the kind we have found to 
be a part of the Other) as predicates..  
If we should run through the theoretical accomplishments from 
the Sophist, we could tag them as topical or more wide-ranging. 
With regard to the topical ones, let us say that: 
1. Absolute Being contrasts with absolute Not-being, which results 
excepted; the single terms and the pair are by no means perva-
sive; Not-being is not; Absolute Being is one of the more far-
reaching genera; 
2. Relative Being (that is specified) links up with relative Not-being (po-
tentially endless); taken by themselves, the two terms are pervasive 
and their relation with the Same-Other pair is diversified: relative Be-
ing disengages itself unequivocally from the Same, while Other and 
Not-being are more easily interchangeable, to the extent that this Not-
being is a part of the Other, and the Other is a not-being; 
3. Same (specified) links up and exists alongside the Other (end-
less); taken by themselves, the two terms are pervasive; 
4. Rest is in opposition to Motion; the pair is pervasive but the in-
dividual terms are not.  
Let us now examine the more wide-ranging outcomes. By show-
ing us some of the possible connections, Plato has produced added 
clarifications on the dialectics applied to purely ideal beings. Yet, 
above all, he has also demonstrated that:  
1 The Being – Not-being dialectic neither plays an exclusive role 
nor has gained the upper hand, in that: 
1.1. relative not-being depends on the other; 
1.2. other categories are just as pervasive as Being; 
2 All does not correspond to Being (and neither to One).  
If we were to delve into these issues, we would have to broaden 
the scope of our reading by a long stretch and to Parmenides in par-
ticular. This kind of operation, though, is not only ill-advised but 
also impossible in the present context. I will therefore retrieve from 
an earlier work of mine11 the table of dialectics of Being, as it ap-
                                                     
11 Dialettica…, pp. 476-479. 
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pears in the Fifth Thesis, and attach it as Appendix III. We shall see 
that, what Plato is usually held to have “revealed” in the Sophist, 
e.g. the intermingling of being and not-being, has already been as-
serted in the Parmenides. 
7. The rout of the sophist 
Plato has long dwelt upon these issues to show what degree of 
caution must be exercised when handling these concepts. For this rea-
son he maintains that any dissenting voice must simply find some-
thing better to say than what has hitherto been said (259 B). Although 
no self-congratulatory or dogmatic stance is recorded, this does not 
mean that a different and conflicting view cannot be met with strong 
condemnation: if any disheartened individual were to find pleasure in 
dragging words one way and another, claiming the great to be small, 
the same to be other, etc, he will be doing nothing worthy of much 
consideration. Plato here sets the final consequences of a task he be-
gan in polemic with Zeno in the opening sections of the Parmenides; 
then, he referred to these issues as hackneyed for the theory of Ideas 
successfully cast them aside (129 A - 130 A)12. But whereas back 
then, standing before the master who had crafted dialectics, he had 
been lavish with praise and compliments, we see that now, in the 
midst of a conversation logically set almost two generations later, af-
ter the boom of sophistry, he is scornful: the development of the dis-
cussion has shown how this manner of proceeding rests on the trick of 
using the same word in a different sense every time. Anyone still tak-
                                                     
12 Even in Philebus Plato glosses over the aporiae he considers the better-
known (14 C-E), such as those relating to the multiplicity of predications or 
of the parts of a thing. As for these sensible difficulties, Socrates says the 
common view is to overlook them as they are childish and hamper dis-
courses; also, they are only used in anti-logical operations surrounding the 
statement «the one is many and endless and the many are one» (Philebus, 
14 E 3). 
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ing this approach seriously is just as new to the problem as a child 
would be (259 B-D). 
That is why we must seek to establish the possible connections 
by carefully fine-tuning our choice of concepts. Indeed, separating 
all from all is wrong and utterly baneful for philosophy and the 
Muses, as all reasoning is blighted. In this case we cannot say any-
thing (258 E - 259 B). 
False speeches 
There is clearly little to be gained by wasting time toying around 
with concepts, so we must all the more be capable of confuting the 
sophist thoroughly. The strong condemnation of sophistry by no 
means forestalls Plato’s argumentative process, quite the opposite in 
fact. The Author plainly seeks to afford no respite to his opponent. 
Amazingly, a key point has been scored, and yet a further escape 
route for the sophist may be glimpsed. And this is the path the 
Stranger has now set out to obstruct.  
The strength of the sophist’s starting position lay in the fact that, 
given the impossibility of thinking not-being, he could deny the ex-
istence of falsehoods and mistakes. The mere assertion of not-being 
thwarts this belief, but not completely. One must also show how 
relative not-being can mingle with discourse and opinion, thus yield-
ing falsehoods. The sophist will duly reject this mingling, and will 
deny again the existence of falsehoods, claiming that in this sphere 
everything is being and one cannot speak of not-being. In short, he 
could say that the art of appearance does not apply in absolute sense 
to all sectors, for opinion and language are not allowed to mingle 
with not-being (260 A-E). 
As Theaetetus himself notes, this heightens the difficulties that 
are faced in this “pursuit”: no sooner is one hurdle, the being/not-
being connection, overcome than it confronts us again in the guise 
of the not-being/language connection (261 A-B). The time has now 
come to conduct the enquiry in this sphere, that of language and 
opinion. 
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The original problem arises once again: we have to establish 
whether words all agree with or exclude one another, or whether 
sometimes they agree and sometimes they do not. Furthermore, the 
agents of actions are called nouns, and what designates an action is 
called a verb. Nouns alone or verbs alone are unable to make up a 
sentence, which in fact come about when these terms are used to-
gether. This represents the primary level of agreement among terms 
for the purposes of forging language (262 A-E). 
Secondly, every discourse must have an object (Theaetetus) and 
a quality (true-false). If we take, for instance, “Theaetetus is seated” 
we have a short discourse regarding Theaetetus; the same goes for 
“Theaetetus flies”. The difference, though, is that one is true and the 
other false. The true one speaks of beings as they are, while the false 
one states things other than they are. It exhibits as beings not-beings 
that are other than those applied to Theaetetus. There is no cause for 
outrage as there are many beings and many not beings; it is not a 
discourse on nobody, as it concerns Theaetetus, and neither is it a 
discourse that speaks of nothing (in which case it would be no dis-
course) as it states that he flies. This assertion speaks of other things 
as if they are same, and of not beings as beings (263 A-D). 
The same reasoning is applicable to thought, since thought and 
language are the same. Whereas the former is an unuttered, inner 
conversation of the soul with itself, the latter is an uttered, outward 
dialogue. The silent, inner process within the soul is called opinion, 
while imagine is what seeps into the soul from the outside through 
the senses. If opinion is the end of a discourse, and imagination is a 
blend of sense and opinion, then they all may be true or false since 
they are akin to language (263 D - 264 B). 
Thus, false opinion and false speech are possible and this spells 
the rout of the sophist.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fifth Lecture 
The relative importance of the Sophist 
 
In this last Lecture we would like to express an overall judgment 
on the dialogue. Its relevance is not an issue here, however, we shall 
seek to lessen the all-too forceful opinion that criticism have often 
displayed towards it. It is a well-known fact that being and ontology 
are one of the milestones in the history of Western thought. It comes 
as no surprise, then, that later thinkers have identified the issue of 
being as the dialogue’s philosophical centre point, and the Sophist as 
one of Plato’s more important writings. Our intent is to withstand 
these critical appraisals, at least in their more radical guise.  
1. The Philosophical Contents of the Sophist 
First of all, one should establish as closely as possible the mean-
ing of the dialogue in its Author’s mind. With Plato this task is far 
from easy, for it is one of the issues that arouses the liveliest debate 
among critics. As elsewhere, I suggest following the classification 
put forward by Szlezák1 in an attempt to single out three elements in 
the dialogue: 
a) The overriding issue, the aggregating force that breathes life into the 
text and which Plato never lets his readers forget about; 
b) The thematic hub of the writing, the philosophically crucial 
question which assesses the worth of the overriding issue 
and/or confers it legitimate meaning; 
c) The foremost problem which the argumentative development 
must grapple with. 
This model has always appeared to me as capable of yielding 
some kind of clarifying effect. It is especially helpful in showing 
                                                     
1 T. A. Szlezák, Come leggere Platone, Rusconi, Milano 1991, pp. 126-127. 
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how the various facets of the discourse are not set alongside one an-
other but necessarily recall each other. The aim is to identify three ele-
ments, strongly-linked yet not mutually coinciding, among the wealth of 
opinions in Plato’s text. Weaving them into one another will provide us with 
the thread that can guide us through the dialogue.  
If we look for them inside our tangled text, we can say that: 
a) The overriding issue is surely the definition of sophist, hinted at 
in the unavailable diairesis of the philosopher, whence it is sev-
ered from; 
b) The thematic hub is the possibility of speaking of “not being” as 
Other (hence the connection between genera), alongside the 
relevant method and including diairesis and definition; 
c) The foremost problem is the defining framework of reality that 
is established by a suggested theoretical move rather than by on-
tology. This motion revolves around the concepts of whole and 
part, and the connection-distinction between one, whole and all, 
before coming to a head in the “doing-suffering” pair. 
If what I have surmised here bears some degree of likelihood and 
if the interweaving of the different strands is so clear as not to require 
any further ado, the attempt to relativise the widespread overstatement 
of the Sophist may seem doomed from the start, judging from the heft 
of the issues outlined above. Still, a trustworthy confirmation does ex-
ist, and it appears in the first page of the Statesman. 
It is at this point, just as the new dialogue begins in seamless formal 
and substantial continuity with the Sophist, once the causal link with the 
Theaetetus is established by having Socrates recall talking with the 
youth “the day before”, and just as we are reminded we are inside a 
“trilogy”, thus shoring up the resolve, expressed in Sophist 217 A, of 
defining sophist, statesman, and philosopher, that Plato highlights the 
theoretical disconnection between the two texts. Without this break-off, 
though, one would be at odds understand why Plato has written two 
dialogues instead of one, and why the young and skilled Theaetetus has 
suddenly and without apparent reason been replaced by his friend 
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Young Socrates, who has appeared in two dialogues without uttering a 
single word and, in the eyes of his contemporaries, was known as one 
of the leaders of the Academy.  
In short2, Plato is very keen to underline continuity but wishes to 
avoid it turning into a speculative assessment. Hence, he devises a 
game: the mathematician Theodorus unwittingly seems to hold the 
three subjects of sophistry, politics and philosophy as having equal 
worth, and places them on the same footing. Indeed, he states that if 
Socrates is thankful (once) after this first treatise, he will be thrice as 
much at the end of the discussion. The philosopher does not forgo 
the chance to tease his old friend on his own ground, that of mathe-
matics. Not only are the three subjects quite unlike one another, but 
the value ratio between them is markedly hierarchical and vertical. 
Whereas Theodorus’ speech seems to place them in a 1:1:1 ratio, 
they start to rise in a progression that not only is non-mathematical 
(1:2:3) but also is higher than a geometrical progression (1:2:4). 
Thus, the mathematical trick shows that, despite their link, the dis-
tance between these figures in terms of worth and importance is 
considerable.  
From Plato’s standpoint, then, the Statesman is a much more 
relevant dialogue than the Sophist in the ascent towards the Philoso-
pher. As for the Philosopher its importance was such that Plato has 
chosen to confine it to the oral tradition. 
Our task has thus changed: we must establish the reasons why 
this dialogue is less important than most critics think. 
We have already hinted at a possible first reason. This dialogue 
deals with the dialectics of being, eking to what has already been 
stated in the Fifth thesis of the Parmenides (cf. Appendix III). And 
all the evidence in both dialogues points to the conclusion that this 
                                                     
2 To examine these statements in more detail, please refer to the commen-
tary in Arte politica… 
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standard of reflection, that of ontology, is important but not meta-
physically crucial.  
A second reasons hinges on the role of the Sophist in the march to-
wards the unwritten Philosopher. As we have said above, it is a ques-
tion of examining in detail two passages of the diairesis, and of assess-
ing two distinct characters such as the sophist and the statesman, with 
whom the character of the philosopher is more easily mistaken. But if 
the true statesman is a philosopher whose business is politics or a poli-
tician dedicated to philosophy, the sophist is that conscious dissembler 
who wrecks the very foundations of rational thought, as we have seen 
expressly stated in the Sophist. If the Statesman has a construens func-
tion, the Sophist merely represents the destruens part of the process, al-
beit a necessary and worthwhile one.  
Oddly, the wide-ranging and detailed treatise on the Sophist ap-
pears wanting in two key points, especially if read in the scope of a 
unity of dialectic works and in the spirit of “seamless” continuity 
with the Statesman. 
Ironically, the first issue at stake is the definition of sophist. Plato 
has crafted a “delightful game” on this point. The end of the dialogues 
seems to have settled matters once and for all: the Stranger wraps up his 
definition by saying that it is the very truth (t¢lhqšstata, 268 D 4). 
And indeed it is. Yet it is not quite exhaustive or, to be fair, it is but we 
have to wait until the Statesman to find out. 
Here the Stranger beholds an oncoming motley crew of odd 
characters, whose outlandishness takes him aback. This scene give 
rise to a memorable exchange (291 A 5 - C 6): 
YOUNG SOCRATES – Who are these people whom you speak? 
STRANGER – They are men also very strange. 
YOUNG SOCRATES – Why? 
STRANGER – A very various race, at least as they appear now; 
for many of them are like lions and centaurs and other such 
monsters, and many more like satyrs and such weak and shifty 
creatures; and they quickly change into one another’s natures 
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and power; only now, Socrates, I think I begin to understand 
who they are. 
YOUNG SOCRATES – Tell me; you seem to have caught 
something strange. 
STRANGER – Yes; for ignorance the strangeness striks every-
body, and just now I myself fell into this experience – suddenly, 
I am surprised, seeing this troop who busy themselves with the 
affairs of the state. 
YOUNG SOCRATES – What troop? 
STRANGER – That of all the sophists, the greatest wizards and 
most practised in this art, who must be separated from those 
true statesmen and kingly men, no mater how difficult this 
separation is, if we are ever to see daylight the object of our 
present enquiry. 
Looking beyond the emphasis, then, we find that just now, in-
credulously, the Stranger has grasped that the truest and most dan-
gerous form of sophistry is the one that applies its skills, deceit and 
“mimicry”, to politics. And since there is no Stranger but only the 
philosopher-writer Plato, only at this point does he call attention 
upon this character with such emphasis as to leave no doubts about 
his “greatness”. The question is so crucial that Plato deems this 
“game” unfit to be left entirely to his reader’s wits. He takes up the 
matter anew, and closes it with a damning judgment against all so-
called politicians 
as being not statesmen but partisans, which preside the most 
monstrous reproductions, and themselves are reproductions; the 
greatest imitators and charlatans, they become also the greatest 
of sophists. 
YOUNG SOCRATES – It is likely that this name quite rightly 
appears to be in reprisal against the so-called politicians. 
STRANGER – Be it so. For us, this is undoubtedly similar to a 
drama: and the troop of Centaurs and Satyrs we contended to 
see a short time ago, and which we were in need to separate 
from the political science, has so now been expelled with a 
great effort. 
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This troop of monsters is therefore made up of the greatest and 
most harmful sophists, those of a political kind. 
Does all this refute the Sophist? Not at all, it simply sharpens the 
reader’s wits and tames his pride. Let us go back to the fifth diairesis 
(264 B - 268 D), and to the eighth definition: the sophist is a con-
scious dissembler. Let us read the passages before the last two: 
sophistry is a human art of image-making through body, a mimetic art 
of appearance based on opinion. This may be wrought by  
 
    a simple imitator      a dissembler 
          demagogue     sophist 
 
The demagogue dissembles in public in long speeches, while the 
sophist makes conversations in private. 
At this point, one is struck with the realization that the definition 
is given in the passage before last! There is already a conscious dis-
sembler, and it is the sophist. The distinction afterwards only refers 
to the field of action, but that “demagogue dissembling in public in 
long speeches” is a fully-fledged sophist, and – as the Statesman 
clarifies – of the worst kind.  
Plato had already told us everything, but hadn’t alerted us to this 
fact. Almost expecting us to flounder, he chose to lay it out again in 
the Statesman. 
I do not wish to appear repetitive, here: but if this way of pro-
gressing is not a game, albeit an earnestly philosophical and ear-
nestly protreptic one, then what is it? 
2. The diairetic Method 
The second level of “incompleteness” is to be found in the indi-
cations on the diairetic method3. Contrary to common opinion this 
                                                     
3 To examine these short notes more closely, please refer to the above 
quoted Pervasività e complessità della dialettica platonica… 
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appears early on in the Platonic dialogues. To my mind, the distinc-
tion between the two strands of wisdom, as highlighted in Apology, 
20 D-E, already presupposes a diairetic activity. This seems to ap-
pear in the Euthyphro, 7 B-D in the distinction between enmities 
about numerical data and those about ethical judgments and qualita-
tive assessments, and to a greater extent in the distinction, submitted 
by Socrates, between that part of justice which attends to the gods 
and the one which attends to men (11 E - 12 D). The next distinction 
(13 A-E) is just as diairetical: the attention that either benefits whom 
it is given or is a sort of collaboration to a project, an aid to realise 
something. 
If one seeks something more clearly structured and “undeniable”, 
the diairesis of Gorgias, 463 A - 466 A; 500 E - 501 C; 513 D-E; 
520 A-B, seems rather articulate, as summarised below:  
 Legislation ⇔  Sophistry 
  Soul    ↓       ↓   Soul 
 Justice   ⇔  Rhetoric 
Art                       Flattery 
 Gymnastic ⇔  Cookery 
Body    ↓       ↓   Body 
  Medicine  ⇔  Attiring  
Nonetheless, there is no doubt the “diairetic” dialogue par excel-
lence is the Sophist. The method is outlined here in a clear and un-
complicated manner, and then consistently applied to the very end. 
Still, this new “introductory” dialogue does appear wanting in a few 
crucial aspects, which appear settled in the Statesman, and in later 
works as well. 
The first major clarification is that the division must not always 
be twofold. As we have seen, this point was made as early as the 
Sophist with regard to clear-cut statements as well as for the presen-
tation of different sophist characters. If we were to outline a com-
prehensive diairetic tree of the sophists found in Greece, we would 
have to split it three ways: 
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          art 
     productive    acquisitive 
         by exchange    by appropriation 
         ¹     fighting     hunting 
      Merchant    ¶        ¶   
              Eristic    Hunter of youth  
Yet, only in the Statesman does Plato expressly state how some-
times it is impossible to make a twofold division, and so one must 
proceed as when slaughtering sacrificial livestock, neatly carving 
limb from body (287 B-D). For sure the act of separation should al-
ways be as close as possible to the number two, for Ideas are thus 
more easily discerned (262 B-E). However, one must first identify the 
“limb” of the object under scrutiny. The division will hinge on the reality 
before us, and does not have a sole and exclusive formal structure. 
Secondly, only the Statesman clarifies the role of those parts that 
are “discarded” as the process unravels. The “sundered” elements 
are not cast-offs, in fact, and must never be forgotten (Statesman, 
280 B). Instead, they are parts of a process that only makes sense if 
the differences between the terms examined are fully grasped. In 
other words, they must both remain at hand but with profoundly dif-
ferent roles: one constitutes a passage of the definition; the other 
element clarifies the meaning of the passage itself.  
Ultimately, the twofold nature of the diairesis only comes forth 
in the later dialogues. So far we have basically followed the process 
leading up to a definition: a diairetic tree that unwinds downward 
until the “definite” term is reached. This complex procedure, as ex-
emplified here by the differentiation of characters as well as diairetic 
trees, allows us to glimpse the other model (or function, if one 
chooses) of diairesis, made topical in the Statesman. At the end of a 
lengthy discussion, the Stranger states: 
that when there is an Idea it is necessarily a part of the thing of 
which it is said to be Idea, but there is no necessity that a part 
should be a Idea (263 B 7-9). 
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Furthermore, this second function is also philosophically deci-
sive: no Idea is thoroughly simple, but is always made up of parts 
that are Ideas themselves. An Idea can only be known, if the struc-
ture of the Ideas that constitute it is also known. The first model un-
derscores the “downward” movement leading to the understanding 
of a concept (albeit wrapped up in a bundle of connections); in this 
process a term is discerned from and connected to a wealth of oth-
ers. The second model highlights the inborn complexity of the con-
cept itself, discerning and sorting the multiplicity within each unit.  
Based on these premises, it is easy to see why Plato suggests a 
methodical procedure that can be comprised of two processes, one 
of separation and one of collation, to be implemented in a manner 
akin to weaving, i.e. schematically: 
1. having taken a whole based on the communion of certain things 
2. all the differences founded on the Ideas must first be grasped 
3. and then gather them together in an entity that embraces kindred 
things based on some kind of likeness (Statesman, 285 A-B). 
The weaving of the two processes along with the division of 
Ideas, as expressly stated here, are also confirmed and explained in 
the Philebus, 16 C-E, whence the following pattern can be drawn: 
1. In every enquiry one Idea defining the subject of enquiry must be 
laid down; 
2. Having grasped this Idea, one must examine whether it may con-
tain another two, three, or more Ideas. 
3. One must proceed in like manner for each one of these units. 
4. Ultimately, the original unit shall be seen to be one and many and 
endless, but also as numerous as the many that constitute it. 
5. One should likewise proceed with the endless: the definite num-
ber of the many must be established first, and it is intermediate 
between one and endless; only then can every Idea be let loose 
and be allowed to slip into the endless. 
We can see that this outlook on reality is perfectly consistent 
with what has been said above on the nature of the diairetic method, 
which is not one and is not just dichotomic. On the basis of the 
above considerations one understands the importance bestowed by 
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the Academy upon the diairetic process. Being at the same time both 
classificatory and defining, this process seeks to identify the single 
element within an intricate context and/or the intricacy within a sin-
gle element (being the same from a reversed viewpoint). In both 
cases the diaireses are necessary to identify those “syllables” be-
longing to a unitary paradigm, to a “grammar”.  
With this procedure due credit is given to the differences and the 
various parts, whose opposition to one another makes up reality as a 
whole. In this sense we can say that it is a typically dialectical method. 
As a final note, the diairesis has been adopted into Platonic dia-
logues quite early on but, despite its ample use in the Sophist, one 
must look beyond this text for rather better exposition of its features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
The Whole-Part relation in the Parmenides and the 
Theaetetus 
Given the concise nature of an appendix1, we shall merely express 
the issues schematically and with direct reference to the original texts. 
1. The Parmenides 
The Part-whole theme is central to the Parmenides. Indeed, the de-
velopment of the dialectical example «does also present a constant ele-
ment recurring at all levels: each one of these passages sees two proc-
esses at play, one of unification and one of division and multiplica-
tion»2. The ultimate reason for this is to be found in a vision of reality 
made up of “doing and suffering action” (cf. Appendix II) and does 
carry one primary consequence: «this dual process of unification (in a 
one-whole) and division (in a whole-part) hinges on the dogged and 
ongoing game of the whole and part relationship. Thus reality is de-
scribed as a mixture: the others are “one perfect whole, having parts”»3. 
As always the Platonic treatise is far from simplified; but is made 
more complex in that it is revolves around four terms (one, whole, 
all, and parts) that at times overlap and at others are distinct. 
The parts and the whole 
The first point is that the two terms, whole and parts, are correla-
tive; therefore each one necessarily implies the other 
                                                     
1 For any further reading, please refer to my two articles on dialectics 
quoted at p. 88 n. 10. 
2 Migliori, Dialettica…, p. 454. 
3 Migliori, Dialettica…, p. 458. 
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Every part is part of a whole… And what is a whole? Is it not 
that of which no part is wanting? (137 C 6-8). 
Still, the two terms do not hold a bi-univocal relation. Let us look 
again at the text, here abridged of all the (positive) replies uttered by a 
very young Aristotle. 
<1> All the parts are contained by the whole… And the one is 
and neither more nor less than all its parts... And the one is also 
the whole... If all the parts are in the whole, and the one is both 
all the parts and the whole, they are all contained by the whole, 
the one will be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in 
itself. (145 B 8 - C 7)4.  
A reality in its wholeness, then, is both the totality of parts and 
the whole. If we regard it as the totality of parts, these must be 
placed within the whole in itself. Thus a relationship is set up be-
tween the itself as whole and the itself as totality of the parts. 
<2> But certainly the whole is not in his parts, neither in all the 
parts, nor in some of them. 
<2.1> For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if there were any 
one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts; indeed, if 
this part is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it 
be in them all? 
<2.2> Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the 
whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, 
which is impossible (145 C 7 - D 6). 
If we consider the whole, this time it is not in the parts, unlike the 
previous scenario. The strong theoretical argument for this lies in 
2.2: the whole is greater than the part and therefore cannot be con-
tained therein. But if the whole is not in one, it can neither be in all. 
To sum up, if the whole has a certain feature, nothing can force 
every single part to show the same feature. 
                                                     
4 Cf. also 157 C-D. 
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<3> The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but re-
garded as totality of parts is in itself (145 E 3-4). 
The so-called “false antinomy” is revealed here, perhaps as a result 
of its significance. We stand before two opposite scenarios regarding 
the same reality but viewed from two different standpoints: regarded as 
a whole the one is in another, while it is in itself if regarded as totality 
of parts. In short, every reality is in another, and is meanwhile com-
prised of an array of parts that, by reason of being parts, are beneath. 
On the strength of this argument, Plato points out that in addition to 
these two relations (1. the parts in relation to the whole; 2. the whole in 
relation to an additional reality, an overriding all) there is a third one, be-
tween the one-part and the other parts, being that array of parts in which 
the single part is contained. The one, in fact, is not said to be “in another” 
but “in others”. Also, Plato stresses how incompatible relations thus 
come into being, in the sense that if one acts, the other cannot be. 
The one was shown to be in a whole, i.e. in itself … And the one 
is also in others… In so far as it is in others it would touch oth-
ers, but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from 
touching others, but being in itself would touch itself only (148 
D 6 - E 3). 
Plato makes the following point here. If we take the single 
part/other parts relation, we shall be looking at a set of direct asso-
ciations that are unlike and at odds with are looking at, if we con-
sider the totality of parts/whole relation instead. This somewhat ob-
vious procedure is justified on the grounds that a part of a reality is, 
in turn, a unitary reality, i.e. a whole: 
Well, must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of any 
reality, as it is a part and not parts, be also of necessity one, be-
ing a part? (153 D 5-7). 
The priority of the whole 
Plato clarifies another point. The fact of executing a development 
process whose goal is to accomplish a parts-based reality could sug-
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gest that the unitary principle is only reached at the end. In actual 
fact, the opposite is true, since the idea of this reality must be em-
bedded in every single passage for the procedure to work: 
And the one comes into being together with the part that first 
comes into being, and together with the second part and is 
not wanting in any part that comes later, whatever it is and in 
whichever order, until it has reached the end and becomes 
one and whole; it will be wanting at no time of the process of 
becoming, neither in the middle, nor at first, nor in the end? 
(153 D 8 - E 4). 
Only in the end, then, an act of completion is recorded. This 
comes about only now because the whole, ever-present in the guise 
of “logic”, ultimately finds itself accomplished as it has realized the 
totality of the parts in itself. 
Lastly, Plato underlines the pre-eminence of the whole, made up of 
parts, and the fact that these parts belong to this whole and none else: 
And parts, as we affirm, belong to a whole?.. But a whole is 
necessarily unity of many; and the parts will be parts of it: each 
of the parts is not a part of many, but of a whole... If anything 
were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely be a 
part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each 
one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it 
will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a 
part of each one; but if not a part of each one, it will not be a part 
of any one of the many; and not being a part of any one, it can-
not be anything else of all those, if it is nothing, neither part nor 
anything else, of none (157 C 4 - D 7). 
The complexity of the above-indicated connections is notewor-
thy. Surely, the part is one of the many parts that make up the 
whole. For this reason, one must clarify that it does not belong to the 
multiplicity of the parts in which it is, but to the whole. The underly-
ing argument is akin to the one above negating that the whole be-
longs to the parts: if it is a part of many it must necessarily be a part 
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of all, but then it would surely have to be a part of itself, which is 
impossible. Yet, if it is not a part of any, it can be a part of none, and 
even less of all, for it faces the risk of coming to nothing: it would 
be a part that is a part of nothing. The conclusion serves to reaffirm 
and shed light on the above:  
Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a cer-
tain Idea and of a certain one, which we call a whole, which 
reaches its perfection as unity of all; of this the part will be a part 
(157 D 7 - E 2). 
Thus all the elements are revealed: the part is not a part with ref-
erence to the group of parts it belongs to (be it the many or all); in-
stead, it pertains to a unity, warranted by a logic that is the Idea, a 
whole that exists all the time and reaches completion at the very 
moment it embodies the totality of the parts. The part is a part of this 
whole. 
An early outcome of all this is to bear down on how manifold re-
ality itself is perceived. 
If, then, the others have parts, they participate in the whole 
and in the one.... Then the others than the one must be one, a 
perfect whole having parts (157 E 2-5). 
Briefly, if we speak of a manifold reality as having parts, we 
speak of it as a unity, i.e. as a reality that participates in the whole 
and in the one. And this applies to the single part, too: 
And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must par-
ticipate in the one too; for if each of the parts is a part, the term 
“each” means, certainly, that it is one separate from the others 
and being in itself; if it must be “each”.… But clearly, participat-
ing in the one it must be other than one; for if not, it would not 
merely have participated, but would have been the one; whereas 
except the one itself no thing can be one.… Both the whole and 
the part must participate in the one; for the first will be one 
whole, of which the parts are parts; and the second one, as part 
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of the whole, will be one and singular part of the whole (157 E 5 
- 158 B 1). 
It becomes clear, then, that a pyramid-like structure takes shape 
before us. It is made up of many wholes, comprised of parts that are, 
in turn, one and whole. But for the very reason they are “one”, thus 
partake of the one, they are not a perfect unity but constitute an ar-
ray of unified parts. Given the significance of the argument, which 
propounds a reality flowing from a process of unification, a doing 
and suffering action relate an inevitably “mixed” reality, Plato as-
serts that “one” is veritably only the One in itself.  
Natural endlessness and the unifying intervention 
Plato does not stop at this conclusion but presses on, drawing 
several more from this line of reason:  
Then, that which participates in the one, will be other than 
one… the others than the one, being others, will be somehow 
many; for if they were neither one nor more than one, they 
would be nothing.… As those which participate in the one-
part and in the one-whole are more than one, must not those 
things which participate in the one be infinite in number?... 
Let us look at the matter thus. Is it not one that which par-
takes of the one, and does not partake of the one at the very 
time when it begins to partake of the one?… They are then 
multitudes in which the one is not present… And if we were 
to abstract from them with the mind the very smallest frac-
tion, must not that fraction, as it does not partake of the one, 
be a multiplicity and not one? (158 B 1 - C 4). 
The discourse picks up from the multiplicity of that which par-
takes of the one, but this time it examines the many (so to speak) 
prior to this partaking, i.e. as a sheer multitude wherein no process 
of unification is at work. Hence, even if we thought of taking a tiny 
part, we should forthwith see it as an unlimited multiplicity, for it 
does not (yet) partake of the one. This means that reality in itself is 
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endless; if this is not de facto the case, then credit is due to the ac-
tion of the Idea: 
And whenever we look at the reality in itself other than the 
Idea, whatever the examined part, always we will see it as 
being endless in number (158 C 5-7). 
The text the goes on to say that the action of the Idea is immedi-
ate: assuming that part and whole exist, it follows that a principle of 
order is already working on reality, framing it “horizontally” in rela-
tion to the other parts and “vertically” in relation to the whole: 
And yet, when each part has become a part, then it will have 
a limit in relation both to each other and to the whole; and 
similarly the whole will have a limit in relation to the parts 
(158 C 7 - D 2). 
Plato is now in a position to “hint” at one of the strong points of 
his metaphysical thought: 
The others than the one happen to have a relation with the one 
as with themselves; in them, as far as we can see, a different 
element appears which gives them limitation in relation to one 
another; whereas their own nature gives them in themselves 
endlessness (158 D 3-7). 
The nature of manifold reality, if taken in itself, is marked by the 
Endless, the apeiron. Only the action of something else on it does 
allow the presence of the limit, the peras, which determines every 
reality that, as such, is measured. This something else that achieves 
the unity of others is the Idea, in which a principle of order mani-
fests itself and without which the Endless would spread everywhere: 
And so necessarily, the being which is conceived by any mind 
must, I think, be broken up into minute fractions; indeed, it 
would always be as a set without unity. And such being when 
seen at a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, but when 
seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to 
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be endless in number, since it is devoid of one, which is not? 
(165 B 4 - C 2). 
Some additional references 
We wish to submit three more points in support of what the Par-
menides has allowed us to establish.  
A first, clear confirmation concerns the outlook on reality as be-
ing arranged into vertical “systems and sub-systems”. Outlined in 
the Statesman, it is rightly allied to the issue of the diairesis: 
STRANGER – … It is a better division, more consistent with the 
Ideas and with the dichotomic method, if you divided the num-
ber into odd and even, the human species into male and female; 
and separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other people; 
they could be opposed to the rest only when it is impossible to 
find two separable terms which were both genus (gšnoj) and 
part (mšroj). 
YOUNG SOCRATES – Very true; but just about this, Stranger, 
how can we have knowledge more clearerly that a genus 
(gšnoj) and a part (mšroj) are not the same, but things different 
from one another. 
STRANGER – Excellent man! You Socrates are asking me a very 
difficult task… later, in a leisure hour, we will follow up the 
tracks of this matter. Nevertheless, you must care not to imagine 
that you ever heard me expressing clearly this difference... that 
the Idea (edoj) and a part (mšroj) are distinct from one an-
other… When there is a Idea it is also necessarily a part of the 
thing of which it is said to be an Idea, but there is no need for a 
part to be an Idea. In this way rather than the other you must say, 
Socrates, I would always speak (Statesman, 262 E 3 - 263 B 1). 
The dialectical method itself, then, is warranted since every Idea 
is constituted of other Ideas. As we have seen, the whole is always 
comprised of parts that are in turn a whole. 
An easy rebuttal of this claim is that Ideas are in themselves uni-
tary and plain. For this reason a distinction need be drawn: Ideas are 
ontologically mixed even if plain, for they are perfect and unmin-
gled wholes. This state of affairs is validated, for instance, by the 
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Soul that God himself has brought to life in the Timaeus, 34 B - 35 
B, by means of a winding process of miscellany that ultimately 
yields a single idea (m…an „dšan, Timaeus, 35 A 7), i.e. a “plain” re-
ality. Another example lies in the distinction between the two Ideas 
(e‡dh dÚo, Philebus, 51 E 5) of pleasure, where the difference rests 
on the degree to which they are “mixed”. In fact we have: 1. impure 
pleasures (referring to the endless and thus having no measure) that 
are mixed and mingled with pain; 2. pure pleasures that (by fulfill-
ing the action of the limit) are measured (™mmetr…an, Philebus, 52 C 
4; ™mmštrwn, Philebus, 52 D 1), thus mixed, but not mingled. 
The second substantiation is drawn from the Philebus, in which by 
virtue of God’s power a limiting force comes to bear upon a reality 
marked by endlessness; this gives rise to a mixed cosmos in which  
there is much that is endless and an adequate limit, and over-
head, a cause far from negligible, which orders and arranges 
years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom 
and mind (Philebus, 30 C 4-7). 
Lastly, in the absence of this one-many view of reality, whereby 
every real thing is structurally both one and many, the outrageous 
assertion in the Philebus, 15 D 4-6 would be devoid of meaning: 
We say that the identity (taÙtÕn) of one and many in the reason 
recurs every time in each sentence, always in the past and pre-
sent alike. 
2. The Theaetetus 
The passage we are keen to examine begins where Theaetetus re-
calls (201 C) the words of an unnamed thinker5, according to whom 
knowledge is true opinion combined with logos. To this extent reali-
ties must be set apart from another, because those which do not en-
                                                     
5 The philosopher is likely to have actually lived, as Socrates asks to match 
up what they have both heard on the subject. 
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visage logos cannot be true objects of science. Asked whether he is 
able to elaborate on this distinction, the youth says he is unable to 
recall it but could only follow the reasoning if another person were 
to state it. 
This somewhat paradoxical situation leads up to a crucial interlude 
(201 E - 206 C) whose relevance can be grasped more easily if the 
foundational procedures espoused by Plato and singled out by Hans 
Krämer6 are borne in mind. 
The first procedure adopts a modus operandi based on simplifica-
tion: by breaking features down into ever smaller parts, in accordance 
with mathematical models, one seeks to attain the plainest root ele-
ments. This procedure is especially applicable to measurable realities. 
The second is the generalizing method, of Socratic origin, rising from 
the particular to embrace the general and on to the universal. Both cases 
ultimately lead to principles but in two very different senses. The first 
case illustrates the principle upon which a reality is built around; in the 
second, the principle whence reality itself is brought forth.  
This already tangled issue is bedevilled further by the fact that 
reality for Plato is essentially a mixture: that whence a thing is gen-
erated is often also that which it is made of7. The difference lies in 
that at times the component is and is in the admixture only, at others 
the component retains an ontological primacy, abiding in itself as an 
                                                     
6 Cf. H. Krämer, Platone e i fondamenti della metafisica. Saggio sulla teoria dei 
principi e sulle dottrine non scritte di Platone, with a collection of essential 
documents in a bilingual edition with bibliography, translated by G. Reale, Vita e 
Pensiero, Milano 1982, 19945, pp. 160-163. 
7 With an added problem, though, which Aristotle unsurprisingly insists 
upon: Ideas are separate yet they must act within reality, as a radical sepa-
ration gives rises to destructive contradictions, as Plato himself recalls in 
the last two objections raised by Parmenides in the dialogue named after 
him (133 B - 134 E). 
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indispensable condition for a derivative, subordinate and dependent 
reality. 
Primary elements and derivative realities (201 E - 202 D) 
We may now go back to the Theaetetus. Socrates steps in with an 
odd turn of phrase: he suggests trading one dream for another, citing 
a theory he has learnt from yet another nameless source. Their ar-
gument runs as follows; the primary elements (prîta stoice‹a, 
201 E 1) which make up (sugke…meqa) all things can only be 
named, as they accept no predication. Predicates such as “being – 
not being” cannot be attached to them, and neither can those root 
concepts that define a datum (such as “this”, “itself”, or the like). 
Their attribution, in fact, implies a reference to a conceptual land-
scape populated by sets of pairs such as same-other and one-many, 
which in the case of “primary” data do not even come into play. 
A logos cannot therefore be feasibly applied to any elements of 
the primary kind (Ðtioàn tîn prètwn, 202 B 1), but can only be 
named. Conversely, as the other things are made up (sugke…mena, 
202 B 3) of a combination of these elements, they contemplate a 
combination of names, hence a logos. In fact 
a combination of names is the essence of a logos (202 B 4-5). 
It cannot be ignored that the concepts expressed by this “dream”, 
if not belonging to Plato, are nonetheless kindred to Platonism, at 
least on three points. 
With regard to the nature of primary elements one only need take 
the Timaeus and the ongoing, unabated emphasis on the obscurity of 
that which is “primeval” (i.e. not comprised of the elements, for 
Plato): the receptacle is a «difficult and obscure genus» (49 A 3-4), 
«which in a hardly comprehensible manner (¢porètata) partakes 
of the intelligible», «which is very difficult to catch (dusalwtÒta-
ton)» (51 A 7 - B 1). As for chora, it is «perceived by a kind of spu-
rious reason without the help of sense, and is presented to us in a 
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dreamy manner» (52 B 1-3), and so on. Plato insists on the obscurity 
and a-rationality in the treatment of somewhat primary realities8. 
As for logos, it is hard not to think about the Seventh Letter, 342 
A-E, where logos is regarded as the second level of knowledge be-
low the noun and is made up (sugke…menoj, 342 B 6-7) of nouns 
and verbs.  
Lastly, there is something inherently Platonic in the casual way 
realities are said to be the result of combinations and “mixtures”. 
It seems, then, that the dream is a necessary device for hinting at, 
without going into detail, a wide range of theoretically weighty ele-
ments that will be handled more thoroughly in other Platonic writ-
ings. Besides, it provides the chance for another one of Plato’s 
games. He speaks of primary elements, cited once as such (201 E 3) 
and then as primary (202 B 1), or as elements (202 B 6), to highlight 
a problem. In fact, while these elements are unknowable and devoid of 
logos, they are, however, objects of perception (¥loga kaˆ ¥gnwsta 
enai, a„sqht¦ dš, 202 B 6); syllables, on the other hand, are 
known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. This 
considerable difference is worthy of much thought. 
Moreover, the dream forces us to confront the question of primary 
realities and of elements, which we know are two distinct issues; in-
deed, Plato hurriedly draws our attention to this diversity. Primeval 
elements, as such, are actually prior to the system of predicates, and 
consequently to the pair being – not-being. It is hard not to think of the 
Idea of Good and the wording in the Republic: 
and yet the Good is not being, but far exceeds the being in dig-
nity and power (Republic, VI, 509 B 8-10). 
It is clear that a similar ambit of reality cannot be rationalised, 
and hence it is not knowable according to a standard cognitive 
                                                     
8 To read more on this subject, cf. our points in the two articles on Timaeus 
cited at p. 61 n. 9. 
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model. In this light the abovementioned perceptibility stands out in 
all its ambiguity; it finds radically different application (or non-
application) depending on whether the subjects of the analysis are 
primary realities, primary elements, or non-primary elements. As 
Plato says in the Timaeus, if primary elements, for instance, cannot 
be perceived by the senses, the parts of a machine or the letters that 
make up a syllable indeed can. At the same time, some primary re-
alities may not have logos but be just as knowable by an immediate 
insight, an intuitive foreknowledge of this reality. The whole reason-
ing we are set to examine, then, is marked by a bizarre indistinction 
of data that, instead, ought to be utterly set apart from a merely pla-
tonic viewpoint. 
Socrates draws the conclusion that, according to the their posi-
tion, the soul that has true opinion without logos is true but cannot 
know, for it is unable to motivate its opinion. If, instead, it acquires 
logos it also acquires full scientific knowledge. In his answer to Soc-
rates, Theaetetus confirms he has already been acquainted with this 
same “dream” that has just been outlined (202 B-C). 
Socrates expresses his glee in triumphant tones, for there can 
clearly be no knowledge without true opinion and without logos. At 
the same time, however, he raises an issue regarding one of the 
statements made that he is unhappy about, despite its elegance. As 
usual Plato “plays” but he cannot be allowed to bear the responsibil-
ity for misleading his reader: somehow important matters must be 
better clarified. 
An in-depth look at letters and syllables (202 D - 206 C) 
The question is to take up again this distinction between elements 
(free of the “primary” tag, here) that are not knowable, whereas the 
“class of combinations” (202 E 1) is knowable. The relationship be-
tween letters and syllables is thus resumed, and with it the whole-
parts connection but not from the point of view of “primary” ele-
ments. Indeed, letters are primary in relation to the simplifying 
grammatical process; yet one only need think at the difference be-
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tween vowels and consonants to understand that letters are know-
able and definable. Besides, they are also mixed as the sounds they 
represent are both human and determined.  
Socrates raises a twofold question: how did we gain knowledge 
of letters? Is it true that syllables have logos but letters don’t? An 
eminently phenomenological enquiry is thus set forth, based on 
common experience. Throughout the simplifying process, in fact, 
syllables clearly feature a logos that the letter alone cannot have: SO 
is explained by S and O, while S does not feature a like explanation. 
This holds true for all letters, even for vowels that have a sound 
along with the vocal utterance. It is, however, noteworthy that just 
as Socrates claims letters to have no logos, he also fields a host of 
data showing how much logos can also be bestowed upon single let-
ters: S is a consonant with sound, B is a mute consonant, O is a 
vowel (203 A-B). 
Anyhow, this is not the element Plato is interested in. The truly 
“crucial” question is something else altogether: it remains to be seen 
whether the syllable is comprised of the sum of the elements or it 
consists in a single form („dšan, 203 C 6) arising out of their combi-
nation. In short: is it a whole made up of parts or is it a whole 
equipped with its own principle of order, a being of whom letters are 
elements and that, as we have seen in the Parmenides, 153 D 8 - E 
4, is only perfectly fulfilled when all the parts are provided? 
The first option is selected. In this case, though, the problem disap-
pears, since, knowing the couple, the elements that should be unknown, 
are necessarily known. If the syllable is “formed by” something, either 
the elements are known or it cannot be brought into being. 
The fact is that a mistake has been made: the right benchmark is 
provided by the second assumption: 
Indeed we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the 
elements, but rather one single form framed out of them, having 
by itself a separate Idea in itself one, other from the elements 
(203 E 2-5). 
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Clearly this confirms what has already been said with regard to 
the whole-part connection. The whole is prior to the part, even 
though it is made up of those parts. In fact, it is noted that what is 
being said about letters applies to all other elements as well (clearly 
second, not primary elements). 
At this point, though, instead of finishing off, Socrates starts to 
raise a number of issues. First of all, the two extreme theoretical po-
sitions take shape: a) the syllable cannot have parts for otherwise the 
whole is the totality of the parts; b) the whole made of parts is a sin-
gle form different from the totality of the parts. 
Theaetetus upholds this second assumption. Yet when asked the 
second question, on whether all and whole are the same thing, he re-
plies that the problem is not clear to him. When Socrates urges him 
to answer frankly, he says they are different things. Socrates ap-
proves of his courage but must now consider whether the answer is 
right (204 B). 
To establish whether the whole (tÕ Ólon, 204 B 7) and all (tÕ 
p©n) differ, one must first ascertain whether all in the plural (t¦ 
p£nta) and all in the singular (tÕ p©n, 204 B 10) are two separate 
concepts. The impossibility of this diversity is mathematically 
proven: 6 is both 6 x 1, 3 x 2, 4 + 2, and so on. This 6 is the same 
number, then, either taken as a whole or as a sum of parts. As many 
things are defined by number, from a stadium to an army, in these 
cases too the entire number of anything is not unlike that of the 
parts. Therefore the sum of the parts is a whole and that which has 
parts is comprised of the parts9. For it to be different, then, the whole 
                                                     
9 It is noteworthy to point out that the whole reasoning here is developed in 
accordance with the simplifying process, as it befits the treatise on the 
whole/part relationship. It is no coincidence, then, that the issue on the nature 
of the number is skipped outright: this nature reflects a precise idea, whereby 
6 is unlike 7; it follows that their components differ, and that (more important 
still) the former is even and the latter is odd. 
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cannot be made of parts, otherwise it would be an all, comprised of 
the totality of its parts. 
Socrates, however, maintains that a part cannot help but be part 
of a whole. Theaetetus, in turn, notes that a part can be part of the 
all. In this light, it appears, then, that whole and all bear the same 
features. Both whole and all lack absolutely nothing: if an object 
lacks anything it is neither whole nor all. On this basis, the two ele-
ments are said to be the same thing, so that in both cases they will 
amount to the sum of the parts.  
If this oneness of whole and all holds true, two possible outcomes 
arise when we examine the syllables. Either the syllable does not include 
its own elements among its parts, which is manifestly absurd and nonsen-
sical; otherwise, if the syllable exists through its elements it must be 
knowable as they are. We have returned to the scenario in which, in an 
effort to avert it, the syllable had been presumed different from the ele-
ments. The outcome of the present reasoning, then, is that:  
a syllable must surely be some unique indivisible idea (205 C 2). 
Yet even this statement, scarcely believable in itself, is far from 
exhaustive. In fact, this brings back to the fore the debate on primary 
elements, which, not being composite, lacked logos and were un-
knowable: this same predicament has now befallen the syllable, in 
that it is a single idea and has no parts. This aspect is so crucial that 
it is repeated and recalled several times10.  
Similarly, the scheme in which this line of reasoning has trapped 
us is repeated (205 D-E), but with some interesting insight. It is 
stressed that if the syllable is a whole constituted by many elements, 
the parts that make it up are knowable. At this point, though, Plato 
provides a clarification, which seems to suggest that not all has been 
solved: 
                                                     
10 205 C 2, 205 D 1-2, 205 D 5, 205 E 2. 
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if the totality of the parts appears us to be the same as the 
whole (205 D 9-10). 
If the syllable, in the contrary, is a unit devoid of parts, then the 
letters as well as the syllable will be unknowable. 
These are theoretical assumptions, though, that Socrates de facto 
contradicts through shared experience: the process of learning 
passes through the identification of elements. From this point of 
view it must be said that, with regard to the learning process of the 
subject matter, the elements are more knowable than the composite. 
Should anyone claim the element to be unknowable, then, he must 
be said to act for a joke. 
The conclusion is such that one cannot say the syllable is know-
able and the element is not. This is the only certainty arising from 
this treatise. If we examine the final pair of assumptions, we should 
infer that a) the syllable does not hold inside a principle of order, it 
does not have an Idea, it relies on the parts comprising it and is 
knowable on the strength of them; otherwise b) it is not knowable, 
due to its being an Idea. 
Plato has manifestly left us before a problem, which might be 
“solved” by referring to the Parmenides for issues regarding 
method, and to the Timaeus for issues regarding content. In this con-
text nothing more can be said. As with the topic of episteme, on this 
point too Socrates is unable to address the whole-part relationship 
properly, as well as the interrelation of the simplifying and general-
izing methods, and the twin questions of separation and the colla-
tion. The reason for this is that he lacks the element which only the 
Eleaticism of Parmenides and of the Stranger have bestowed upon 
Platonism: dialectics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II 
The Doing-Suffering Pair 
This is clearly not the right place for an exhaustive treatise of the 
issue, which is central to the picture of Platonic philosophy that the 
Sophist presents us with. We shall merely provide the reader with a 
cursory look at a variety of points and writings that back up what the 
Sophist has stated outright.  
1. Uniting and dividing: the Parmenides 
Plato has mentioned several times that a process of division and 
multiplication is underway. In view of its being and being one, in 
fact, reality in its immediacy appears split into countless parts: the 
simple act of establishing a one that is leads to a process of infinite 
division, into ones that are and beings that are one (Parmenides, 142 
D - 143 A). At the same time, lest a pure chaotic infinity is reached, 
the one is said to be implied in every single part of being. The same 
process of effecting divisions and multiplications, then, requires an 
activity that is both unifying and limiting (Parmenides, 144 C-D, 
144 E - 145 A, 158 A-D). This spiel is repeated several times in the 
Parmenides with regard to equality and inequality (149 E, 161 D-E) 
in terms of both the one-whole and one-part (cf. Appendix I).  
Not satisfied, Parmenides dares to assert that two interrelated 
processes are underway; these recall and reject one another at the 
same time: the coming of the one implies the end of the many and 
vice versa. Plato ties all the other process in with this setup, so that 
on the one hand we have the one, connected to the process of aggre-
gation, assimilation, and becoming like; on the other we have the 
many, connected to the process of separation, diversification, and to 
growing and diminishing (Parmenides, 156 B). 
Once this principle of unity is lifted, when the one is not and pure 
multiplicity is examined, the others in relation to each other, then 
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each (of others), it appears, taken as a whole, is a multiplicity in-
finite in number; and even if a man takes the smallest fraction, 
this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, due 
to the ongoing fragmentation, and from being the smallest be-
comes very great, as an object conjured up in a dream (Par-
menides, 164 C 8 - D 4). 
Yet the presence of two processes, pitted against one another, 
necessarily points to an doing and suffering action. 
2. Doing and suffering 
Plato first drew the reader’s attention upon this extraordinary pair in 
a somewhat uncanny text in the Euthyphro. Just as Euthyphro has ac-
cepted the notion of holy as that which all the gods love, Socrates raises 
a further objection (10 A): is holy that which is loved by the gods or is 
it loved by the gods because it is holy? The question is simple, as is the 
answer it calls for: the holy is loved by virtue of it being holy and not 
the other way round, namely, it is not holy because it is loved (10 D). 
Nonetheless, Socrates undertakes a lengthy examination that is hard to 
follow, a) to show the difference between that which suffers an action 
and the actor thereof, b) to affirm that, although the object has its very 
own nature, it is qualified by the agent’s action. A thing is not in itself 
patient, but it is as much as it suffers the action of an agent; a thing is 
seen inasmuch as somebody sees it, there are no beholders by virtue of 
things that are seen. In the same way, a thing is beloved because there is 
someone who loves it, and not the contrary, namely, the reason for 
someone loving something is that it is loved. 
The reasoning is set forth with regard to an outward action that 
does not meddle with the nature of the object but merely attaches 
another attribute to it. Let us leave aside the fact that one could eas-
ily construe actions carrying substantially different effects, hinted at 
when speaking of generated realities (10 C) that exist by virtue of 
being generated. Plato here points at this pair, stressing that suffer-
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ing an action only occurs when an action takes place; in turn, this 
hinges on the nature of the agent, not of that which suffers. 
We are just looking at nothing more than a warning sign here. 
More relevant still are a number of passages, in which Plato bluntly 
highlights the importance of this pair with respect to ontology. One 
only need consider the famous passage in Phaedo, 97 B - 99 C, in 
which topics discussed included the philosophical education of Soc-
rates and the Anaxagoras’ philosophy, and his regulating Mind: 
I argued that if anyone desired to find out the cause of the gen-
eration or destruction or existence of anything (g…gnetai À 
¢pÒllutai À œsti), he would have to find out what state of be-
ing or suffering or doing was best for each thing (À enai À 
¥llo Ðtioàn p£scein À poie‹n) (97 C 6 - D 1). 
The text moves along from classic ontological concepts (being, 
generating, destroying) to this “odd” association between being and 
doing/suffering. This pair reappears when Socrates says it would 
have been enough for him to understand  
how it is best for each one to do and suffer what he suffers (kaˆ 
poie‹n kaˆ p£scein § p£scei) (98 A 5-6). 
Plato rejects the absolute One in an equally telling manner, by re-
submitting an argument first set forth in the Republic: 
For, reality as a whole cannot at the same time both suffer and 
do (pe…setai kaˆ poi»sei); if so, one would be no longer one, 
but two (Parmenides, 138 B 3-5). 
The same thing cannot do and suffer (t¢nant…a poie‹n À 
p£scein) opposite things (Republic, IV, 436 B 8). 
Then nothing will convince us that the same thing can suffer or 
be or do opposite things. (t¢nant…a p£qoi À ka  ˆ e‡h À ka  ˆ
poi»seien) (Republic, IV, 437 A 1-2). 
3. The view of reality in the Philebus 
If timely hints and quotations may leave us somewhat cold, then 
an elaborate theoretical proposal that casts its shadow over an entire 
APPENDIX II 
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
 
124 
dialogue, of which it constitutes a cardinal element should arouse 
quite a different reaction altogether. Famously, in the first part of the 
Philebus Plato develops a long metaphysical treatise in which reality 
is described as a mixture that depends on the action exerted by a 
limiting principle, Peras, over an indistinct and endless reality, 
Apeiron (16 C - 17 A; 23 C - 31 E). This is not the place to dwell 
upon such treatise, which amounts to the boldest written example of 
Platonic protology. Let us just stick to a number of basic issues1. 
The text shows that Peras defines an otherwise indefinite reality. 
It is a principle of order, then, a limiting factor that puts an end to 
the action of the opposites, which mark the endless, by introducing 
number: thus, opposites are made measurable and compatible with 
one another. Peras is therefore the principle that actually makes the 
existence of the mixture possible. Socrates expressly states that this 
is true for all reality, from material things to music, and from the 
seasons to the many fine things in the soul (25 D - 26 C). 
Yet, this limiting Limit alone is not enough. The dialogue claims 
that God performs the function of efficient cause (26 E - 27 C; 30 C-
D) that acts according to a worthy motivation: the Goddess steps in 
for she sees the wickedness of endless things, the goodness of order, 
and that it can be brought about through the action of Peras (26 B 7 
- C 1). On the strength of a higher godly Cause, then, Peras can ac-
complish the order that is good for itself; in this way things can be 
redeemed. In line with this outlook, Apeiron acts as a kind of mate-
rial cause that is affected by the regulating action. And all is mixed. 
A picture of reality clearly emerges that makes everything depend 
on the doing/suffering action pair. 
 
 
                                                     
1 For further reading, please refer to my book: L'uomo fra piacere, intelli-
genza e Bene. Commentario storico-filosofico al "Filebo" di Platone, Vita 
e Pensiero, Milan, 1993, 19982. 
 
 
 
Appendix III 
The Dialectics of Being in the Parmenides (161 E - 162 B) 
I will simply summarize the facts arising from the text in a nec-
essarily sweeping manner.  
We are now in at the Fifth thesis, «where the negated One is and 
is not together. The negated One, however, is a “this”; it is an object 
of discourse and knowledge, so to some extent it is. Otherwise… we 
would end up by speaking of the Not One that is not or the One-that-
is. The dialectics of being is thus dealt with in this ambit: it appears, 
then, that the Not Being can be stated as different, and that there are 
several ways of partaking in the Being and in the Not Being»1. 
The text presents us with four options: 
1. the being of Being that is, i.e. the affirmation of pure Being; 
2. the being of Being that is not, i.e. relative affirmation of the 
Becoming; 
3. the not-being of Being, i.e. the relative negation of Becoming; 
4. the not-being of Not Being that is not, i.e. the negation of pure 
Nothing. 
This is clearly a simplified model, because in actual fact Being 
and Not Being can be interwoven in eight ways, four affirmative and 
four negative: 
a) the being of the Being that is, i.e. the affirmation of pure Being; 
b) the being of Being that is not, i.e. the relative affirmation of Be-
coming; 
c) the being of Not Being that is not, i.e. the affirmation of pure 
Nothing; 
d) the being of Not Being that is; 
e) the not-being of Being that is, i.e. the negation of pure Being; 
                                                     
1 Dialettica e verità…, pp. 477-478. 
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f) the not-being of Being that is not, i.e. the relative negation of 
Becoming; 
g) the not-being of Not Being that is not, i.e. the negation of pure 
Nothing; 
h) the not-being of Not Being that is. 
It is now clear why Plato has operated a number of omissions: 
with regard to points d) and h), manifestly unacceptable for they 
speak of a positively existing Not Being and to points c) and e) pat-
ently self-contradictory. Only the two extremes remain, then: the af-
firmation of pure Being and the negation of Nothing, and the middle 
ground of phenomenal reality that is and is not, and thus it becomes. 
«The fact that this treatise has been carried out in the Fifth thesis 
demonstrates that, in the absence of the One, the fundamental dia-
lectical exchange is between Being and Not Being; and on account 
of this, with the exception of Being that is affirmed and Not Being 
that is negated, everything becomes. However, the Thesis reaches a 
conclusion whereby, in the absence of the One, this Becoming is 
proven to be inexplicable as no consistent form thereof can be iden-
tified. The absence of the One lends support to the claim that this re-
ality is in motion and yet is not, it mutates and does not mutate, it is 
born and dies yet it is not born and does not die. The absence of the 
One, then, outlines a kind of reality that can easily fall prey to 
Zeno's antinomies. This is the only thesis among all the ones exam-
ined that we believe closes with a true aporia, revealing the unfeasi-
bility of this assumption»2. 
 
 
                                                     
2 Dialettica e verità…, p. 478. 
 
 
 
Exchanges with the Author 
Bruno Centrone* 
Maurizio Migliori has provided us with much food for thought in his 
stimulating, sometimes provocative, lessons on the Sophist. I will espe-
cially dwell upon the dissenting and divergent points, because to empha-
size my assent to certain other points would not add a great deal to the 
theses of the author. Nonetheless, I wholeheartedly agree with several ar-
guments. To name but a few, the thesis on the protreptic nature of the dia-
logue, the idea that the diairetic procedure in the “dialectic” dialogues 
comes across as a complex notion and not easily attributable to predeter-
mined patterns. Moreover, it is rightly noted that no parricide actually 
takes place in the dialogue, but an “overreaching and fulfilling” of the po-
sitions of Parmenides. Finally, I also subscribe to the belief that the Soph-
ist ought not be regarded as the peak of Platonic thought.  
1. A question of method 
First, though, I wish to make some observations regarding the erme-
neutical and methodological premises laid down by Migliori in the first 
reading. Given that we are dealing with a “hawkish” esoteric, it is sur-
prising that in many ways his criteria of Platonic ermeneutics often ap-
pear closer to those of Schleiermacherism, opposed by the Tübingen 
school (often with very good reason), and to some of its recent devel-
opments by contemporary commentators even more so from the Ger-
man academic field (Michael Erler and especially Theodor Ebert spring 
to mind, leaving the Straussian school aside). Plato lays out before his 
readers a range of problems, which the more alert ones are in a position 
to unravel and solve without straying from the written text, or at least 
from the body of Platonic works (intra-textual esoterism). In doing this 
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he makes use of riddles, odd references, and sometimes actual tricks, 
such as the deliberate insertion of argumentative fallacies. 
I am personally somewhat wary of some extreme applications of 
this method, and I would distinguish between  
a) problems consciously submitted as such and left unresolved, 
which the mindful reader can actually tackle himself in the 
light of other Platonic writings. This I believe is the case with 
the aporetic dialogues (supposing – not without hardship – that the 
reader or listener of the day could lay his hands on the entire body 
of Platonic works at the same time; more likely, the aporetic dia-
logues amounted to a kind of protreptic to oral teaching, regardless 
of the subject being taught; and 
b) riddles and “tasks”, betoken by alleged errors made at some point 
in the reasoning, which Plato deliberately plants in key spots to 
stimulate thought in the more watchful readers. 
Of all the necessary preconditions Migliori lays down for rea-
sonably speaking of willful errors, I agree with the first one: the er-
ror must be manifest and not inferred by us. Yet, when the second 
precondition states that it must be manifest from the standpoint of 
Plato’s logic and can therefore be inferred through it, we run into a 
problem: Plato’s logic, in fact, is in itself the riddle that ought to be 
solved beforehand, and each scholar perhaps fancies himself to be 
more steeped in this logic than others. For the very reason that the 
error can be misleading, I believe it must be undeniably apparent. 
But I don’t believe this to be the case, for instance, with the passage 
from the Philebus examined by Migliori. I shall then set out to fix 
some points about this argument, at least insofar as I can make out.  
The anamnesis at 34 B 2 ff. is thus identified in its otherness 
from mneme: 
1. the soul retrieves without the body sensations experienced be-
forehand with the body (met¦ toà sèmatoj); 
2. the soul retrieves without the body sensations (or mathemata) 
experienced beforehand and thence forgotten. 
BRUNO CENTRONE 
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
 
129
The one thing that seems clear to me in this distinction is that an-
amnesis necessarily entails mneme (mn»mhn ... ¢napol»sV p£lin). 
In this situation the former coexists with the latter (that is why, to 
say it all, kaˆ mn»maj might be preserved). The distinction between 
anamnesis and mneme does not imply their mutual exclusion: there 
can be mneme without anamnesis (when it is swthr…a of sensation, 
34 A 10), but not anamnesis without mneme. When it is said, A 35 - 
B 11, that the soul apprehends the replenishment by help of mem-
ory, I sight no error therein. If anything, perhaps the use of the more 
specific term, anamnesis, would have been more fitting. Still, even 
this is not entirely convincing. Although we are speaking here of an-
amnesis with regard to feelings experienced beforehand with the 
body, the problem surrounding the “first time”, however, cannot be 
explained by anamnesis alone. The soul’s active power explains its 
ability to recover feelings currently absent or forgotten, but in the 
abovementioned case this ability must also be shared by animals, 
whose desire to drink cannot but be structurally akin to man’s. This 
anamnesis must always be active even in a standard appetitive proc-
ess. That we are speaking of anamnesis here may, I fear, recall the 
full-rounded anamnesis in the Phaedo, a reminiscence of ideas that, 
in its highest fulfillment, is most likely reserved to the philosopher. 
It would consequently follow that the distinction made in the Phile-
bus is overplayed. Unlike with philosophical anamnesis, there sim-
ply is no condition prior to incarnation where the soul could have 
sensations, although such a thing could explain how the recollection 
of a given sensation might arise in the case of a “first time”.  
On the whole I am wary of readings of this kind for an even 
broader reason: if the alleged riddles have escaped the attention of 
readers for millennia (to my knowledge Migliori’s reading of the 
Philebus passage is utterly original), then Plato has spectacularly 
failed in his endeavours as a writer, in those paragraphs at least. 
Considering it is hard enough to find the answer to riddles mani-
festly laid before us as such, then perhaps it behoves us not to go 
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looking for riddles that ought to be reckoned as such first, and upon 
whose nature all may not agree.  
2. The importance of the Sophist 
Turning our attention to the Sophist, one of the hallmarks of Mig-
liori’s reading is the relative importance of the dialogue, and ontol-
ogy in general, for Plato. I am loath to venture along this path be-
cause “assessing” the importance of a dialogue is perhaps a well-
nigh impossible operation. Just as Migliori is willing to assign it 
even a relative importance, so we may easily concede that the dia-
logue does not represent the highpoint of Plato’s philosophy. 
I shall merely point out that one of the arguments fielded strikes 
me as somewhat unconvincing; it centers on the distance between 
the sophist, statesman, and philosopher characters and their different 
ranks, and maintains that the incomplete trilogy actually represents a 
steady advance towards the (unwritten) Philosopher. The argument 
applies to the characters and not to the contents of the dialogues, but 
there is no gainsaying that things of greater worth may still appear in 
a work whose subject matter is of lesser value. If Migliori were right 
the Statesman ought to be deemed a philosophically more relevant 
dialogue than the Sophist, which is certainly a fair enough assessment. 
Still, in the author’s outlook, would it not perhaps be better to acknowledge 
that, each in its own way, both dialogues contain explanatory applications 
of a method whose uses were surely not meant to run out with the end of 
the dialogues? 
Another strong point in Migliori’s reading is the relative impor-
tance of ontology, and once again the matter cannot be lain to rest in 
a few sentences. For sure, though, the relativizing process is less 
likely to succeed from within the Sophist (unsurprisingly, Migliori 
must once again rely on the Parmenides, cf. pp. 95 ff. and Appendix 
III) and only seems feasible if external elements are considered (and, 
in my view, rightly so at that). 
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At this stage, however, one cannot ignore the fact that Aristotle, who 
is also the main witness to the agrapha dogmata, seems not to have lent 
much weight to the possible super-essentiality of One or of Principles. 
In his criticism of the substantiality of One and Being, viewed by 
Platonists as genera, they seem to be pegged at the same level and 
the issue is famously regarded as the most important and necessary 
one for establishing truth (Metaphysics, Beta, XI aporia). From an 
esoteric perspective that hinges largely upon the reliability of the 
Aristotelian account, this aspect becomes hard to disregard. Yet, if 
cutting ontology down to size is a reasonable effort, the Sophist of 
all the dialogues seems like the least suitable for the purpose. 
3. The supreme genera 
The Sophist’s partial downgrade is tied with the idea of the 
protreptic game, which Migliori insists upon at several stages. He 
claims one of the signals that Plato is speaking “in jest” is to be found 
in the less than unequivocal indications given on the number of 
classes. Although the number is set to five, the reservations and allu-
sions are such that Migliori concludes the terms involved are actually 
eight, having previously added absolute not-being, relative not-being 
and relative being. Now, one can safely agree that the number five has 
no definitive connotation, if anything because even the “supreme” be-
comes a relative term when there is a plurality of megista. But what 
are the terms involved actually? Are they ideas, meta-ideas, genera, 
classes, mere logical connections? An underlying problem of the 
Sophist is the nature and actual status of the ghene. Migliori speaks of 
‘meta-ideas’, or at times only refers to this genera as ‘ideas’. He also 
considers those categories obtained by negating a term, i.e. not-
beautiful, not-big, not-good (cf. pp. 84-86) to be genera. At this point, 
clearly, the genus loses any ontological heft as it is unable to carry out 
an effective division of reality. After all, academics had notoriously 
disregarded any ideas concerning negative realities.  
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This situation appears even more manifest in the case of absolute 
not-being, which Migliori includes among the terms under scrutiny, 
only to recall later (p. 87) that Plato had made clear his discourse did 
not retrieve absolute not-being, and had reaffirmed that not-being is not. 
All this demonstrates that the terms involved cannot be construed as 
genera or ideas in the full sense. That an idea or class might refer to not-
being would mean true teras for the Sophist. If the question merely 
rests on defining even casual clusters of beings or possible logical con-
nections, there is no problem. However it is very difficult, and I think 
even Migliori would not go that far, to claim that this is simply Plato’s 
will. Perhaps the game is to talk in terms of genera or eide but to con-
ceive them in a different manner? At this point, though, the number 
eight (along with the number five) also loses any importance. 
The most troublesome of all seems to be the distinction that Migliori 
traces between relative not-being and other. Not-being, in the words of 
Plato himself, is a part of the other. Migliori claims the difference here 
is not at a semantic level but is to be found in the nature of the concepts, 
and backs this up by showing that their respective opposites are not the 
same: the opposite of other is same, and that of relative not-being is 
relative being. For the sake of precision, though, if other and relative 
not-being are not semantically distinct because they can be used in the 
same sense in a specific sense (the italics are the author’s, p. 87 n. 9), 
the same must apply also to Being and Same, where “being” means 
likeness in a specific acceptation. According to Migliori (cf. pp. 84-86) 
the other determines genera (not-beautiful, not-good, etc.) and these are 
pervasive to varying degrees depending on the negated term. Hence, it 
does not correspond to not-being, which is, in turn, juxtaposed to being 
and is all-pervasive. It seems undeniable to me, however, that not-being 
can only be said to be part of the other at the extensional level. Having 
said this, though, the distinction is hard to keep up: it follows that what-
ever is not-x must be deemed other than x (and thus is a kind of the 
other), but it is also a kind of not-being on account of its being not-x. 
The part of the other that is opposed to being is a “genus” of all the 
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other parts that are in opposition to big, beautiful, etc, and constitute the 
range of the other. If the deduction of not-being as genus is based on its 
opposition to being in the range of the other, then all the “genera” of the 
other (not-big, not-beautiful, etc) are summoned to form as many gen-
era, with seemingly disastrous consequences. 
In this way any casual cluster of composite beings would identify a 
ghenos. I am neither sure of the meaning of the phrase «these negatives 
are always used to speak of what is other and not of what is contradic-
tory». Indeed, “not-beautiful” does not necessarily mean “ugly”, and 
this is undeniably stated in the Sophist, but the fact that a negation does 
not mean opposition does not warrant Migliori’s branching out into the 
contradiction, when he claims the negation does not refer to an indefi-
nite opposite. Even when meaning “other than big”, not-big identifies a 
necessarily indistinct class of things and both terms encompass the two 
sides of the contradiction (each x is big or other than big). 
Generally, what are the conditions for the distinction and inference 
of the existence of a genus? Whereas the semantic level is undoubtedly 
crucial (cf. for instance 254 D 11-12), the issue of semantics pertaining 
to single classes must necessarily undergo a clarification of the func-
tions of the verb “to be”, (i.e. existential, copular, of identity) and Mig-
liori fails to confront this aspect head on. Much learned opinion has said 
that Plato has made use of these distinctions without directly or openly 
elaborating them theoretically. What cannot be denied is the persistence 
of ambiguous uses (the crucial question is whether they are the result of 
poor distinction or deliberate will). An example for all is at paragraph 
256 A 3-5: motion is other than same, and therefore is mè tautòn, not-
like, for it is not the Same; there is a manifest shift here in the word “is” 
from identity to copular function. Clearing such ambiguities is then an 
indispensable preliminary exercise in order to establish the correct 
framework of the genera and, consequently, for a rightful assessment of 
platonic ontology in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arianna Fermani* 
Overall, it is hard to argue with someone you agree with. More-
over, when the agreement is practically across the board, as in the 
case of Migliori’s Lectura Platonis on the Sophist, overreaching the 
mere contents and stretching to the methodological framework of 
the enquiry, then it just gets harder. What I find convincing and wor-
thy of endorsement are, on one side, the conclusions of the analysis, 
in addition to its very own methodological framework on the other. 
This is rooted in a broad examination of the dialogue in its totality, a 
tense and timely confrontation with the written text carried out with 
a string of pressing arguments, and (ultimately) a constant referral to 
the other Platonic works which find in the Sophist the reason for 
their being and fulfilment. 
Rather than start a discussion here, I shall simply provide a num-
ber of additional elements I believe to be of interest to the debate it-
self, extending it to another dialogue, the Phaedrus. The Author has 
shunned a direct confrontation with this dialogue but I think a few 
very close points of contact can be found with regard to the main con-
ceptual hurdles identified within the Sophist. 
Lastly, given the necessary brevity of this contribution to the dis-
cussion, we shall proceed somewhat schematically, drafting in broad 
detail the key features of this contact. 
1. Phaedrus 265 C 9 - 266 B 1: the diairetic and synoptic pro-
cedures 
The first and more remarkable point of contact between 
Phaedrus and the Sophist is surely the presentation in the former of 
the two fundamental moments of Platonic dialectics: the diairetic 
and synoptic procedures. 
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The examination of the three speeches on Eros in the first part of 
the dialogue (the first is by Lysis, the other two by Socrates) leads 
Socrates to present the two principles in detail: 
SOCRATES – There are two kinds of procedures, of which it 
wouldn’t be bad if someone could have the skill to catch the 
power.  
PHAEDRUS – What are they? 
SOCRATES – The first way to proceed consists in returning to a 
single Idea by taking a global look at scattered particulars in 
many ways (e„j m…an te „dšan sunorînta ¥gein t¦ pollacÍ 
diesparmšna), so as to clearify, by defining each of the things 
we want to teach… 
PHAEDRUS – And what about the second kind of procedure, 
Socrates? 
SOCRATES – It consists, on the other hand, in being able to di-
vide into Ideas (kat’e‡dh dÚnasqai diatšmnein), according to 
the natural formations (kat’¥rqra Î pšfuken), and attempting 
not break any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two latest 
discourses assumed the madness as a single Idea; and then, as 
the body, which is one, becomes two parts with the same name 
(dipl© ka  ˆÐmènuma), called left and right side, so our two dis-
courses conceived of madness as naturally one Idea for us; the 
first discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide 
this (Ð mn tÕ ™p’¢rister¦ temnÒmenoj mšroj, p£lin toàto 
tšmnwn), and did not desist until it found in them a sort of left-
handed love, which it very justly reviled; but the other discourse, 
leading us to the right-hand part of madness, found another love 
having the same name as the first, but divine, which it praised as 
the author of our greatest benefits. 
In this passage where Socrates explains the operations hitherto per-
formed in the dialogue1, we therefore find a remarkably clear exposition 
                                                     
1 For an in-depth look at the relationship among the several discourses on Eros put 
forward in the Phaedrus and on the operations Plato performed in the dialogues, 
please refer to my own paper: Eros tra retorica e filosofia. Il “gioco” polisemantico 
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(it has been noted in fact that «this elucidation on the two functions of 
the dialectic method, synoptics and diairetics, is the clearest and sharp-
est Plato has ever spoken on this topic2) of those two moments of 
dia…resij and sunagwg» whereupon Platone will hinge the entire dialec-
tic reflection contained in the following dialogues3. 
Claiming this dual dialectic process, and especially the diairetic 
one, is an immediate cross-reference to the Sophist is almost a mun-
dane observation. In actual fact, with regard to this dialogue and (to 
some extent) to the Statesman, the relevant passage presents further 
elements of likeness I feel are noteworthy: 
1. the constant mention to the question of names, indeed ongoing 
throughout the whole Phaedrus. In this sense the dialogue 
shows how the eŒdoj – Ônoma relationship cannot always be qualified 
as simple and bi-univocal (in the sense that every name corre-
sponds to a form and/or a form to every name)4, but turns out to 
be much more complex, as exemplified in the case of eros, i.e. 
the only name that conceals many different and, sometimes, op-
posing forms (the human and “left-handed” part, and the divine 
“right-handed” part). In this sense one should construe, on the 
one hand, the Socratic warning to beware of all those realities 
                                                     
del Fedro, in La struttura del dialogo platonico, edited by G. Casertano, Loffredo, 
Naples, 2000, pp. 297-319. 
2 W. Jaeger, Paideia, Die Formung des griechischen Menschen, Walter de 
Gruyter & Co., Berlin und Leipzig 1944 - Oxford University Press, New 
York 1945; Italian translation by L. Emery e A. Settis: Paideia. La For-
mazione dell'uomo greco, Introduction by G. Reale, Indexes by A. Bellanti, 
Bompiani, Milan 2003, p. 1667. 
3 Cf. Fifth Lecture, pp. 81 - 84. 
4 Cf., for example, Phaedrus 238 A-B; 238 A 2-5: «Now excess has many 
names, and many members, and many forms (poluènumon – polumelj g¦r 
kaˆ polumeršj). And of these forms the one which rises above the others 
gives its bearer the name derived from it». 
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(like Eros) that have “two parts with the same name” (Phaedrus 
266 A 1)»5, and, on the other, the outspoken allegation, fully de-
tectable in the critique issued against the Lysian oration6, of the 
fallibility of names and the intrinsic inadequacy of this cognitive 
level. Just as in the Sophist where «Plato repeatedly draws our at-
tention to the shortcomings of the terms»7, and the difficulty of 
conducting an enquiry on a multiform reality8 is repeatedly 
stressed, Phaedrus advises against establishing a simplistic rela-
tion between the level of Forms and that of names. This link is 
seen as one of the crucial hubs for implementing a correct se-
mantic and ontological investigation of reality; 
2. the example of the carver to demonstrate the right way of sepa-
rating Ideas. In outlining, albeit broadly, the hallmarks of the 
diairetic procedure, which consists in subjecting the object of 
enquiry to a series of cuts and divisions9 and reaching, as stated 
in Phaedrus 277 B 7-8, «that which can be sundered no further» 
(mšcri toà ¢tm»tou tšmnein), Plato provides a crucial methodologi-
cal indication for establishing a correct diairesis: Ideas need to 
be severed where the joint is by nature and without breaking any 
part off, trying not to make the same mistake that befalls those 
hamfisted butchers who slaughter without heeding the natural 
separation of the limbs (Phaedrus 265 D). The same parallel be-
tween the ramification of Ideas and the separation of animal 
limbs is not taken up again in the Sophist, but in the Statesman. 
                                                     
5 And, consequently, his warning at 237 C that one must know the nature of 
what one is advising about so as not to risk failure, having failed to come to 
an understanding with one another and oneself. 
6 Beautiful for the choice of words but inadequate for its content, having ut-
terly disregarded the “dual limbs of eros”. 
7 Second Lecture, p. 49. 
8 Cf. Sophist 223 C, 226 A, 240 C. 
9 Phaedrus 266 A 3-4: «cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this». 
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As Migliori notes, this dialogue clarifies many of the operations 
performed in the Sophist and where «Plato expressly state how 
sometimes it is impossible to make a twofold division, and so 
one must proceed as when slaughtering sacrificial livestock, 
neatly carving limb from body (287 B-D)» and that «one must 
first identify the “limb” of the object under scrutiny»10. 
This clarification in the Statesman actually seems to hold true for 
the Phaedrus as well; the diairesis Plato implicitly employs here and 
reveals only later on11 does not proceed rigorously by two. Indeed, 
once the presence of two kinds of madness is established (man…aj dš 
ge e‡dh dÚo) (265 A 9), and having set apart the human and negative 
side of the man…a from the positive, divine one (265 A 9-11), the lat-
ter is further split into four parts:  
The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds (tšttara 
mšrh dielÒmenoi), with reference to four gods: we have as-
signed the prophetic inspiration to Apollo, the initiatory to 
Dionysus, the poetic to the Muses, the erotic to Aphrodite 
and Eros12. 
If we can observe for Phaedrus, as Migliori has done for the 
Statesman and the Sophist, that «the division will hinge on the reality 
before us, and does not have a sole and exclusive formal structure»13, it 
should also be said that the clarification of the diaireses completed 
within the dialogue comes with the emphasis that the discourse 
                                                     
10 Fifth Lecture, p. 100. 
11 As M. Migliori has noted in L’uomo fra piacere, intelligenza e Bene, 
Vita e Pensiero, Milan 1993, pp. 21-22: «Plato’s game often consists in 
hinting at things and, later, revealing what has just been hinted, or in not 
finishing an argument and then submitting a conclusion without declaring it 
as such». 
12 Phaedrus 265 B 2-5. 
13 Fifth Lecture, p. 100. 
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made is indeed convincing, but not thoroughly (265 B 8: «compos-
ing a discourse not wholly lacking in persuasive might», oÙ 
pant£pasin ¢p…qanon lÒgon) given that, while having grasped the 
truth, he has also been thrown off course at times (265 B 6-8: «on 
the one hand getting to some truth and, on the other hand, even 
straying off the track»). 
A groundless discourse 
The second discourse of Socrates, the one called upon to provide 
the definitive word on eros, is not false but, having been expressed 
in poetic form, it inevitably ends up as proving itself a “game” (265 
C 8-9 «it seems to me that in everything else we have truly played» 
tù Ônti paidi´ pepa…sqai). As rightly observed, the poetic allegory 
offered by Socrates’ discourse «though highly powerful – cannot re-
place the argumentative groundwork of the objective determinations 
contained therein, and therefore it cannot hold good as a dialectical 
treatise. And the discourse on Eros is a “game” insofar as it is de-
tached from a dialectical treatment that is valid to all effects and 
purposes»14. 
That Socratic discourse is “groundless”, in the sense it is not 
shored up by an adequate rational exposition, is also confirmed by 
an immediately subsequent statement, in which some things are 
claimed to have been «said at random» (™k tÚchj ·hqšntwn). This ut-
terance can neither be ignored nor taken literally15 and should rather 
                                                     
14 T. A. Szlezák, Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie. Interpretationen zu 
den frühen und mittleren Dialogen, W. de Gruyter, Berlin 1985; Italian translation 
by G. Reale: Platone e la scrittura della filosofia. Analisi di struttura dei dialoghi 
della giovinezza e della maturità alla luce di un nuovo paradigma ermeneutico, Vi-
ta e Pensiero, Milan 1988, 19892, p. 95. 
15 As Szlezák observes, Platone e la scrittura…, p. 93: «no-one should 
want to take this limitation literally: Plato does not make Socrates speak at 
random. However it would not be less wrong to act as if this limitation did 
not exist; it too does not occur in the text by chance». 
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be framed and appreciated in the light of that perspective of inade-
quacy and groundlessness that marks the Phaedrus. The mythical 
exposition of the different kinds of madness and their inner work-
ings, and the subsequent clarification of the two dialectical proce-
dures employed (albeit little more than sketched out) certainly can-
not be deemed enough to found the treatise upon. Hence this trea-
tise, which surely has not been steered at random, nonetheless re-
mains “groundless” (™k tÚchj). 
The inexperience of Phaedrus 
This, after all, is the high point that Socrates might have reached 
in a discussion with Phaedrus: an intelligent, willing, yet unskilled, 
young man, who has never heard of the two dialectical procedures 
(cf. 265 D 2; 265 D 8) and often appears appeasing throughout the 
dialogue rather than truly swayed by the Socratic argumentations16. 
Phaedrus’ inexperience and his inability to follow a “philosophi-
cally grounded” discourse on dialectics account for the plainness17 
and conciseness of the exposition of the two dialectical procedures, 
as well as for the impossibility of providing the elements for its 
foundation within the dialogue itself. If this is true, one cannot dis-
regard that in the Platonic dialogues, as Migliori states, «there are no 
interlocutors and there is no debate: this is fiction. In actual fact 
                                                     
16 In this sense one cannot but agree with Szlezák: «Socrates is alone in debating 
with Phaedrus: what he has to say is directed at him personally; he would say these 
things differently to another, or perhaps he would not say them at all, depending on 
the situation and the nature of his partner in the conversation» (Szlezák, Platone e 
la scrittura…, p. 76). 
17 Brisson (Platon, Phèdre, Traduction, introduction et notes par L. Brisson, suive 
de Le pharmacie de Platon de J. Deridda, Paris 1988 pp. 53-55), has rightly 
noted that, aside from the clarity with which these two dialectical procedures are 
presented in the Phaedrus, this exposition appears nonetheless more simple and 
«beaucoup plus primitive» than the long and elaborate diairesis in the Sophist and 
in the Statesman. 
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there is only one great master, a philosopher gifted with true writing 
genius, who can lead us wherever he wants»18. Yet even if what has 
been said for Euthyphro also holds good for Phaedrus, namely that 
«to understand what is going on, we must withstand the spell of the 
dialogue and remind ourselves that neither Socrates nor Euthyphro 
exist, and that Plato’s hand has wrote the words we are poring 
over»19, then we must also say that the Author has decided Phaedrus 
was unable to enlighten us any further on this topic. 
Besides, however concisely, the reference to the dual ascensive 
and descensive processes reaches the clearest of conclusions: the 
ability to perform this dual motion is the condition for thought and 
speech20 and those who are able to perform it can be rightly called 
dialecticians (Phaedrus 266 C 1: dialektikoÚj). Lastly, Socrates 
claims to be a true worshipper of persons with these features: «And 
if I find any man who is able to see the One and the Many, him I fol-
low, and ‘walk in his footsteps as if he were a god”» (Phaedrus 266 
B 5-7).  
2. Phaedrus 270 D 1-8: the doing-suffering pair 
In view of the main role assumed by the reference to the doing-
suffering pair in Migliori’s Sophist lecture, there is a further point in 
the Phaedrus I wish to dwell upon. As highlighted in the Lecture 
and restated in Appendix II, this pair constitutes one of the core is-
sues of Plato’s vision of reality. Moreover, as well as representing 
the true “heart” of the Sophist, it makes an appearance in the Par-
menides, Phaedo, Republic, Philebus and even in one of the very 
                                                     
18 Fourth Lecture, pp. 72-73. 
19 First Lecture, p. 22. 
20 Cf. Phaedrus 266 B 3-5: «I am myself a great lover of these processes, 
Phaedrus, i.e. of division and generalization; they help me speak and think». 
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early dialogues such as the Euthyphro, albeit in different contexts 
and guises. Naturally, it also makes an appearance in the Phaedrus. 
After having established a parallel between the procedures of 
medicine and rhetoric, based on the notion that «in both arts a nature 
must be defined (dielšsqai): the nature of the body in medicine, and 
that of the soul in rhetoric» (270 B 4-5), Socrates notes that, with 
regard to the soul and the body, but more in general «about any 
other nature (perˆ Ðtouoàn fÚsewj)», it has to be seen whether 
it is a simple or multiform thing (¡ploàn À polueidšj)… And if 
simple, then to enquire what power it has, i.e. what and where-
upon is its power of doing and what and wherefrom is its power 
of suffering (t¾n dÚnamin aÙtoà, t…na prÕj t… pšfuken e„j tÕ 
dr©n œcon À t…na e„j tÕ paqe‹n ØpÕ toà). And if multiform, hav-
ing numbered the forms, to establish for each one of them what 
is understood when it is one, i.e. wherefore it may do itself by 
nature or wherefore and wherefrom suffer (tù t… poie‹n aÙtÕ 
pšfuken À tù t… paqe‹n ØpÕ toà) (270 D 1-7). 
What holds true for the body and soul, then, also applies to the 
nature of any other thing. In any case, it is a question of knowing the 
nature of what is being spoken of,  
1) to see whether it is simple or includes several forms (po-
lueidšj); 
2) if it is simple, one must ascertain its power of doing, and upon 
what, and its possibility of suffering, and by what; 
3) if it has manifold forms, instead, it is a question of: 
3a) counting them; 
3b) and seeing for each one of them (™f’˜k£stou) its own ca-
pacity of acting and suffering, and by what. 
It is obviously a somewhat cumbersome task, which (it must be 
noted) Plato neither takes up again nor develops inside the dialogue. 
Only the rough guidelines of this procedure are outlined without 
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elaborating it: Phaedrus has in fact not an inkling as to what is on 
Plato’s mind21. But while in the Phaedrus this core vision of reality 
and the pervasiveness of an all-defining dynamics (Phaedrus 270 D 
1) are merely hinted at, in the Sophist, on the other hand, the will to 
furnish a suitable definition (ƒkanÒn) (Sophist 248 C 4) of such a 
dynamics (which is, unsurprisingly, taken up and presented 
throughout the oeuvre22) is expressly stated. Indeed, the dialogue 
reaches its peak in the declaration, perfectly mirroring the one in the 
Phaedrus, that every reality even the slightest one (Sophist 248 C 5) 
is defined by a power of doing and suffering. Once again we are 
forced to say, quoting Migliori’s remarks on the Theaetetus23, that 
“one cannot go any further with Phaedrus”. 
3. Between witting and unwitting deceit (Phaedrus, 261 E - 262 B) 
The last issue I briefly wish to signal (though fleetingly touched 
in the brief referance to the issue of the link between names and 
forms, so crucial to both the Phaedrus and the Sophist) relates to the 
subtle yet treacherous relationship between witting and unwitting 
deceit. Plato presents once again the theme of deceitful speech with 
such insistence that, in this sense, it represents one of the golden 
threads throughout the Phaedrus. Here, alongside the fundamental 
discriminant between truth and deceit, true and false discourse, an-
other key discrimen appears: that between witting and unwitting de-
ceit (or self-deceit).  
In this sense, Socrates sets against the character of Lysias, who 
has driven the discourse back to the only aspect he is familiar with, 
                                                     
21 In 270 D 8 in fact, Phaedrus, quite unconvinced by the philosopher’s 
words, says: «Perhaps, that’s right, Socrates».  
22 «In reality, Plato has called our attention to these processes right from the 
beginning» (Third Lecture, p. 66) 
23 First Lecture, p. 26. 
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the negative one, by ignoring the ramifications of the notion of Eros 
and has therefore unwittingly deceived himself, he who, by distin-
guishing between the likeness and unlikeness of beings in a precise 
manner (t¾n ÐmoiÒthta tîn Ôntwn ka  ˆ¢nomoiÒthta ¢kribîj) (Phaedrus 
262 A 6-7), succeeds in «deceiving another without being deceived 
in turn» (Phaedrus 262 A 5-6). The knowledge of truth, then, the 
knowledge of «what each of the beings is» (Phaedrus 262 B 7-8) 
not only represents the conditio sine qua non for the making a true 
speech, but also the irrevocable condition for a consciously deceitful 
oratory art. 
The distinction between that form of witting ignorance and that 
«very large and dangerous» (Sophist 229 C 1) ignorance that occurs 
«when a person supposes that he knows, and does not know» (Soph-
ist 229 C 5), also represents one of the basic points in the Sophist. In 
this dialogue, indeed, as Migliori has shown, following a first diaire-
sis (Sophist 221 C - 223 B) that maps out the Sophist’s character as 
a sham educator and therefore conscious dissembler24, a fourth 
diairesis (Sophist 226 B - 231 B) is developed. Here, just as in 
Phaedrus25, by insisting on the need for bearing the subtle distinc-
                                                     
24 This definition will be taken up again and endorsed by the eighth definition of the 
fifth diairesis, 264 B - 268 D: the Sophist is a conscious dissembler. 
25 «SOCRATES – If we inquire in this way, I think that it will be made clear. When 
will there be deception, when things have a large or small difference from 
one another? PHAEDRUS – When the difference is small. SOCRATES – But it is 
evident that you will be less likely to be discovered in passing into the 
other extreme in small steps than when you go all at once at great strides» 
(Phaedrus 261 E 6 - 262 A 4). See also Phaedrus, 262 B 2-9: «SOCRATES – In 
men who have notions which are at variance with realities and are de-
ceived, it is clear that the error slips in through certain resemblances 
(di’Ðmoiot»twn tinîn). PHAEDRUS – It just happens this way. SOCRATES – So, 
is it possible that someone has the skill to turn everything, inch by inch, to 
the opposite direction, by the help of resemblances (di¦ tîn Ðmoiot»twn), 
bringing it from being into its contrary from time to time, or to avoid it by 
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tions in mind and strongly underlining the importance of resem-
blances26, the possibility of a serious case of involuntary ignorance 
gradually emerges. This ignorance is all the more troublesome as 
«no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those 
things he believes he knows» (Sophist 230 A 7-8). 
The two dialogues, therefore, seem to come to remarkably like-
minded opinions. 
4. Conclusions 
This swift yet necessarily abridged excursus through several 
points of convergence between the Phaedrus, the Sophist and other 
dialogues examined in the Lectures denotes a strong element of con-
tinuity between the Phaedrus and the group of dialectical dialogues 
(Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman). In this sense it ap-
pears possible to maintain that, as esteemed scholars have argued27, 
the Phaedrus can be construed as the last dialogue of maturity – 
immediately prior to the dialectic works – that foreruns and prepares 
the dialectical dialogues themselves. The unequivocal signs (though 
neither confronted systematically nor philosophically well-
grounded) given off by the Phaedrus on the issue of doing and suf-
fering, the clear references to dialectics, even furnished with meth-
odological instructions, the reference to diairetic and synoptic pro-
cedures and to the multiple connections that can be made between 
names and forms, and, lastly, the reflection on the delicate question 
                                                     
himself, if he doesn’t know what each of the beings is? PHAEDRUS – It is 
quite impossible». 
26 Given that likenesses themselves can be most deceitful (Sophist 231 A-B). 
27 Cf., for instance, Reale, Platone, Fedro, introduction, translation, notes and ad-
denda by G. Reale, Rusconi, Milan 1993, p. 29; Brisson, Platon, Phèdre..., p. 34; R. 
Hackfort, Plato’s Phaedrus, Translated with an introduction and commentary by R. 
Hackforth, University Press, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 3-7. 
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of deceit will all be picked up and developed in the Sophist and the 
other dialogues belonging to the same batch of writings.  
If this reading is legitimate, then perhaps one could attempt to 
add another element to the picture of connections and complemen-
tarity outlined by Migliori28, by saying that prior to the Parmenides, 
Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman block, and before the «introduction» 
represented by the «outstanding example of dialectic philosophy»29 pro-
vided by the Parmenides, it seems possible to establish a “poetical 
introduction” of the Phaedrus who conceals precious indications on 
content and methodology behind his «flowing vein»30, preparing the 
reader for the wearisome meander down the path of dialectics. 
 
 
                                                     
28 Cf. First Lecture, pp. 24-27. 
29 First Lecture, p. 27. 
30 The expression belongs to L. Stefanini, Platone, 2 voll., Padua, 1932-1935; new 
updated edition 19492; anastatic reprint of II ed., Istituto di storia della Filosofia, Pa-
dua 1991, vol. II, p. 24, who believes some scholars place Phaedrus behind the dia-
lectical works for an eminently “aesthetic” reason: «the consensus is due to an aes-
thetic need for balance and proportion, which critics unwittingly heed when they 
claim the doctrinal roughness of the Republic is followed by the flowing vein of the 
Phaedrus, and in forestalling that, once the uphill climb of dialectics has been re-
sumed in the Theaetetus or in the Parmenides, this is cut short again by the mad-
dening force of the Phaedrus». 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lucia Palpacelli* 
As a premise let me say that it is hard to ask questions or raise 
considerable issues when moving along a line of substantial agree-
ment with the reading of the dialogue put forward by Migliori. 
1. Traces of the school of Elea prior to the dialectic dialogues 
In evaluating the batch of dialectic dialogues among which the Sophist 
is grouped, Migliori writes: «All these works tie in with Eleaticism, 
with one key footnote: no reference has been made to this school 
prior to the Parmenides»1. 
I find this statement troubling if we consider a dialogue such as 
the Euthydemus, which must surely be ranked among one of Plato’s 
first works2. This dialogue, in fact, appears strongly linked to the 
Sophist from a number of different aspects3 and, given the theme 
                                                     
* University of Macerata 
1 First Lecture, p. 24. 
2 The “stylometric” method places the Euthydemus in the same groups as 
Meno, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Cratylus. It is considered as one of Plato’s 
early dialogues and, more precisely, among the last ones of the first group 
(cf. L. Stefanini, Platone, Cedam, Padua, 1932, 19492, pp. LXII - LXXII). 
3 This point cannot be adequately illustrated here; let us simply bear in mind 
that in the Euthydemus, Plato employs the two Eristics, Euthydemus and Dio-
nysodorus, to stage many aspects of sophistry – neither examining them in 
depth nor establishing them – which are discussed and theoretically explained 
in the Sophist. In this light, the Sophist can be regarded as a “boetheia struc-
ture” for the Euthydemus (about this concept cf. T. A. Szlezák, Come leggere 
Platone, Rusconi, Milan, 1991, pp. 66-92). For example: 1) the fact that the 
two main characters in the dialogue are Eristic refers us straight away to the 
Sophist’s scope: in fact, the Eristic is defined in the third diairesis as a kind of 
sophist dedicated to controversy on justice and injustice for money-making 
purposes (Sophist, 224 E - 226 A); 2) in very close kinship with the Sophist, the 
 
EXCHANGES WITH THE AUTHOR 
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
 
150 
that is being addressed, we especially find the same evaluation of 
Eleaticism as the “strength” of the sophists that is most vivid in the 
Sophist. 
Indeed, as the Fourth Lecture has highlighted, in this dialogue 
Plato identifies the sophist’s strength in the Eleatic concept of Being 
and Not Being: while in pursuit of him, one realizes he has «in the 
cleverest manner got into an hard place to explore» (236 D 1-3), 
namely in the mimetic art that, for it to be acknowledged as purvey-
ing falsehoods, necessarily refers to Not Being. By shifting the dis-
course to Not Being the sophists manage to lead their interlocutors 
into contradiction: theirs is an art of appearance, as the Stranger 
from Elea acknowledges, they are deceivers, although 
                                                     
two are outlined as false educators, whose aim is money in return for which 
they promise to teach virtue (Euthydemus, 273 D); 3) Socrates indicates the 
hub of their teaching in the statement asserting their omniscience and in the 
promise of bestowing this upon those who are willing to pay (294 B); we there-
fore find in the words of the Stranger from Elea a perfect correspondence with 
the declaration Socrates is entrusted with in the Euthydemus: first, he indicates, 
as a feature of the sophistic art of confutation, a certain ability to discuss all 
subject matters, so as to demonstrate knowledge all, then he rails against this 
clearly hollow promise (Sophist, 232 E - 233 A); 4) that sophistic art only of-
fers an illusion of wisdom is confirmed both in the Euthydemus and in the 
Sophist by the ongoing reference to the dimension of magic and spell-casting 
(cf. Sophist, 233 C; 234 E - 235 A; 234 C; Euthydemus, 288 B; 289 E - 290 E; 
303 B - C 3: ultimately, in this sort of Eristic comedy narrated by Socrates to 
Crito, the spell-casting dimension is actually staged; 5) lastly, just as the Soph-
ist’s great worth is to provide us with the negative side of the philosopher, as il-
lustrated among others in the Fifth Lecture, also in the Euthydemus, Plato con-
structs the negative figure of the philosopher, albeit with a different breadth and 
depth of philosophical intent, by employing two characters whose attributes are 
opposite to the philosopher’s: the Eristics Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. 
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how a thing can appear and seem but not be, how a man can say 
a thing which is not the truth, all that has always set many prob-
lems, in the past as in the present (236 D 9 - E 3). 
Parmenides, in fact, views Non Being as impossible to either be 
spoken of or thought. Therefore, a thing cannot be said not to be 
true, as it would amount to speaking of Not Being. In this way false 
opinion must be negated along with not being. 
Having established this strength, Plato shows in the Sophist the 
way to strike it down: 
in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Par-
menides, and force Not-being to be in a certain sense, and Be-
ing, on the other hand, somehow not to be (241 D 5 - 7). 
As the Fourth Lecture has shown, Not Being can be somehow 
force to be by accepting that not-being can not merely be thought as 
negating existence, as Not Being in the absolute sense, but also as a 
negation of a given quality, therefore in the sense of Other:  
When we speak of not-being, we speak, apparently, not of some-
thing opposed to being, but only different (257 B 3 - 4). 
If we outline the positions, the Sophist theorizes that 
- sophists hide in Not Being and are thus hard to drive out, for Not 
Being cannot even be uttered without falling into contradiction: 
indeed, they make false promises, but this cannot be proven as 
they are capable of asserting that falsehoods do not exist, on the 
basis of the Parmenidean concept of Being. This is, in fact, the 
strength sophists draw from the Eleatic doctrine. 
- The Stranger of Elea also shows the path to follow to defeat the 
sophists. 
In the Euthydemus, though not stating it outright, Plato illustrates 
the strength sophists draw from Eleaticism, bringing two Eristics into 
the fray, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. They give Socrates and the 
host of youths around them a demonstration of the Eristic art, laying 
down many of the Sophisms presented against the backdrop of the 
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Parmenidean concept, shaped to suit their ends: the two often base 
themselves on the Eleatic concept of Being that, by negating Not Being, 
also negates the Other, because that which is other is no longer what it 
was before, it as not become other, thus it simply is not.  
2. Some of the Sophisms in the Euthydemus 
Let us look in detail at where this “Eleatic root” can be un-
earthed4. 
 
Sophism 3: The youth Cleinias’ search for wisdom (283 B-D) 
Dionysodorus asks if the boy is wise or unlearned. If he is unlearned 
and it is wanted that he become wise, it is wanted that he is no longer 
what he is now, therefore it is wanted that he dies. The Parmenidean 
backdrop is evident when being (that is used with a copulative function: 
being wise, being unlearned) is dropped to move on to considering not 
being: at this point, in fact, it is assigned an exclusively existential 
value, thus allowing the passage from the statement of changing to dy-
ing. Starting from the Eleatic conception, any form of becoming and 
change becomes impossible because to say “Cleinias, who was 
unlearned, has become wise” means to say he is not what he was, i.e. he 
exists no longer, and is dead. It is possible to trace in this passage of the 
reasoning that strong sophistic motive, which finds its theoretical expli-
cations in the Sophist: becoming is impossible for it implies Not Being 
in an absolute sense. This logic shows well how easy it is to puzzle 
one’s interlocutor, and lead him to inferences he cannot refuse. 
 
Sophism 4: the impossibility of lying (283 E - 284 A) 
Lying is impossible: anyone who lies talks about the object of the 
lie, i.e. he speaks of this thing that, as it is being spoken about, must 
                                                     
4 The numeration given to sophisms follows their order of presentation 
within the dialogue; we have reconstructed this sequence but cannot ade-
quately explain it here. 
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exist and must be separated from the others. Whoever speaks, then, 
says that which is, therefore he says the truth. Eleaticism is easily 
traceable in this impossibility of speaking falsehoods, because, if 
one speaks, one only speaks of that which is, therefore not being and 
falsehoods disappear together. 
Without theorizing them, this sophism shows two points that the 
Sophist will treat with considerably greater philosophical depth: a) 
the connection between false and Not Being, whereupon the reasoning 
is based; b) the manner in which Eleaticism unwittingly provides the 
sophists with “strong” cases. 
 
Sophism 5: the objection of the youth Ctesippus to the impossibility 
of lying (284 B-C) 
Ctesippus observes that, even assuming it is true that whoever 
speaks says that which is, Dionysodorus has not spoken of things 
now. Euthydemus answers this objection by shifting the reasoning 
towards Not Being: that which is not is not absolutely; no-one can 
do what does not exist; speaking is like doing, so no-one can speak 
of that which is not. The backdrop is still Parmenidean: Not Being 
can neither be uttered nor thought. 
 
Sophism 7: the impossibility of juxtaposing two interlocutors (285 D 
- 286 B) 
The game is based on two premises, the second of which takes us 
back to the Parmenidean concept of Being: a) there are words 
(lÒgoi) for each being; b) there are words only for that which is. 
Given the first premise, Dionysodorus asks whether these words 
will speak of being as it is or as it is not: Ctesippus answers boldly 
«as it is», meaning they will say the truth; Dionysodorus recalls, in 
fact, no-one speaks of how a thing is not because not being is not 
spoken of. But then it is impossible for two speakers to contradict 
one another, either if they speak of the same thing as they will be 
saying the same thing, or if they speak of different things because 
there is no common ground whereupon to measure one another. 
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Sophism 11: kinship ties (297 D- 298 C) 
Given that a man cannot be both father and not father, if Sofron-
iscus is acknowledged as being father (of Socrates), then Chaerede-
mus cannot be father (regardless whose) for he is other than the fa-
ther (of Socrates) and thus is not the father (of Socrates) and vice 
versa. This game works thanks to the absolute value assigned to 
names, against the Eleatic logic that negated the Other likening it to 
Not Being. This is expressed through Socrates’ clarification, who 
says that Chaeredemus is other than his father and not from the fa-
ther in an absolute sense. Absolute negation is one thing, negation 
as affirmation of a diversity is quite another thing. Hence, Plato al-
ready hints at the solution he will give in the Sophist. 
3. A further confirmation 
Comparing the two dialogues, then, yields the conclusion that in 
the Euthydemus Plato enacts or, if one prefers, gives a practical 
demonstration of what he theorizes and solves in the Sophist. 
Through the two Erists’ modus of proceeding, the Author shows the 
sophists’ strength in action, which seemingly makes them unassail-
able and invincible, without however delving into the theoretical 
roots of that strength. Eleatic philosophy is not dealt with and, as we 
have seen, a potential solution is merely hinted at; this, however, has 
no effect here, to the extent that Socrates is apparently beaten by the 
two brothers’ sophisms after all. 
This almost hidden presence of Eleaticism seems also justified in 
what Socrates says when commenting the sophisms of the two Erists 
with regard to the alleged impossibility of lying and contradicting 
oneself: 
I have often heard this thesis from many people and have been 
amazed always. It is employed, in fact, by the disciples of Pro-
tagoras, and others before them. To me it appears quite wonder-
ful, and that in demolishing the others, also demolishes itself. I 
think I am most likely to learn the truth about it in the best way 
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from you. What else can it mean if not that saying falsehoods is 
impossible? (286 C 1 - 6). 
Socrates speaks of this reasoning on the impossibility of saying 
falsehoods as a very commonplace and unoriginal discourse, also 
used by others: the followers of Protagoras, whom he explicitly re-
fers to, and «others before them». Critics unanimously see in them 
the Eleatics, to whom these sophisms must be necessarily recon-
nected, as we have seen.  
Indeed, while starting off from very distant positions, Eleaticism 
and the Protagorean doctrine achieve the same result on this ground, 
negating the possibility of falsehood and contradiction; after all, that 
is just what Eristics are interested in5. By taking Protagoras’ thought 
to its logical consequences, one can reach the stage of negating 
falsehood, bestowing values of truth to every opinion; basing one-
self on the Parmenidean univocal Being, one reaches the point of 
negating falsehood, because falsehood leads back to Not Being that 
can neither be spoken of nor thought. Furthermore, playing on the 
Eleatic univocity, the sophists are capable of making their interlocu-
tors constantly fall into contradiction.  
Based on this argumentation, I think Plato can be said to at least 
hint at Eleaticism, even though obviously in an undeclared and tech-
nically shallow manner, much before the dialectic dialogues. After 
all, this manner of proceeding by hints and references that is found 
in the Euthydemus agrees perfectly with that «extremely well-
crafted form of writing, intent on measuring the information the bare 
necessities»6 that Migliori recognises as typical of Plato: this dia-
logue is among the early dialogues and it is clear that – in line with 
                                                     
5 Cf. L. Maccioni, Filosofia e matematica in Platone. Osservazioni 
sull’Eutidemo, il Tripode, Naples, 1978, p. 52. 
6 First Lecture, p. 25. 
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the dictates that find expression in the Phaedrus7 – it could not thor-
oughly deal with a problematic such as the one raised by Eleaticism, 
in an oeuvre that, within the limitations of written communication, 
seems nonetheless addressed to “(relatively) simple souls”, which 
must therefore be spoken to in simple terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Cf. Phaedrus, 277 B 8 - C 3: «… after recognizing the nature of the soul 
with the same criterion, by uncovering the kind of discourse more suitable 
to every nature, may the discourse be thus framed and regulated, providing 
complex discourses to a complex soul, and simple ones to a simple soul». 
 
 
 
Diana Quarantotto* 
Within the framework of this discussion I wish to deal with two 
of the many issues Migliori raised in his interpretation of the Soph-
ist: the number of supreme genera and the criteria for discerning 
them, and the common thread that weaves through ontology, the di-
mension of one and many, the dimension of whole, of all and of 
parts, and that of doing and suffering. 
1. Supreme genera 
Migliori believes the Sophist contemplates eight supreme genera 
(pp. 79-81, 86-89): absolute Being, relative Being, absolute Not-being, 
relative Not-Being, Same, Other, Motion, and Rest. Of these eight, 
Plato expressly introduces and defines five: Being, Same, Other, Mo-
tion, and Rest. The remaining three, in accordance with the protreptic 
objectives of the Platonic texts, are implicit and can be inferred by care-
fully reading the textual hints and the philosophical content in the dia-
logue: relative Being, relative Not-being, and absolute Not-being. The 
aim of these pages is to suggest that relative Being and relative Not-
being, even though they correspond respectively to meanings of being 
and not-being that are set out and defined in the Sophist, are not self-
contained genera, for they are “generable” from the five supreme gen-
era and the relations existing among them. On the other hand, Absolute 
Not-being does not represent a genus as it does not fall within the “op-
erational objectives” of the theory of meg…sta gšnh. 
This “counteroffer” hinges on two assumptions relating to the meaning 
and to the explanatory range of the theory of supreme genera. This I shall 
express in a dogmatic manner, so to speak, for the sake of brevity. As the 
first assumption goes, not only the five supreme genera Plato has laid down 
fail to exhaust the whole range of existing genera, but, above all, they are 
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not located at the same level as the others. Rather, the five supreme genera 
are “structural” genera that, all together and in relation to one another, bear 
witness to some of the most important “inner workings” of Being1. Ac-
cording to the second assumption, the theory of supreme genera aims to il-
lustrate the “inner workings” of being that are necessary and instrumental 
to the sophist’s capture; i.e. to the solution of the issue of falsehood and 
not-being. It does not contemplate the unraveling of the endless questions 
that are indeed linked to the issue of falsehood and not-being but that, 
though mentioning them, Plato decides to overlook2. 
Absolute Being and relative Being 
Let us first consider the distinction between the genus of absolute 
Being and that of relative Being. With this distinction Migliori 
“splits” the only kind of Being expressly construed by Plato. To be-
gin with, I must admit its precise meaning somewhat escapes me 
and I shall consequently confront the issue on the basis of following 
three assumptions. The difference between absolute and relative Be-
ing corresponds to the distinction between being viewed in itself and 
being of a specific thing3; alternatively, to that between existential 
being and copulative being; lastly, to the one between being of what 
is in itself and the being of relative things.  
If absolute and relative Being coincide with the being view in itself 
and the being of a specific thing, respectively, there appears to be no 
need to count relative Being among the kinds of Being. To underwrite 
this distinction, in fact, the Being need only be established as a genus 
set apart from all others: absolute Being is the genus of Being itself, 
                                                     
1 Cf. 259 A 4 - B 6.  
2 Cf. 241 B 9 - C 1; 245 D 12 - E 5; 261 A 4 - B 4.  
3 In the light of Migliori’s assertions at pp. 87-89, this seems the most likely as-
sumption. 
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whereas relative Being (construed as being of a specific thing or of 
many) is given by the partaking in Being of other genera4. 
Even the assumption that absolute Being corresponds to existential 
being, and relative Being coincides with copulative being seems to fail to 
warrant the position of two genera of Being. The distinction between ex-
istential and copulative being stems from the twin function of the genus 
of Being itself: as a genus wherein each of the others participate, and it is 
by reason of this5, and as a bridging element among them (akin to the role 
vowels take on in relation to the other letters)6. 
One’s attention could thus turn to the distinction between being 
of what is in itself and the being of relative things. Nonetheless, this 
assumption too seems to present a few problems. What Plato states 
at lines 255 C 12 - D 7 suggests that “being in itself” and “being in 
relation to some other thing” are two separate ways of being, arising 
from the nature of a specific genus and its participation in Being. 
Relative Not-being and Other 
With regard to the distinction between relative Not-being and 
Other, Migliori (pp. 84-86) argues that, while constituting a part of the 
Other, relative Not Being is an additional, self-contained genus for it 
possesses a higher degree of pervasiveness than other parts of the 
Other. Indeed, as a part of the Other that opposes Being, relative Not-
being is utterly pervasive and affects all genera. The other parts of 
Other, instead, do not oppose Being but each one opposes a specific 
genus. Therefore their degree of pervasiveness is more bounded as it 
depends on the negated term (not-beautiful, not-good, not-right, etc.). 
Relative Not-being, then, coincides with all those genera that are 
separate from the Being genus, but considered for the reason that, 
though partaking of Being, they are not Being. This “class” or “meta-
                                                     
4 Cf. 254 D 10; 256 A 1; D 8-9; E 3; 258 A 7-9. 
5 Cf. supra note 3. 
6 Cf. 251 A 8 - C 1, 253 A 4-6, B 8 - C 3. 
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class” of genera, however, does not in turn seem to constitute a self-
contained genus, for it is the mere result of the act of establishing Being 
and Other. Indeed, it is on the very strength of the relations other genera 
establish with Being and Other that, though participating in Being, they 
are not identified with Being (i.e. they are relative Not-being)7: these re-
lations (with Being and Other) are enough to “beget” relative Not-being 
(that is, to announce that all genera separate from Being, owing to this, 
do not be) and to demonstrate its pervasiveness. 
Absolute Not-being 
Along with relative Being and relative Not-being, Migliori believes 
the third genus to be implicitly construed in the Sophist is that of abso-
lute Not-being (pp. 84-86)8. If absolute Not-being is understood as a 
genus in opposition to Being, however, this hypothesis appears refuted 
by the statement at lines 258 E 6 - 259 A 1. Here, in fact, is where Plato 
asserts he can announce the existence of not-being without falling into 
contradiction; the reason being that he has dropped the issue relating to 
not being, construed as the opposite of Being. 
On account of the fact that it does not partake in Being, the absolute 
Not-being, understood as the opposite of Being, can neither be thought nor 
spoken of9. Consequently, it can neither belong to that system of supreme 
genera that is construed to warrant the possibility to think and speak of not 
being, in the absence of which the sophist cannot be apprehended10. 
                                                     
7 Cf. 256 D 5 - E 2, 258 D 5 - E 2, 259 A 4 - B 1. 
8 In some occasions, however, even Migliori affirms that absolute Not Be-
ing is excluded (cf. pp. 83-84). 
9 Cf. 237 E 1-6; 238 C 8-10; 241 A 5-6.  
10 There is a sort of negation that might correspond to absolute Not Being. 
When the minotaur is said not to exist, in fact, his participation in Being is ex-
cluded tout court. Plato, on the other hand, seems not to want to deal with this 
issue in the Sophist as it is not functional to the sophist’s “capture”. In fact, he 
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2. Ontology and the “foremost problem” 
In disagreement with one of the most widespread readings, Migliori 
believes that «the heart of Platonic philosophy which emerges from the 
Sophist» (p. 51) is not ontology. “The defining framework of reality” is 
rather marked by a theoretical move revolving «around the concepts of 
whole and part, and the connection-distinction between one, whole and 
all, before coming to a head in the “doing-suffering” pair» (p. 94). In 
Migliori’s view, the dimension of numbers, that of the whole and the 
parts, and that of doing and suffering are not merely distinct from on-
tology but even appear prior to it (pp. 61-63, 72-74, 80-81, 123-126): 
such dimensions amount to «a necessary pre-condition for the admissi-
bility of some sort of ontology» (p. 61)11. 
The fact that the enquiry on being is developed through an ongoing 
reference to the notions of “one” and “many”, “whole” and “parts”, 
“doing” and “suffering” suggests that their importance cannot be un-
derestimated. Nonetheless, the steps12 Migliori takes to then develop his 
argument do not imply, in my view, that the one and many, the whole 
and the parts, doing and suffering are realities that are “distinct” from 
being and antecedent to it. These steps are indeed compatible also with 
a milder reading, namely the idea that, rather than coinciding with di-
mensions distinct from and antecedent to ontology, such concepts rep-
resent determinations/relations belonging to all that is in that it is. 
Insofar as the relationship between being and whole is estab-
lished at lines 245 C 1-3, D 4-6, for example, that if being were not 
                                                     
assumes that every discourse, even false ones such as “Theaetetus flies” relates 
to something that is: in this case to Theaetetus (cf. 263 C 9-11). 
11 The notion of “pre-condition of ontology” is in actual fact used by Migliori (p. 
61) only with reference to the all, the whole and the parts. What Migliori says at pp 
61-63, 71-74, 80-81, 121-124 and especially at pp. 94-95, however, suggests that 
also one and many, doing and suffering are understood as preconditions for being. 
12 Cf. 245 B 4 - D 2; 237 B 10 - 238 C 10; 254 D 7 - 256 D 4. 
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a whole it would be in want of itself, and would be unable to engen-
der itself, i.e. to come into being. Hence it merely seems possible to 
infer that whole is a condition of being, and not that it represents a 
pre-condition for it: all that is, for the reason that it is, constitutes a 
whole, for if not then it could not be. Plato says nothing in the 
abovementioned passage suggesting that the whole is a “reality” an-
tecedent to being. Indeed, the theory that being and whole are dis-
tinct, and that whole can exist in itself seems only put forward to 
underscore the absurdity of the consequence flowing therefrom: the 
fact that being would be in want of itself. By saying that if it were 
not whole being would be in want of itself, Plato seems to regard be-
ing and whole as co-original and interdependent realities: whole is 
one of the things that found just what the being is. 
A like argument also seems to apply to the relationship between being 
and numbers. The intrinsic nature of this relationship is (negatively) es-
tablished at lines 238 A 1 - C 6. Here, absolute not-being is absolute due 
to the impossibility of predicating of it either unity or multiplicity. Hence, 
unlike things that are not, those that are, in that they are, represent a unity 
or a multiplicity: saying that something is, or better still, simply saying 
something amounts to bestowing it automatically unity or multiplicity. 
As with the whole, one and many also seem to constitute conditions, and 
not preconditions, of being; in other words, property of all that is in that it 
is. In fact, at line 238 a 10 numbers are included among the things that 
are, and not among the realities that forerun being. 
As for doing and suffering, or better still, the power of doing and 
that of suffering, these concepts are defined at lines 247 C 9 - D 4 as 
principles ingrained and common to corporeal and incorporeal things 
alike: they represent what by virtue of which they both are. Such reali-
ties, therefore, do not appear unconnected or antecedent to being. On 
the contrary, the idea that being is none other than dynamis (247 E 3-4) 
is understood as a definition to all effects. 
The hypothesis that one and many, the whole and the parts, and do-
ing and suffering constitute determinations/relations belonging to all 
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that is, in that it is, rather than realities that are distinct from and antece-
dent to being, also appears corroborated by the structure of Platonic en-
quiry on being, as developed in the Sophist. This enquiry on being, in 
fact, immediately takes the shape of a search for its quantitative and 
qualitative properties (242 C 4-6, 250 C 1-10): the aim is to establish 
what is being and what are its predicates. The main motivation for such 
a structure, that is, the idea that being is endowed with qualitative and 
quantitative properties, is to be found in the first critique of monistic 
theories: if being were in want of determinations it would be unutter-
able, in other words it would be kindred to absolute not-being (244 B 9 
- D 12). Out of all the infinite properties of the things that are, one and 
many, the whole and the parts, doing and suffering perform a very spe-
cial role because they embody attributes of being in that it is: indeed, 
these properties are not only shared by all things that exist, but are in-
trinsic conditions of their being.  
The perspective of the enquiry on being and not-being, further-
more, is not of genetic-evolutionary kind but is static. It hinges on 
demonstrating the possibility of falsehood by defining the bonds of 
participation occurring between genera in relation to one another. The is-
sue centering on the priority or antecedence of relations among genera or 
“dimensions” of reality therefore appears beyond the scope of the research 
presented in the Sophist. 
These considerations aside, I agree on the point that “the foremost 
problem” in the dialogue is not that of ontology. My impression, which 
I summarize hastily as a mere talking point for the debate, is that this 
problem is less concerned with one or many, whole or parts, doing or 
suffering, all viewed as conditions or preconditions for being, than with 
the relations occurring among being, thought and speech: the criteria 
whereupon the inner workings of being are defined coincide with its 
criteria pertaining to its intelligibility and utterability. 
The issue of the relations among being, thought, and speech 
seems indeed to constitute one of the recurring themes in the Soph-
ist, as well as the theoretical picture wherein the search is devel-
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oped. It manifests itself from the very beginning, within the aporia 
raised by the last definition of the “sophist” (falsehood and error are 
impossible, for saying something is equal to saying something that 
is, whereas not-being is unthinkable and unutterable13), and is taken 
up again at the end of the dialogue as the relations between Being, 
Other, Opinion, and Speech are defined14.  
Purposefully, also the aporia concerning the impossibility of negat-
ing not being gains significance: if not being is unthinkable and unut-
terable, then it is also impossible to negate, i.e. say that it is not15. Based 
on this acknowledgement, then, the problem of not being is rephrased 
and redefined as a problem on the correct linguistic formulation of not 
being (t¾n Ñrqolog…an perˆ tÕ m¾ Ôn)16.  
The relations between being, thought, and speech also play a major 
role in the critique of monistic theories. The first confutation, indeed, is 
based on the idea that if being were one, it could not be named17. More-
over, motion and rest are not only regarded as beings or properties of 
what is, but also as conditions for the intelligibility of things that are: the 
intelligibility of being requires of it that it neither be fully in motion nor 
fully at rest18. Even the idea that one and many are determinations of be-
ing in that it is, does seem to lead back to the conditions of utterability of 
being: whatever is is either one or many, because saying something 
amounts to assigning unity or multiplicity to it19. Within the context of 
the enquiry into the possible sorts of relationships among genera, the first 
option (i.e. the idea that genera do not participate of one another at all) is 
                                                     
13 Cf. 237 B 10 - E 6.  
14 Cf. 260 B 10 and ff.  
15 Cf. 238 D 4-7.  
16 Cf. 239 B 1-5.  
17 Cf. 244 B 9 - D 12.  
18 Cf. 248 D 10 - 249 D 4. 
19 Cf. 238 A 1 - C 6.  
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ruled out as incompatible with the intelligibility and utterability of be-
ing20. In turn, intelligibility and utterability of being constitute the crite-
ria whereupon the third assumption is preferred21: participation between 
some genera is possible and not between others. This third hypothesis is 
placed in relation with the same possibility of dialectic philosophy. 
Among other things, it seems construed as a method that, on account of 
its conforming to the “inner workings” of being, allows for correct 
thought and speech22. 
Our discussion thus seems to have come full circle: mainly on the 
strength of being’s criteria of intelligibility and utterability, we have been 
able to detect and ascertain the “inner workings” of being; in turn, they 
constitute what is needed to “seize” the sophist, justify dialectic philoso-
phy and tell the true philosopher and the mere dissembler apart23. 
 
                                                     
20 Cf. 251 E 7 - 252 C 9. 
21 Cf. 259 D 9 - 260 B 2. 
22 Cf. 252 E 9 - 253 E 6. For this purpose, it is also meaningful that the same 
theory of supreme genera is presented as a model whose function is not only 
that of justifying the possibility of false discorse and opinion, but also of allow-
ing for the confutation of sophistic logoi based on the different meanings of 
words (cf. 259 A 10 - B 4; 259 B 8 - D 7).  
23 Although phrased in a summary and loose manner, it does not seem to me 
that this assumption has been confuted by the observations on names, which 
Migliori refers to at p. 48. The criteria of intelligibility and utterability of being 
do not relate to names per se, but to the rules and structures of predication. Be-
sides, when practicing dialectics, i.e. when genera are distinguished and their 
relations identified, Plato himself introduces names for those things that appear 
in want of them. At least in the context of the Sophist, then, the “frailty” or “in-
adequacy” of names does not seem to represent a cardinal aspect of speech. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Final Observation by Maurizio Migliori 
I must first of all express my heartfelt thanks to all my interlocu-
tors for their evident and diverse efforts, and must apologize with 
my two loving “critics”. I deeply regret not being able to give them 
the chance of a further counter-reply (to which I could perhaps add a 
few... brief considerations), but I sincerely hope this thought-
provoking comparing and contrasting work is undertaken elsewhere. 
I must especially apologize for the lengthiness of the answers that I 
hope will be warranted in the light of three factors.  
The first is that their objections have raised central issues that I 
feel would be wrong not to address in depth; secondly, a number of 
objections have revealed to me the possible misunderstandings acci-
dentally fielded by my arguments and, worse still, a certain number 
of oratory slips that could have lead into error – and for which I 
apologize to my readership. For the sake of fairness, I have made no 
amendments to the previous text but, also as a tribute to the reader 
who has shown the endurance to come this far, I have felt the need 
to seek to clarify my thought. 
Lastly, I have received confirmation of the necessity of acknowl-
edging the weight of the paradigms: what appears central and mean-
ingful in one paradigm can appear downright minor to anyone mov-
ing within a different field of thought. This is especially true when 
the conversation partners are thoroughly fair-minded and very ap-
proachable, as in this case. Perhaps it is for this reason that the di-
vide and the communication problems appear more overt. This, 
however, only warrants a greater effort to make oneself understood. 
I fear all this may engender boredom in the reader, but I believe 
it is a risk worth taking: should I fail to be convincing, at least I will 
have got my position across more clearly. In the end, along with a 
few “converts”, I will at least be confronted by many dissenting with 
greater precision. This would be a fine result already (although I 
wish to beguile myself and hope for a more positive outcome). 
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1. In conversation with Fermani and Palpacelli 
I wish to thank my two kind and competent young assistants, 
whom I have perhaps involuntarily put in an awkward position by 
asking them to discuss theses they substantially agree with. I must 
also thank them for adding observations, pertinent and I believe in-
teresting for the reader, in support of the interpretative picture I have 
submitted, wisely drawing them from dialogues I had not made ref-
erence to.  
As for the absence of critical remarks, I think this is due to the 
young age (and fondness for the writer): we all agree on the fact 
that, as Plato and Aristotle teach us, the fine pupil is the one who 
continues on a same course while finding new routes. These may 
also well be “critical” ones. But for this, thank goodness, the 
younger generations have all the time in the world. My heartfelt 
wish is for them to succeed in fulfilling this task. 
I am furthermore most thankful to Palpacelli because she has 
given me the opportunity to clarify what I have must have phrased 
rather loosely on the relationship between Plato and the Eleatics. I 
harbor no doubts that Plato must have had an early encounter with 
Eleatic philosophy even before his first written work. Diogenes 
Laertius tells us he was the pupil of an Eleatic, Hermogenes1, so we 
are inclined to cast aside the idea of his late acquaintance with this 
school. Moreover, as I point out in the text (p. 25 and n. 11), elsewhere 
I have tried to prove that Plato appreciates from the outset the link between 
Eleatism and the development of sophistry. It follows that the lack of obvi-
ous quotations and the creation of that grand coup de theatre – the onset of 
Parmenides in the dialogue bearing his name – I believe are the outcome of 
choices made in relation to the particular form of Platonic writing. I think 
this clarification has reestablished the agreement somewhat. 
                                                     
1 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the philosophers, III, 6. 
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Clearly, I am keen to confront the pressing questions that my 
other two conversation partners have kindly but firmly lain before 
me. They are “hefty” issues that cannot be dealt with in a single dia-
logue but require lengthy preambles, which this context cannot 
suitably guarantee. Once such observations have been made, though, 
they can neither be discarded nor ignored as they provide an oppor-
tunity for useful clarifications and amendments. Bearing in mind I 
am not expecting to sway anyone, least of all colleagues and schol-
ars as in this circumstance, I merely seek to frame a few clarifications 
in legitimate defense of my theses. The debate will thereafter continue, 
among us and doubtless beyond us.  
2. A clarification with Bruno Centrone 
I have already said publicly and have no qualms committing it to 
writing, that I am truly envious of the accuracy and intelligence with 
which Bruno Centrone frames his arguments. I am therefore twice 
as happy for the many points of contact, as he has himself high-
lighted, that touch on fundamental issues. As for the divergences he 
rightly focuses on, I will seek to answer clearly so that my meaning 
is not misconstrued. 
A strange “orthodox” 
The first question to be addressed deals with my “loyalty” to the 
methodical setup of the Tubingen-Milan school, and the bemuse-
ment at finding such “surprising” elements in the writings of a 
«“hawkish” esoteric”», as I surely am and have always claimed to 
be. However… 
However, first of all I wish for this word “esoteric” to be ban-
ished, for I feel it is utterly misleading. My belief is that Plato seeks 
to help his pupils “make philosophy”, building up their own thought 
along lines he would feel are right, but which the subject must un-
cover himself. This he put in practice with his interlocutors, judging 
on what can be reconstructed in Letter VII, for example. The func-
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tion of the interpersonal dialogue was to inspire and examine; its 
purpose was not to communicate or “teach” in the sense we com-
monly ascribe to the word. Plato indeed possesses his own philoso-
phical model but it is “socratically” certain that, if spelt out, the 
other one would be bereft of the opportunity of discovering it and 
thus truly gaining possession of it. 
If this is his underlying belief, he surely could not have handled 
things differently in writing. Hence, a writing technique capable of 
somehow adhering to this educational tenet is crafted. The primary 
goal has less to do with communicating than with rousing the intel-
lect; one should write only in relation to the further thought the 
reader can and must develop (surely, providing a “philosophical” 
nature is given). It is in this sense that Plato himself speaks of writ-
ing as of a “game most earnest”. 
I feel I am thoroughly steeped in the Tubingen-Milan perspec-
tive, also because at first the game refers to the dialogue itself, then 
to other dialogues, and then to something the dialogues lack, and 
rightly so, for it constitutes the ultimate and conclusive solution. 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the protreptic element in this plan of 
mine becomes a great deal more decisive than any of the other re-
nowned advocates of this hermeneutical framework have claimed. 
We have all always agreed that our shared inspiration cannot bar in 
any way even remarkable differences in method and outcome alike. 
Secondly, on the issue at stake, one should recall that voluntary 
error is an extreme and very rare game that must appear amendable, if 
not amended, in the light of the dialogue itself. This is because an Author 
such as Plato, who is deemed responsible for the consequences flowing 
from his works, cannot be thought to spread falsehoods and errors light-
heartedly. Besides, Plato’s game is more than just riddles or puzzles. To 
begin with, it is always a problem and always a cross-reference, therefore 
also stimulating and rousing, and then also a riddle and puzzle and, ulti-
mately, even a signaled error (this serves as a merely hypothetical grading 
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that is also exemplified in the sequence of dialogues themselves, steadily 
more revealing while being more difficult and obscure at the same time). 
The main issue for me was to reinforce this kind of approach to 
Plato’s “philosophical writing”, while I am sure that only a whole 
book of “examples of games” drawn from almost every Platonic dia-
logue can show in a suitably convincing way that this is the underly-
ing technique of Platonic writing. Naturally, I am sure that all the 
examples provided may, and will, be re-interpreted in a manner 
unlike mine, but I hope that the sheer quantity and variety of the 
evidence put forth can generate enough critical mass to persuade as 
to the appropriateness of regarding this approach as not only correct 
but also necessary. 
Rules against misuse (to be expected and easily practiced) 
This applies to the future, however, which lies in the lap of the 
gods as the saying goes. Insofar as the present day, I must clarify my 
point. For sure, Centrone is right to be wary and I should be just as 
much as him, if not more: for sure there is a clear danger that this 
model might open the floodgates to the kind of mishandling, or 
worse, done in the name of irony, the master key to open all doors in 
the difficult passages of the dialogues. For this reason we should es-
tablish sound rules to agree upon.  
I must therefore explain the sense of the second rule, which states 
that error must be visible in the light of “platonic logic”. In fact, I 
am speaking in a technical sense here: employing contemporary 
logic to point to an error in the text seems irrelevant to me. More-
over, I would tread carefully also when employing Aristotelian 
logic. I contend that, whatever the issue, it had to stand out in the 
eyes of Plato and his readers of the time, and not to post-
Aristotelians and post-Kantians like us. As I spell out in the text, 
«the evidence must spring from the Author’s words» (p. 13) and not 
be drawn from our more sophisticated logical instruments. In this 
keynote I agree with Centrone on the fact that the error must be 
“undeniably apparent” (p. 128), as long as Platonic writing tech-
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nique and 2500 years of philosophy in between are not forgotten. 
This tells us to exert even greater caution, as we know that Plato 
may well have made some mistakes, even of a logical kind, without 
realizing. 
The passage in Philebus 
And so we ought to go back to the text I have brought forth as 
the highest example of Platonic “game”. 
It seems to me the issue laid out by Centrone, if I grasp the thrust 
of his argument, can be summed up in three statements: 
a) No problem is given as the text states that the soul can only 
experience anamnesis based on memory, or mneme; 
b) No error is given; 
c) No other solution is given as the anamnesis cited here is not 
the one in Phaedon, as it is not the heavy-duty anamnesis 
restricted to Ideas and perhaps suited for philosophers only. 
I see a range of problems here; the first kind arises from the text, 
while the second relates to Centrone’s observations. 
I cannot avoid asking myself why Plato made such a stark dis-
tinction between anamnesis and memory, given that anamnesis 
plays no part in the issue. An implied answer, supplied not by Cen-
trone but by most literary criticism, is that so many are the oddities 
in Plato that the question is not even worth asking. Yet that is just 
what good hermeneutics should strive not to do, in my view: each 
“oddity” ought to be identified and motivated. At worst, one should 
acknowledge that a fitting explanation cannot be given, but the quirk 
must not be simply glossed over. 
The second question thus springs to mind: why does Plato set 
forth the problem of the “first time”? What is its function in the dis-
course? Taken out the “game” part, I cannot see it has any. And this 
is all the more bizarre, for it “flaunts” what seems to me a conspicu-
ous conceptual error (that Plato simply cannot have made). 
This is in fact the third, decisive question: Plato is seeking to ex-
plain on what basis the soul expresses a yearning, such as to drink. 
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Indeed, the answer he gives is naturally wrong, for this yearning can 
only be explained from the “second time” onwards. And what hap-
pened the first time? Plato cannot be said to have flouted the ques-
tion because he raised the issue to begin with, for no apparent rea-
son. Furthermore, he claims this treatise serves to enlighten on long-
ing, and on pleasures and their origin (34 C-D). 
A description of a process that has skirted the major issue, after 
pointing it out in the first place, would be downright unworthy. In-
deed, we would be looking at a philosopher who is as unskilled in 
his writing as he is naïve in his reasoning, to the point of unwittingly 
providing a wrong answer to a problem he had raised himself. Not a 
genius, then, but a fool of baffling proportions; worse still, a “bad 
teacher”.  
Centrone replies that, indeed, there is nothing else in the text, as 
the anamnesis mentioned therein relies on a previous memory. This 
is very true2, no doubt, but if we just dwell on this point we should 
also say that Plato 
1) after making a pointless distinction between memory and anamnesis 
2) raised a problem (“the first time”) that he has failed to solve, and 
3) worse still, has wrapped up the problem with a wrong answer. 
My answer is that here lies a reference to the need for a further 
consideration on anamnesis; one that is not made here. Forsooth, we 
face an extreme game and Plato is in grave danger of misleading the 
reader. Yet, on account of this fact, I am inclined to believe that (for 
want of any other reason I can come up with) he has fielded all the 
terms, in the shape of hints, which must be implemented philosophi-
cally to find a solution, and to piece the puzzle together. 
I feel that Centrone might outline a dual counter-inference. 
                                                     
2 To the extent that I believe a copyist, in reasoning just like Centrone, 
must have felt the need to add: kaˆ mn»maj. 
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First of all, there is the reference to animals. It is a theoretically 
sound objection, unbeatable even, I fear. I must say quite frankly 
that I do not know how Plato would respond to this objection. I am 
conducting a screening of the Platonic dialogues (for reasons unre-
lated to the present work) and I will henceforth try to make out 
whether, in the web of intricate and intriguing relationships linking 
his diverse ideas, Plato sheds any light on the matter. I must say, 
however, that it is a “theoretical objection” that perhaps identifies a 
true weakness in Plato’s own reasoning, but which cannot and must 
not allow us to make inferences on the text. Thus the abovemen-
tioned rules are heeded. Truthfully, it seems to me that no reference 
to this problem appears in the text, and I am consequently at a loss 
for words as Plato says nothing on the matter. The position of a phi-
losophically correct objection, though “additional” to the text under 
scrutiny, does not warrant any form of straying from the text itself. 
Secondly, Centrone seems to make a stark distinction between 
two diverse and separate forms of anamnesis: one that is closely 
linked to memory and the past, and another that is built into the na-
ture of the soul and its otherworldly “source”, a knowledge of ideas 
that is perhaps suited to philosophers only. Equipped with a less 
“transcendent” outlook on the issue (differing once again from a 
host of kindred scholars), I ask myself: when the worst sort of hu-
man being picks up a thing and says “beautiful” or “good”, what is 
the driving force that warrants such opinion? Is it perhaps not the 
Idea of Beauty that abides even in him? And when he says that two 
pieces of wood are the same, on what basis does he say this, if not 
because he somehow possesses the idea of “Same”? And if the soul 
of the newborn longs for certain things while recognizing others as 
negative, to which it reacts in kind, what is it that stirs the body to 
action, to long for pleasure and shun pain, given that it has no previ-
ous experience and can thus recall nothing? 
I cannot come up with an answer other than “anamnesis”. Per-
haps it is still bound up with a very specific form of memory that 
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seems very much kindred to what we would call today an innate or a 
priori capacity, touching on supreme ideas as much as on the human 
being’s fundamental workings. 
Now, this solution may well be rejected, providing a different an-
swer is put forward to the three questions below:  
1. why does Plato speak of anamnesis? 
2. why does he raise the issue of the “first time”? 
3. what solution is suggested in this text to the underlying prob-
lem: what spurs longing in the soul? 
The paradoxical success of Platonic writings 
There is an interesting objection in Centrone’s reasoning: if I am 
right, then Plato has failed miserably (and not just here) in his quest 
as a writer. 
That is my thought exactly. Plato seeks to stem what he sees as 
the shortcomings in writing, but he is fighting a losing battle. As a-
cademic debate at the time showed writing is entrenched to such an 
extent that any effort to promote a “different” use of writing proves 
fruitless almost from the outset: the written words communicate, and 
that is their main if not sole function. 
Plato’s outright failure is first exemplified by the fact that a de-
bate broke out soon after sense of his philosophy. But above all, we 
stand before a unique case where, despite having access to the entire 
written output and a great deal of additional – even firsthand – evi-
dence from contemporary sources and after two centuries of signifi-
cant and plentiful research, we still stand before a “mystery” that 
should no longer exist: when it comes to Plato critics agree on prac-
tically nothing. No wonder we are discussing anamnesis here, a core 
concept and not that thorny in itself, from fairly distant positions.  
Unless the explanation for this apparent paradox is sought in the 
specific pitch, as unique as it is unsuccessful, of platonic writing I 
am really at a loss as to where to look for it. 
Yet this is also the source of its timeless, exceptional success. 
Assuming Plato’s intent in writing was to prompt his interlocutor to 
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think and to “make philosophy”, there is no doubt he fulfilled his 
goal. Contrary to his expectations, however, this success owes less 
to “his” philosophy than to the generous array of stimuli, challenges, 
and questions that pepper his works, and have fostered thought 
among skeptics and dogmatists, metaphysicians and scientists, phi-
losophers and men of letters. 
3. A clarification with Diana Quarantotto 
In the case of Diana Quarantotto’s objections, which I shall seek 
to answer later, I must first make some clarifications beforehand. 
This is for two reasons: first, I fear a deep yet subtle rift runs be-
tween us, and secondly, because this serves me to express a number 
of elements that will come in handy in the debate with Centrone. 
Quarantotto manifests what she believes is the theme in the Soph-
ist: «the relations occurring among being, thought and speech» (p. 
163). I feel there may be a possible ambivalence here that I wish to 
clear up.  
It is undoubtedly true that «the criteria whereupon the inner work-
ings of being are defined coincide with its criteria pertaining to its intel-
ligibility and utterability» (p. 163). Nonetheless, it is a question of 
understanding whether for the Sophist this issue requires in-depth 
examination or is a commonly used tool; in other words, if it is an 
assumption supporting platonic philosophy altogether, or a problem 
that is somehow confronted and worked out in this dialogue. 
My answer is that it is a tool, as all the examples laid out by D. 
Quarantotto clearly show. To clarify the problem, I will schemati-
cally (and trivially) draft my position: both Ideas and Principles are 
existing beings, canons of reason (and therefore bedrock of truth), 
and cause of the being of things that correspond to ideas themselves. 
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I am inclined to dismiss the idea that all this might work3, but that is 
how I believe Plato’s reasoning to run. 
It is precisely for this reason that what cannot be stated rationally 
does not belong to the dimension of the Real. The gap between the 
two spheres is such, however, that it gives rise to tensions and even 
aporias, but this has all to do with Plato and his philosophy, ands 
nothing to do with Migliori’s (or anybody else’s) interpretation 
thereof. Once again, I believe the (albeit necessary) theoretical ap-
praisals ought to be kept apart from the historical reconstruction.  
This calls forth a second issue, namely, whether among the vari-
ous elements fielded, any of the positions are overriding or they are 
all on a par with one another. My answer is that Platonic procedure 
is perfectly circular, albeit with some consequences. If I have to a) 
say that Being partakes in Motion on the basis of phenomenological evi-
dence that beings are in motion, b) say that Being partakes in Rest on the 
basis of phenomenological evidence that beings are at rest, c) deny that Be-
ing may simultaneously and in like meaning find itself in both states, based 
on logical evidence arising from the law of non-contradiction that excludes 
it, then this means that either Being itself is in motion or it is at rest. This 
also explains why, on the one hand, beings may either move or be at rest, 
and, on the other, we are right in thinking this. 
The reasoning is perfectly circular in that it may be traced in ei-
ther direction, on a dual course: from phenomenological to rational 
and from empirical to ideal. I am not concerned here in the slightest 
with the accuracy of the reasoning: I am saying that in my belief the 
Platonic procedure is such and it is thoroughly consistent both with 
his vision of reality and with the methodical instructions he delivers 
on dialectics. 
                                                     
3 For me (but I think for us) it is not possible to reason consistently along 
these lines, in a thought process affecting both ideal and conceptual reality, 
and that finds in empirical reality an assured evaluation but problematic, 
given the ontological height difference between the two worlds. 
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In this same dialogue Plato seems keen to remind us of the sim-
plicity of this passage, when, in speaking of negative terms, he 
claims not to regard them as opposites, but as unlike; hence, the 
negative particles (the many not-) 
put before words, reveal something other than the words which 
follow, or rather than the things represented by the names, 
which follow the negation (257 B 10 - C 3). 
So far, it seems to me that Quarantotto’s position is somewhat 
removed from mine, which is fine. However, I feel that the “logical-
predicative” theme in her reasoning has gained overwhelming 
weight over the ontological issues in a Platonic sense; namely, that 
Being is a concept (and indeed it is) rather than a subsisting Idea 
that contains (!) parts which are Ideas in turn, as Plato expressly 
states4. 
In this sense, I find myself reading (hopefully misconstruing their 
sense) phrases such as: «This enquiry on being, in fact, immediately 
takes the shape of a search for its quantitative and qualitative properties 
(242 C 4-6, 250 C 1-10): the aim is to establish what is being and what 
are its predicates» (p. 163). I feel that a strong hermeneutical slant is de-
tectable here, a “logical-predicative” take that bears close resemblance to 
present-day thinking but is only partially found in Plato. This causes logi-
cal-linguistic data to be overrated, as in fact occurs in Quarantotto’s analy-
sis, thus making way for other elements whose nature is perhaps more Ar-
istotelian than Platonic5. 
                                                     
4 It is no accident, in fact, that I have dedicated to this point and all those akin to 
it, from the whole-part issue to doing-suffering, almost the whole treatise from p. 
98 onwards. We shall now seize the chance to try to assess the entity of this prob-
lem, but to me this view of inner structure as subsisting realities is underrated to 
say the least. 
5 Taking advantage of the friendly atmosphere in this debate, I wish to re-
mark “cheekily” that I am always very much surprised to find the Aristote-
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But it is now high tide the thematic issues are dealt with. 
4. The importance and the purpose of the Sophist 
Centrone is certainly right in urging me not to exaggerate in 
grading the relative importance of the individual dialogues, also be-
cause an operation of this kind can lend itself to misunderstandings, 
as if I failed to view the Sophist as one of Plato’s “great dialogues”. 
Nonetheless, I was interested in highlighting three points: 
a) The Statesman reviews and expands on a number of key points in 
the Sophist, also including the very definition of sophist, as I 
have sought to show in the Fifth Lecture; 
b) The Sophist makes an analysis in the negative (in the sense that it 
gets to the bottom of an error) in order to dislodge a foe, the 
sophist; the Statesman carries out a like operation in the positive 
to establish the character closest to the philosopher, the true 
statesman; 
c) There is a sort of “theoretical ascent” towards the Philosopher, wherein 
Plato should have elaborated on “Exactness in itself (aÙtÕ t¢kribj, 
Statesman, 284 D 2), but was unwilling to commit it to writing. 
I now wish to add a fourth point to the above. I am convinced that 
understanding Plato’s political philosophy (i.e. two texts with the 
gravitas of the Republic and the Laws) without the Statesman is an 
impossible task. In this dialogue Plato has “stowed away” the key to 
understanding his position6. Besides, this may perhaps help explain 
                                                     
lian expression “being in that it is being” and the like in a treatise on Plato 
(cf. pp. 161-164). 
6 To back up these statements I must necessarily refer to my commentary, cited at 
p. 27 n. 12, and to my articles dedicated to Plato’s ethical-political outlook (La 
prassi in Platone: realismo e utopismo, in Il dibattito etico e politico in Grecia tra il 
V e il IV secolo, edited by M. Migliori, La Città del Sole, Napoli 2000, pp. 239-282; 
Cura dell’anima. L’intreccio tra etica e politica in Platone, «Ordia prima» (Cordo-
ba, Arg.), I, 2002, pp. 25-65; La filosofia politica di Platone nelle Leggi, in Plato’s 
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several comments of mine that are not meant to “belittle” the Soph-
ist, but just to lessen the excessive weight (in my view) that Western 
and certainly “ontological” philosophical tradition has assigned to it. 
Sundry preliminary remarks 
Before confronting this crucial issue, I must however make a few 
points quite clear.  
The first is that I believe the far-reaching debate (already under-
way for centuries) has adequately demonstrated that, because of the 
very nature of Platonic writing, Plato’s texts can be put together in 
such a way as to yield effects that may be in opposition to one an-
other. To steer clear of this outcome I reckon Plato’s context and 
reasoning ought to be reconstructed in every (feasible) case to ap-
preciate the problems arising therefrom. I also believe that we ought 
to curb, insofar as possible, our tendency to ask questions that the 
text neither formulates nor warrants. While utterly correct from a 
theoretical standpoint, this action of “asking” (all but inevitable at 
times) often leads to bewilderment on a historical level, and to 
downright “twisted” effects in Plato’s case. I will therefore merely 
seek to establish, with (I fear) some degree of repetition of the 
analysis previously made, whether a number of “interpretations” of 
mine are warranted by the development of Platonic reasoning and 
the textual references. 
Secondly, I must “dogmatically” draw attention to a fundamental 
point. As I have sought to argue throughout all my essays in recent 
years, Plato is by no means “Descartian”; on the contrary, he seems 
to loathe “clear and distinct” ideas as he prefers to multiply the ex-
planatory patterns so as to explain reality, inasmuch as it is possible. 
                                                     
Laws: From Theory into Practice, Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicum, 
Selected Papers, Edited by S. Scolnicov and L. Brisson, Accademia Verlag, Sankt 
Augustin 2003, pp. 30-41; L’unità del pensiero politico di Platone, «Rivista di filo-
sofia neo-scolastica», 95, 2003, pp. 337-388. 
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In a nutshell, to the risk of sometimes bordering on contradiction, he 
favors the “both … and…” pattern to the “either … or..:” one, so 
typical of modernity7. 
If I may add further examples of this constant variation of inter-
pretational structures, I have asserted the Same-Other pair to be im-
mensely important and thoroughly far-reaching. Nonetheless, nei-
ther this may be stated in the absolute sense given that, if I may 
quote the Parmenides once again, Plato demonstrates how one can-
not trace everything back to this pair, for the all-part connection 
somehow goes “further”: 
Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or 
other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a 
part to a whole, or of a whole to a part (146 B 2 - 5). 
In a like fashion, I have endeavored to show (pp. 82-83) that 
even the antithesis of rest and motion, repeatedly put forward8, ap-
pears to have been relativized in at least one passage9. If I may sug-
gest an additional text in support of this (seemingly) bizarre assump-
tion, just as Plato is engaged in debate with the “friends of ideas”, he 
employs a (seemingly) neutral example to state that  
on this view, being (t¾n oÙs…an), acted upon by knowledge, in 
so far as it is known is therefore in motion; for it is suffering an 
action, and this in a state of rest cannot occur, as we affirm (248 
E 2-4). 
It is an odd statement, bringing into play the concept of rest that 
had hitherto never been spoken of. Yet this announcement seems to 
                                                     
7 This explains why Plato may end his treatise in a non-dogmatic way by 
inviting those who disagree to say something better than what has been said 
so far (259 B), while underlining that, if this is not done, then the elabo-
rated discourses must hold. 
8 252 D, 254 D, 255 A-B, 255 E. 
9 256 B 8-9 cited at p. 83. 
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suggest that rest is in motion on account of its being thought. I say 
this for the umpteenth time: such an explanation can be overruled 
but these oddities need explaining. Still, I think it is easier and more 
persuasive to accept the idea that Plato sees that what is at rest in 
one sense may be in motion in another. 
The use of “being” 
All this leads to a further important point for our discussion. It 
seems clear to me that at times Plato uses “being” as a by-word for 
reality itself and at other times as a specific “genus”. One could say 
this proves that his philosophy is an ontology. In my opinion, in-
stead, it simply reflects the acceptance of a use of language that is 
immediately intelligible, if not “prosaic”.  
If we look at some instances drawn from the text, the issue in the 
“historical” treatise revolves around the concept of reality, defined 
as beings, t¦ Ônta. This use is perfectly applicable at first, since 
questions are raised as to the nature and number of these beings (242 
C 5-6; C 10). Then, the Ionian and Sicilian Muses support the use of 
the singular term tÕ ×n (242 E 1), being. To these philosophers, this 
“being” is both one and many. This use is repeated, for instance, 
when it is said that  
innumerable troubles will befall him who says that being (tÕ ×n) 
is either two things or one (245 D 12 - E 2). 
It seems clear to me that the focus of the discussion here is real-
ity, which may be read from a monist or pluralist perspective, and 
not “being” in the technical sense as a specific category. Indeed, 
“all” is also used as a synonym10. 
Furthermore, in the struggle over the “substance” (246 A 5: perˆ 
tÁj oÙs…aj) in the Gigantomachy, it seems clear to me that this sub-
                                                     
10 Cf. tîn p£ntwn, 242 D 6; t¦ p£nta, 244 B 3; tÕ p©n, 242 E 5, 243 D 9, 
244 B 6, 250 A 2, 252 A 6. 
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stance, having an earthly form, cannot be understood as being in the 
technical sense but applies to reality. The same yardstick also ap-
plies to the claim whereby to the others, the “idealists” 
certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas (noht¦ ¥tta kaˆ 
¢sèmata e‡dh) are the true substance (t¾n ¢lhqin¾n oÙs…an) 
(246 B 7-8). 
They believe that this substance (oÙs…aj, 246 C1) of materialists 
is not as such. It follows that both groups contemplate a substance 
(oÙs…aj, 246 C 6), but while one sees it as ideas (™n e‡desin, 246 C 
8), the other drags everything down to matter (e„j sîma p£nta, 246 
C 9). 
These references seem to me to leave little room for doubt on the mean-
ing of being in this context.  
Yet a second problem arises. In the debate between monists and 
pluralists, the charge leveled against them is that whenever they say 
something “is” or “becomes” one or many, they utterly fail to ex-
plain these terms and their meaning is misconstrued. To avoid mis-
understandings, the term “being” is said to require closer examina-
tion, lest the same trouble experienced with not-being is encountered 
(243 C-D). 
In an effort to clarify the matter further, the Stranger expresses 
the will to 
know, inasmuch as possible, from the assertors of the all <is> 
one, what they mean by ‘being’11. 
Aside from the oddity of implying the being into which the enquiry 
is centered, it seems clear to me that problems arise when this text is 
examined in the light of the (legitimate and, for us, virtually unavoid-
able) distinction between the predicate and the existential “is”. Clearly, 
                                                     
11 244 B 6-7: par¦ tîn n tÕ p©n legÒntwn «r' oÙ peustšon e„j dÚnamin 
t… pote lšgousi tÕ Ôn; 
EXCHANGES WITH THE AUTHOR 
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
 
184 
the implied being whereupon the question is centered is the predicate 
being, although the enquiry in progress assigns it an existential value 
right away. This constitutes a problem for us, but much less for Plato 
who seems to think along the following lines: whoever claims that A is 
b, is saying A, which exists by virtue of being a subject of predication, 
has the quality of b. Hence, Plato seems to split the meaning of “being”, 
which must also necessarily acknowledge the existence of the terms in-
volved for the quality to be expressed.  
The assertors of two principles, e.g. that all things are hot and 
cold, have been previously asked what they understand as “being”. 
Either this is a third principle in addition to the other two, or it is the 
principle that brings everything back to unity (243 E - 244 A), be-
cause by qualifying the other two it also brings them back to itself. 
Also in this case, the shift from the predicate to the existential12 di-
mension is immediate13.  
Beyond ontology 
The core issue is the (methinks necessary) relativization of on-
tology in the sphere of Platonic philosophy.  
This relativization is not validated through other works, as Cen-
trone seems to suggest (p. 130); these are “provided” in support of a 
thesis primarily based on the fact that, in this same dialogue, Plato 
casts before materialists and “idealists” alike the doing and suffering 
                                                     
12 In a like manner the text in 256 A 3-5 recalled by Centrone (p. 133) 
should be tackled: Plato holds that «motion is other than same, and there-
fore is mè tautòn, not-like, for it is not the Same; there is a manifest shift 
here in the word “is” from identity to copular function». 
13 Monists are questioned instead about how they can say that the only real-
ity is, using two terms and thus splitting the real that is one and being. This 
is hardly surprising: the one that is, the non-Eleatic one that is found in the 
second thesis of the Parmenides divides itself for ever, since both one and 
being branch off into one and being (Parmenide, 142 B - 143 A). 
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pair as a suitable (ƒkanÒn) feature of reality. Let us recall the key 
passage: 
I offer a definition; beings are nothing else but power (dÚnamij) 
(247 E 3-4). 
The paradoxical game that allows Plato to reach this definition (a 
crucial point for me) fails to rouse my interlocutors, including Quar-
antotto14, for whom doing and suffering «represent what by virtue of 
which they both [corporeal and incorporeal things] are» and «the idea that 
being is none other than dynamis (247 E 3-4) is understood as a defini-
tion to all effects» (p. 162). I fear we are using different language 
here but I shall suggest two questions nonetheless. 
First of all, not only I ask myself if “being” corresponds here to 
the specific category or is a byword for reality, but I also wonder if 
the use of the plural (Ônta, beings) may be underestimated. To me 
the idea of construing “beings” as referring to being in the “techni-
cal” sense seems less reasonable than identifying them with reality, 
viz. its single constituent parts. Plato himself clarifies this applies 
even to trifling actions (247 E) and to the slightest thing (248 C). 
Moreover, in giving examples against the friends of ideas, knowing 
and being known are spoken of as actions done and suffered (248 D-
E); this bears no immediate relation with the concept of being. 
                                                     
14 I must reply to a doubt raised by Quarantotto (p. 161 and n. 11): I believe 
that doing and suffering, whole and part are prior to and pre-requisites for 
the dialectics of being; I do not think one and many share the same nature, 
but lesser, unlike Unit and Dyad of Big-and-Small, which I consider at a 
higher level still. If I have nothing to say on the latter point here, I hope 
that the manner in which I have dealt with whole, all, and part has not lead 
to confusion among pairings of terms I think are quite different (clearly, “in 
a certain way”, for the one-many pair can easily be traced to the Unit-Dyad 
pair, but Plato does not seems to me to be performing this operation in his 
writings). 
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More generally, I feel this notion of doing and suffering explains 
well Plato’s heightened emphasis on the processes of unification and 
division, and the constant reference to the whole-parts connection. 
Unsurprisingly, this very method is defined here as the one enquir-
ing on every single element and on all alike (kaq' ›kast£ te kaˆ 
™pˆ p£nta, 235 C 4-6, quotation at p. 53). Even when introducing 
the relation between genera, the terms used (encompassed, pervad-
ing, extended, put into; cf. 253 B-E) seem to emphasize that it is a 
question of doing. 
Still, even though I am not fully convinced of the theory that 
these elements constitute a ramification of being, in that they «repre-
sent determinations/relations belonging to all that is in that it is» (p. 
161), its plausibility cannot clearly be disputed a priori. 
This is where the second question arises. Does the definition 
quoted above provide us with the inner structure of a reality, as 
Quarantotto seems to think, or does it lead us back to the deeper and 
higher nature of that which is defined? If I take the diairetic proce-
dure as laid out in the Sophist15, I believe the definition of a term can 
be said to lead to a “higher” structure of reference, and not to an in-
ner one. 
Furthermore, if being is the underlying structure of reality, why 
does Plato employ expressions such as that in 249 D (quoted at p. 
68), in which he claims that both being (tÕ Ôn) and all (tÕ p©n) are 
in motion and at rest? How can these duplicities of references be 
justified if being is all? 
Quarantotto is surely right in highlighting that «the issue centering 
on the priority or antecedence of relations among genera or “dimensions” 
of reality therefore appears beyond the scope of the research presented in 
the Sophist» (p. 163), but that is just what brings forth the “oddity” of 
                                                     
15 I say this because in the writings on dialectics (cited at p. 88 n. 10) I have 
sought to emphasize how two models of diairesis exist in Plato. 
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the dialogue structure. Plato speaks of being and not-being and must 
do just that; he speaks of supreme genera in order to broach the 
Other, and emphasize the theme of relation and/or non-relation 
among genera. All this is acceptable. But why speak of whole and 
dynamis? What is the reason for this “pointless” digression that (appar-
ently) bears no relation with the issue at stake? After having set forth the 
issue of not-being and even established the premises, the apologies, and 
the requests for attention (241 B - 242 B), why does Plato deliver an un-
usually lengthy speech (242 C - 249 D) that, far from dealing with either 
being or not-being, broaches other issues (concerning very relevant con-
cepts), and ends with the decisive question of the rejection of the abso-
lute immobility of Ideas? 
My explanation for the “oddity” is that, conscious of the possible 
“ontological” reading of the treatise, Plato felt the need to point out 
that things were not as they might seem. He wanted his philosopher 
readers to have no doubts (!) that the issue at stake was neither that 
of the Parmenidean One, nor the generically Eleatic being. At the 
same time, he stresses repeatedly that the terms actually involved in 
explaining the nature of reality are of a different kind. And this he 
states outright: the hallmark of reality as a whole, and therefore of 
every single element, is that doing and suffering are. 
Finally, other than a sense of ontological priority on his part (and 
I apologize for the unavoidable word play), I cannot seem to ascribe 
any interpretation to the statement in which Plato even highlights the 
subsistence of the whole; namely, when he says that  
he who does not give whole a place among beings (™n to‹j 
oâsi) must not deem being (æj oâsan) neither being nor gen-
eration (245 D 4-6)16. 
                                                     
16 Special attention must be given to the fact that claiming the whole to be 
among the beings cannot be construed in favour of ontology, given that a 
statement of this kind concerns the ontological pair par excellence, being 
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I wish to make an additional observation to Quarantotto’s hy-
pothesis relating to the existence of relative being and not-being 
(which we shall go back to later), which «are not self-contained 
genera, for they are “generable” from the five supreme genera and 
the relations existing among them» (p. 157). I shall make a “small” 
adjustment to the objection itself. On the basis of express Platonic 
quotations, I have repeatedly said that Plato holds “simple” ideas to 
be composites of other ideas, so that each idea is a part of others and 
its parts are in turn ideas17; yet the mere fact that they are “derived” 
or “constituted” is not in itself enough to claim they are not self-
contained ideas. The objection is that such genera belong to a differ-
ent ontological level, i.e. not supreme genera on a par with the five 
Ideas submitted. Hence, we should have: 
a) being as a basis for reality, 
                                                     
and becoming; these seem to me to be clearly dependent on the position of 
the whole here. 
17 A few quotations to this effect: cf. Statesman, 262 B 5 - C 1, cited at p. 38; States-
man 285 A 3 - B 6: «All things yielded by an art do certainly in some sense 
partake of measure. But these persons, because they are not wont to inquire 
dividing along real Ideas, jumble together widely different things, in the 
belief they are alike, and also fall into the converse error of not dividing 
into parts things that are other. Whereas the right way is, if one has seen the 
community of many things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until 
one has found all the differences therein, at least all those that are qualified 
as Ideas; once many kinds of unlikeness have been identified in a multi-
plicity, one should not be disheartened nor desist until all of them having 
any affinity have been comprehended within the bounds of one similarity, 
and embraced within the essence of a single genus»; Statesman, 262 A 8 - B 
2: «STRANGER – We must not cut off a single small part (mÒrion), from these 
big and many parts, nor act regardless of Ideas (e‡douj), but the part (mšroj) 
should at the same time be an Idea (edoj)»; Statesman, 262 E 3 - 263 B 1, 
cited at p. 110; Phaedrus, 265 C 9 - 266 B 1, cited at p. 136. 
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b) its ramifications made up by supreme genera (which become 
four); 
c) The ones I refer to as further subordinated relative being and not-
being (which I shall clarify later). 
Now, I do not feel this Platonic text warrants stratification to such a de-
gree, for these concepts are placed at the same level, overall. Indeed, if I 
had to arrange a ranking I would grant priority to Same and Other.  
Moreover, if a kind of identity is established between being and 
whole, it must follow that being can be divided and is made of parts 
just like every whole, and that is therefore not one but partakes of 
one. We therefore have a partaken unit and the pure Unity. I cannot 
see how this can be construed as a superiority of Being over the 
One, which instead is utterly devoid of parts (244 D - 245 A). And 
this is where I draw the line, for proceeding along these lines one 
would have to broaden the whole debate to Plato’s entire metaphysi-
cal outlook. 
Finally, it seems to me that, conscious of this possible reading, 
Plato himself actually opposes it in the final negation of not-being, 
wherein he also states: 
And again, being, partaking of the other, would be other than the 
remaining genera, and since it is other than all of them, it is nei-
ther each one of them nor all the rest but itself alone (259 B 1-4). 
Thus being is being only and must be kept apart from other genera, 
both taken one by one and all together. Hence, these cannot be 
“parts” of being. 
Finally, if being is a genus on a par with others, how can ontol-
ogy be fundamental and central in Plato? 
I fear that all this is not enough: one would have to establish if 
and how my hypothesis (and the other one) agrees with the other 
dialogues, with the extensive whole-all-part treatise therein, and 
with the dialectical outlook supported by Plato in many other works 
as well as the Sophist. One would then have to examine what Aris-
totle has to say and the subsequent debate in the Academy. How-
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ever, the discussion would take us back to Plato’s broad outlook18, 
and therefore ranges far beyond the scope of our comparison. I can 
only confirm my belief that a comprehensive view of all this is im-
possible, aside from the assumption I have drafted. 
If I may allow myself a pleasurable break before the more taxing 
pages ahead, how could we moot so much the sense of that Good which 
is superior to being, ™pškeina tÁj oÙs…aj if being were always, neces-
sarily and philosophically that which identifies the whole? 
5. Supreme genera 
Still, this does not alter the fact that the Sophist’s central treatise 
deals with being and not-being and those meta-ideas, which Cen-
trone and Quarantotto rightly urge me to go back to. 
Aristotle 
I shall say from the outset that I will not confront the reference to 
Aristotle that Centrone asks of me. And for a reason I hope he will 
agree. I am convinced the Aristotelian testimony should be adopted, 
even though I do not share Centrone’s statement that «an esoteric 
perspective… hinges largely upon the reliability of the Aristotelian 
account» (p. 131). Our conviction is that it behoves us to work, as 
always, with all the sources available to us, although the main one 
lies in the dialogues themselves. As proof of this, I suggest counting 
the pages Reale dedicates to the dialogues in his important volume 
                                                     
18 If I may go back to the passage in the Timaeus, cited at p. 61 that estab-
lishes as elements prior to the cosmos «three distinct realities, being, space, 
and generation», I wish to note that it surely assigns great meaning to being, but 
1) alongside genesis and space, 2) as being subsequent to Necessity, the divine 
Cause and the Paradigm (in order to explain these “dogmatic” statements I 
must necessarily refer to my analysis of the Timaeus, i.e. the two essays 
cited at p. 61 n. 9). 
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on Plato19, and the ones on the Aristotelian testimony or indirect 
sources generally. 
I also maintain that, in an effort to avoid misunderstandings, the 
following must be clearly distinguished: 1. unwritten doctrines that 
are obviously unavailable to us; 2. indirect testimonies, above all 
that of Aristotle, which also field the “unwritten doctrines” while 
discussing Plato’s philosophy, 3. the dialogues that, while always 
leading to further clarifications, provide us with “elements, indica-
tions, parts” of Platonic philosophy, and therefore with data on the 
“unwritten doctrines”. 
Going back to the Aristotelian source, the problem is that a) one 
must first reconstruct (or at any rate regain) the philosophical con-
text of the Stagirite, and then b) assess his testimony20 in that it is 
surely affected by the perspective into which the philosopher puts 
himself. Now, if this has only a relative bearing on naked facts21 or 
for some testimonies22, it conversely becomes absolutely decisive in 
the case of theoretical issues such as the one under examination.  
                                                     
19 Reale, Per una nuova interpretazione di Platone…. 
20 Thereby being mindful to separate that which is attributable to Plato from 
both what is of uncertain attribution, and what is surely ascribed to other 
Academics; in the latter group, one should distinguish that which applies to 
the individual academic and what is nonetheless important for reclaiming 
the range of debate within the Academy (and such that would somehow 
also involve Plato). 
21 For instance: Aristotle speaks of “unwritten doctrines”. This may be in-
terpreted as one sees fit, but the fact remains that he and his “listeners” (we 
are dealing with lectures, not written works) conceived the notion of identi-
fiable “things” in correspondence with the “unwritten doctrines” clause. 
22 For instance: Plato’s philosophical training laid out in Metaphysics A is ut-
terly believable and persuasive… yet the Eleatics are missing. Still, one only 
needs to think about Aristotle’s views on dialectics and Eleatism in general to 
see the reason for this bare “underrating”. It is no accident, then, that even the 
slightest reference to Parmenides is outright missing in Aristotle. 
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And I do not even want to approach the Aristotelian concept of the 
One. 
Supreme genera 
The sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher are three genera 
(t¦ gšnh, 217 A 7), and they are ideas, otherwise a correct diairesis 
would be impossible to make, given that the diairesis must always 
move along with ideas. Thus, so does the angler. Not supreme gen-
era, but genera23. What are they then? 
It is the question Centrone raises on supreme genera: «Are they 
ideas, meta-ideas, genera, classes, mere logical connections?» (p. 
131). If we are to set off from what Plato allows us to state and un-
derstand, it must be said that here he tells us nothing outright on the 
sense of these genera, nor on what they are. He just says they are the 
greatest, which implies there are also lesser ones, thus upholding the 
systemic and pyramid-like nature of Platonic philosophy. I have no 
reason, then, to think any different from what I have said: they are 
metaphysical beings that determine reality as a whole, ideal as well 
as empirical, and they are principles of true reasoning, beings whose 
nature is simple but are articulated in their innermost structure; Ideas 
that exercise their primary action on the very system of Ideas. In this 
sense I believe they may rightly be dubbed meta-ideas. 
I think that both my “critics” have pinpointed a true weakness in 
my exposition: genera cannot be said to be eight, while giving the 
impression they are somehow placed on a par with one another. The 
risk is tangible, and Plato himself ultimately vehemently denies hav-
ing reintroduced absolute not-being. Nevertheless, I think this ex-
ample of excusatio non petita stems from Plato clear perception of a 
                                                     
23 I have no answers at present to the possible question on identity or differ-
ence between genera and ideas. I feel the two terms have a tendency to flow 
into one another but I am unable to say any more. If that were not the case, I 
would have no reason to study Platonic philosophy, as I keep on doing. 
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possible, and unacceptable, misunderstanding. I am therefore over-
joyed to be able to clear it up. 
I wholeheartedly agree with the fact that the number of supreme 
genera is not important in itself, also because Plato states his will to 
examine some of the major ones (254 C 3-4); we are therefore look-
ing at a list that is meant to be neither somehow exhaustive. 
However, I do not think one can disregard the fact that Plato re-
sorts to numerical values seven times (again, without any plausible 
reason) in the brief passage from 254 D 7 to 254 E 5, i.e. in 14 
“lines”24. Furthermore, another four numerical values appear be-
tween 255 C 5 and 255 D 9, and again three in three lines (256 C 11 
- 256 D 1), plus a lone reference at 255 E 8. If read aloud, as I think 
ought to be done, one is shocked by the excessive use that is almost 
embarrassing for its utter pointlessness. To make matters worse, 
Theaetetus remarks that their number cannot be less (256 D 3-4). 
Should this “oddity” not raise doubts that perhaps Plato is seek-
ing to draw our attention to the numerical data? No problem if that 
is not the case, but another explanation must be found for this “odd-
ity”, for I think we must refuse to accept the notion that an author 
who is so skilled at calibrating his words so wisely and carefully can 
suddenly just…. “go mad”25. 
My hypothesis is that Plato wants to point out a problem to us. It is 
the very one my critics rightly bid me to go back to; the one wherefore I 
                                                     
24 Given the dialogue structure, in actual fact, they can hardly be regarded 
as true lines: having put them together with the computer, they have be-
come seven. 
25 In this work I think I have pointed to the tangled web of definitions Plato 
suggests in relation to the sophist’s second diairesis. Unless these “games” 
have some kind of motive (I have explained my theory on the matter) we ought 
to muster the strength to say we stand before a “deranged” author, who is even 
incapable of presenting a four-party diagram in a clear and consistent manner. 
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think these supreme ideas, these meta-ideas, can be said to be five, but 
they are also six, and also eight to boot, whatever Descartes thinks. 
The “relative” 
Diana Quarantotto rightly asks me to clarify in what sense one 
can speak of absolute being and relative being, and she formulates 
three theories on the matter (pp. 158-159). In turn, I am tempted to 
answer that all three are valid to some extent. But then I would have 
to back this statement up with evidence from Plato’s text, so I hope I 
shall be forgiven for deciding against this action (given also that the 
present text is too long already). 
For the time being I shall limit myself to proving that this distinc-
tion does indeed exist in Plato. 
My starting point is the dialectics of being in the Parmenides, 
quoted at pp. 125-126, in which we find 
1. the Being that exists, whose mere being is stated; 
2. the Not-being that is not, whose mere not-being is stated; 
3. Being that is not, whose being and not-being are stated alike. 
I have no qualms in saying that this classification gains great sig-
nificance in my view, to the extent that I have taken the liberty to 
express, at the start of my commentary, a possible explanation as to 
why Plato omits the other four assumptions that surely any fool can 
put together with little effort.  
We shall then have to see whether the Sophist also fits into this 
pattern, in a bid to provide a fitting answer to the objection, as well 
as to persuade the many (far too many, methinks), who reckon Plato 
is a (truly bizarre) philosopher who keeps changing his mind one 
dialogue from the next. 
I would first like to confront the objection below, less apparent to 
me, that «absolute Being is the genus of Being itself, whereas relative 
Being (construed as being of a specific thing or of many) is given by 
the partaking in Being of other genera» (pp. 158-159). If I understand 
correctly, this means that by partaking in absolute being – that which is 
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absolutely and therefore cannot not be – the various genera would then 
possess a relative approach, which in one sense is and in another is not. 
The problem arises from the fact that the features of the former 
do not seem to match those of the latter, since the former utterly 
rules out not-being whereas the latter implies it.  
By the same token I have misgivings about the feasibility of con-
sidering “being for itself” and “being for another” as just two differ-
ent ways of partaking in one being. What (i.e. which ontological di-
mension) would justify the difference in this different way of partak-
ing? Our way of thinking along the lines of pure concepts, more or 
less loosely connected, seems to me unlike that of Plato. He estab-
lishes a rather strong link between conceptuality and reality, in such 
a way as to appear (almost) utterly alien to us. 
6. Not being 
The issue at stake is that of not-being, and that there are two 
“concepts” which I have dubbed “absolute not-being” and “relative 
not-being” for want of a better tag. 
An insurmountable difficulty 
First, however, it is worth recalling how Plato stresses the objec-
tive thorniness of this troubled topic. Well, it seems to me even 
Plato’s speech is fraught with such difficulties. His words ring as a 
kind of “warning”, so much that they underline the ongoing exis-
tence of the difficulties, in the past as well as the present (236 D 9 - 
E 3; cf. the text at p. 151). 
But this is not the only warning sign: the solution eschewing con-
tradiction is a tough one (236 D 9; 237 A 1); the sophist has fled to a 
reality that is intrinsically fraught with hardship (236 D 2: e„j 
¥poron edoj; cf. then also, 239 C 6-7: e„j ¥poron tÒpon). The 
Stranger asks not to be deemed mad if he turns things upside down 
and back again with every step (242 A). And in the end it even looks 
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as if he wants to reject as worthless a part of the discourses that need 
doing on these issues (259 B-D). 
This is what we ought to find in the text, then. If anyone is capa-
ble of finding a simple, straightforward solution, we ought to infer 
that either we are looking at an oversimplifying mock-solution, or 
that Plato has made these statements for some game that needs to be 
revealed. In my opinion, though, there is no such simple solution. 
The presence of not-being 
I think it is clear that the treatise concerns being and not-being 
alike. Everything centers on the effort to speak of not-being, namely 
to say that not-being is, without contradicting oneself and accepting 
the risk of appearing a parricide26. In this sense, then, I think the 
terms involved are six for sure, judging from the theme and the 
words of Plato himself, stressing how the treatise on being and not-
being must be confronted and solved together27. 
As Quarantotto has rightly observed (p. 160), absolute not-being 
certainly «can neither belong to that system of supreme genera that 
is construed to warrant the possibility to think and speak of not be-
ing, in the absence of which the sophist cannot be apprehended». 
Still, if I may start off with an image (and using appropriate lan-
guage), the outcome does not belong to merely added terms, but is a 
structural element of the calculus. By the same token, it seems to me 
that without this term the argument does not work for Plato. 
                                                     
26 Indeed, in the Statesman, 284 B 7-8, this treatise (too long for his liking too) is re-
called: «as in the case of the sophist we forced not-being to be» (kaq£per 
™n tù sofistÍ proshnagk£samen enai tÕ m¾ Ôn). 
27 Plato reminds us: first it is assumed the same difficulty also affects being 
(243 B-C), then it is said that we face the same troubles for being as we had 
with not-being, hence an effort must be made to save them together (250 E 
- 251 A). Indeed, shortly after, it is stressed that the effort must extend to 
being and not-being alike (254 C 5-7). 
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It remains to be seen, then, whether and how we can speak of “two” 
kinds of not-being, bearing in mind that we stand before the need to estab-
lish how far it is possible to:  
1. speak of not-being, given that it necessarily has to be said28; 
2. negate absolute not-being without falling into contradiction. 
Absolute not-being 
I must have been especially unsuccessful in my exposition on 
this topic, considering that both my interlocutors seem almost 
shocked29 to learn that, deep down, I too recognize Plato as negating 
not-being. I call upon the usual dialectics of being in the Parmenides 
to maintain that I have never harboured any doubts on the matter. 
Moreover, I see it as a necessary milestone throughout the reason-
ing, so I simply cannot be guilty of an oversight of that kind, even if 
it had been intended. The problem is another altogether, and it is 
twofold.  
First of all, this not-being is already present in Plato’s text. In-
deed, just as the Stranger winds up his speech denying having rein-
troduced not being, he also starts off from this very issue, namely 
(237 B 7-8) the fact of 
speaking the sentence ‘absolute not-being’ (tÕ mhdamîj ×n). 
He then denies the possibility of assigning it to something or predi-
cating anything to it (237 B - 238 C), finishing off by saying (238 C 
8-10) that  
not-being in itself by itself can rightly neither be spoken, said or 
thought (tÕ m¾ ×n aÙtÕ kaq' aØtÒ). 
                                                     
28 After all I have recalled (p. 53 n. 2) that Plato himself quotes (not unin-
tentionally, I think) the passage in Parmenides, where the Goddess fails to heed 
her own prohibition, saying that one must avoid the path whereby “are the things 
that are not”. 
29 Cf. p. 132; p. 160 n. 8. 
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Furthermore, it is also difficult to negate without falling into contra-
diction. Indeed the Stranger emphasizes how he has gone on uttering 
“not-being” and speaking of it, and recalls how this paradoxical situa-
tion has already spelt victory once before for one of being’s foes, and I 
am inclined to read this as a reference to Gorgias (238 D - 239 B). 
Even though this remains absolutely true in parts, these observa-
tions belong to the aporias of Eleatism that Plato intends to over-
come. Quoting from this passage and grouping it altogether with 
Plato’s philosophy has the effect of rendering the subsequent effort 
inexplicable. 
Instead, it is a question of understanding in what sense the diffi-
culty abides in Plato. I shall give the answer away: in the Platonic 
text one can say that the absolute, definite and stated exclusion in a 
certain perspective, is not likewise in another. 
I take Quarantotto’s position as a yardstick. First she says that 
«on the other hand, Absolute Not-being does not represent a genus 
as it does not fall within the “operational objectives” of the theory of 
meg…sta gšnh» (p. 157), then she accordingly argues that by virtue of 
its partaking in being, absolute not-being can neither be thought of 
nor uttered30. Now, if this were true absolutely, whole sections of the 
text that undoubtedly speak of it would have to be overruled; among 
these is the latest and final negation that, by utterly excluding this 
Not-being, shows that it can indeed be thought of and uttered! At 
least in some sense that somehow requires an explanation. 
After all, as well as specifying the problem of not-being that is 
(as we shall see later), the Stranger hopes  
                                                     
30 Nonetheless, I wish to point out that the quotations backing this “fair” 
statement are not “pertinent”; this is because, as I have just said, in 237 E 
1-6; 238 C 8-10; 241 A 5-6 we are in the midst of the aporiae of Eleatism, 
i.e. we are deep inside the position that must be overcome, by showing that 
(clearly in different senses) Not-being can be said, namely, one can say 
both “this is not that” and “not-being is not”. As Plato indeed says! 
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that we, who speak of not-being as really not being, may some-
how escape unscathed (254 C 8 - D 2). 
The problem of Not-being-that-is-not has by no means been ban-
ished from the scope of Plato’s reasoning but abides in a manner 
that is even more troublesome if possible.  
On the strength of the final negation and consistent with the dia-
lectics of being in the Parmenides, my hypothesis affirms that Not-
being is assumed as not-being, in that “is not” is it only possible at-
tribution, it is assumed as removed, as necessarily negated. Unless 
this operation is carried out, absolute “Not-being” cannot be spoken 
of, reverting to the position of Parmenides. As Plato’s text shows, 
however, it is not possible to avoid speaking of this Not-being as 
well; providing that one clarifies immediately that, unlike the other 
one (the Not-being that is and is not) it is utterly removed and ne-
gated. The negation of absolute Not-being is in fact necessary for 
the problems relating to our capability to speak and think, requiring 
it to be distinguished from the affirmation of the other. 
This allows me to explain in what sense I believe the strong unity 
between reason and ontology, so typical of Platonic thought, struggles 
to withstand the test: on the one hand absolute Not-being certainly can-
not be ranked among the genera on a par with the others, for it is not in 
any sense; on the other hand one cannot submit the issue of Being and 
not submit that of Not-being at the same time, and thus distinguish the 
two senses in which this negative term is submitted. This however can-
not constitute a purely logical operation, devoid of reflections on the 
level of reality, at least for Plato. But Not-being is not… 
After all, what else is the meaning of the oft-cited words from the 
Parmenides: “not being of the Not-being that is not” other than that 
a term (the Not being that is not) is submitted as removed (it must be 
stated as not being)? 
Even in the Sophist, finally, when speaking of false opinion as 
the statement of a not being, the Stranger asks the key question: 
whether falsehood is uttered (240 E 1-2) 
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by opining that things which are not are not, or that things which 
are absolutely not in a certain sense are (t¦ mhdamîj Ônta). 
The answer applies to the second possibility, since the first 
statement, upholding the non-existence of things that are not, takes 
on a value of truth. Underlining the absoluteness, that is missing 
from the answer, serves well to express the notion that falsehood is 
only given when operating upon a “full” not-being, not one that in a 
certain way is. Indeed, in such a case that which is not can also be 
said to be nonetheless. At the same time, falsehood is claimed to 
consist in saying that things which most certainly exist from all per-
spectives do not exist at all (240 E). 
All this is necessary to isolate, as in the chart in the Parmenides, 
a Being that is being only, and a Not-being that is not being only, 
telling them apart from that being which is and is not. 
In short, Not being cannot be placed at an ontological level, but 
neither can it be banished from our line of reasoning. This is a “dan-
gerous” position that explains Plato’s vehement closing speech, de-
nying having reintroduced absolute Not being as something that is.  
Relative not being and Other 
Plato tells us right away what relative not being is. After outlining 
the problems arising in Eleatism from the view on and even the nega-
tion of absolute Not being, Plato speaks of this Not being in the image 
of the copy, that is not the true thing but exists in that it is a copy (240 
A-C). Apparent images, which are the raison d’etre for the whole trea-
tise, certainly are and yet they are not what they seem to be. They 
cannot be said not to be absolutely, but they are not in relation to that 
which they seem to be. This being and not being “in that it is …”, i.e. 
“relating to…” constitutes relative being and not being. 
Let us take another text: sophistry is the productive art, so says 
the final definition in the dialogue. Productive art is that which al-
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lows a previous not being to turn into being31. What do we talk of 
with this not-being? Certainly not of absolute Not being but, rather, 
of an x that is not y, and is no longer or not yet, or not fully etc; in 
short, it is other than that specific being it refers to (because an other 
is such only in relation to an other). 
On the relationship between relative Not being and Other, 
though, Quarantotto lays before me a crucial point, since I argue that 
«while constituting a part of the Other, relative Not Being is an addi-
tional, self-contained genus» (p. 159). 
Now, if a part is also a genus, as I have said before, this should 
not represent a problem to anyone. It is then a question of ensuring 
whether Plato himself tells us it is. 
Plato speaks of the Idea of Not being (258 C 3, edoj ›n; 258 D 6, 
tÕ edoj; 260 B 7, ti tîn ¥llwn gšnoj). Unless we want to argue he is 
speaking of absolute Not being in these cases, we must recognise he is 
speaking of something else; that is, as we fully well know, of a part of 
the Other, an Idea that is part of another Idea. In this sense I can con-
cede straight away that it is ranked at a lower level than the five genera. 
But in one sense only, if I have interpreted Plato’s words well. 
The negative and the other 
At this point it is a question of understanding what could be the 
difference between the all, i.e. the Other, and this Not being that is a 
part. Indeed, nothing in the text justifies assigning to Plato the ab-
surdity of a part perfectly matching with the whole. 
As I have said before, a first solution deals with semantic value and na-
ture: the Other is utterly pervasive and in opposition to the Same, whereas 
relative Not-being in itself cannot but be juxtaposed to Being (relative in it-
self). Its importance is due to the fact that there is no way out from the ab-
solute Eleatic negation unless its existence is acknowledged. 
                                                     
31 219 B 4: m¾ prÒterÒn tij ×n. 
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If this “Not being” is a part, there must be more. In other words, there 
are other negatives that are “other” than other positives: the not-beautiful 
(that is certainly other than ugly) is the part of other relating to the beautiful, 
and so on. For sure, with regard to being, this not-beautiful is also relative 
not-being, but this needn’t be emphasized here as its core feature is given in 
relation to the beautiful.  
I understand that, based on this difference, it comes easy to object 
that the pervasiveness of relative Not being appears such that it can co-
incide with the Other. This objection is technically correct but Plato’s 
text does not seem to suggest this. Or, better still, on the one hand it de-
nies it when speaking of part, on the other hand it also highlights the 
possibility of an equivalent view of the two terms. Indeed, it underlines 
the infinity of not-being (256 E 5-6 cited at p. 84) in that 
for every genera, the nature of the other, making each of them 
other than being, makes it not being; and therefore of all of them 
we may truly say that they are not by themselves (256 D 12 - E 2). 
Being itself is as many times not being, as there are genera, i.e. 
infinitely (257 A). In this case the identity of the two “genera” is 
specified as that which enables us to say for every other that “it is 
not that something”. But if this were the only and final position, i.e. 
if we had to acknowledge one identity only, we would have to say 
that Plato was wrong in claiming Not being to be part of the Other. 
I think the only acceptable way is the one I supported in the pre-
amble (cf. pp. 180-182); that of accepting the co-presence of differ-
ent interpretative frameworks, and recognising that from a certain 
perspective all the others are not being, and from another perspec-
tive there are distinct parts of other itself.  
Some clarifications 
Given the importance of this issue I cannot fail to give ample 
space to a number of considerations submitted with the usual preci-
sion by Bruno Centrone, and that I will discuss one by one. 
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First of all, he states: «It seems undeniable to me, however, that 
not-being can only be said to be part of the other at the extensional 
level. Having said this, though, the distinction is hard to keep up: it 
follows that whatever is not-x must be deemed other than x (and 
thus is a kind of the other), but it is also a kind of not-being on ac-
count of its being not-x. The part of the other that is opposed to be-
ing is a “genus” of all the other parts that are in opposition to big, 
beautiful, etc, and constitute the range of the other» (pp. 132-133). 
As I have said already, the objection is right on the mark, but two 
problems follow, with regard to Plato’s text: 1. not only it fails to 
explain the difference between the whole Other and the part, but 
also threatens to negate it; 2. it makes the assumption that the part 
(not being) is whole (genus) to the other parts (the many others); this 
perhaps explains why Plato favoured another approach: to ensure 
the Other only remained unitary, and therefore warrant the existence 
of realities that, as parts of the Other, are not pure negatives (as we 
shall shortly see). 
Centrone goes on: «If the deduction of not-being as genus is 
based on its opposition to being in the range of the other, then all the 
“genera” of the other (not-big, not-beautiful, etc) are summoned to 
form as many genera, with seemingly disastrous consequences. In 
this way any casual cluster of composite beings would identify a 
ghenos» (p. 133). 
It is another insightful objection, which I think may only be an-
swered in three ways: 1. these are not random clusters since, with 
reference to Ideas, they must express an objective order; 2. Plato 
speaks of the not-large as an other and not as an opposite (257 B), 
i.e. he tries to grant him a dimension in the positive that seems ap-
plicable to both small and equal; 3. on the strength of what can a 
small or equal thing be said to be not-large, unless a ghenos? What 
does it partake in for us to grant it this quality? I think Plato’s an-
swer could be: in that part of the Other relating to large. 
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It should be noted: I am not saying the process works but that it 
clarifies the statements in Plato’s text, turning things upside down 
and back up (as the Author had promised). 
Centrone goes on to say he is unsure of the meaning of my 
statement that «these negatives are always used to speak of what is 
other and not of what is contradictory» (p. 85) and notes: «“not-
beautiful” does not necessarily mean “ugly”, and this is undeniably 
stated in the Sophist, but the fact that a negation does not mean op-
position does not warrant Migliori’s branching out into the contra-
diction, when he claims the negation does not refer to an indefinite 
opposite. Even when meaning “other than big”, not-big identifies a 
necessarily indistinct class of things and both terms encompass the two 
sides of the contradiction (each x is big or other than big)» (p. 133). 
Anyone who, like me, has studied logica minor on books of Aristo-
telian-Thomist tradition cannot but agree entirely: I have no doubts on 
the matter. But I do suspect Plato seeks to avoid this quandary, if I in-
terpret his words right32. Namely, we can surely trace Plato’s position 
back to a contradictory pair consisting of a specific term on one side, 
and an unspecific one on the other. And I would wager that the phi-
losopher himself knows this fully well (unless Aristotelian logic is 
thought to have a sudden and “miraculous” origin). Still, it seems clear 
to me that he is trying to suggest an additional framework that would 
                                                     
32 In this sense I am loathe to apply further logical sets to Plato’s text. As an exam-
ple: for O’Brien, Non-être …, p. 65, the mutual exclusion of same and other does 
not amount to contrariety, even though the absence of one implies the latter’s pres-
ence, but not in the sense motion and rest are, for they do not partake mutually, 
whereas this occurs with same and other, albeit in different ways. Therefore, the 
other is not in opposition to the being it partakes in; it follows that neither the part of 
the other in opposition to being, i.e. not-being, is in opposition (p. 66). But the exis-
tence of a not being that is not in opposition to being looks troublesome: the whole 
reasoning seems to me to hinge on the application of logical sets far more rigid than 
Plato’s plurality of approaches. 
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provide a specific significance to a term he refuses to condemn as “pure 
negative”. To this effect he says: 
we shall not concede that it is said that the negation signifies the 
opposite, but this only, that the negative particles put before 
words, reveal something other than the words which follow, or 
rather than the things represented by the names, which follow 
the negation (257 B 9 - C 3). 
Perhaps we can say it does not work. After all, however, if we 
had the time, will and skill to take on the other great dialectics, that 
of Hegel, would we not find ourselves facing “logical” hurdles of a 
same and surely not lesser kind? 
This tangled web explains my hypotheses, whose purpose is to 
give a sense of meaning to the statements in the text. In short, not-
being is a part of the other because it possesses a different semantic 
value and nature, and because there are other parts of the other. One 
can clearly seek another solution but in any case one has to justify: 
1. the explicit affirmation of the “not being” genus; 
2. the positive affirmation of “negative” elements such as not beautiful; 
3. the gap between other and not being, which is a part thereof; 
4. the relationship between not being and the “negatives” such as 
not beautiful. 
And all this must be performed without weakening an ontological 
discourse that is developed on a “pure gene” level. 
With regard to the nature of this negative genus, Centrone’s other 
question surely remains untouched (p. 131): if the negative is admit-
ted «At this point, clearly, the genus loses any ontological heft as it is 
unable to carry out an effective division of reality. After all, academics 
had notoriously disregarded any ideas concerning negative realities». 
I agree, but once again I ask myself if the same can be said for 
Plato, since he maintains  
1. that the nature of the other has parts like science (257 C-D), i.e. these 
negatives have full texture, just like various arts and sciences; 
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2. that the part of the other opposed to the beautiful has a name, and 
is unlike the beautiful in nature (257 D); 
3. that the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being to being 
(257 E); this claim leads this “not being” to be as all things other; 
4. that these “negatives” are thus by no means lesser than their posi-
tive counterparts (257 E - 258 A). 
All this is explained by the fact that the nature of the other be-
longs to the things that are, and the parts of this nature must equally 
be supposed to exist (258 A-B). Ultimately, these parts are indeed 
the not being that was being enquired upon, which has its own na-
ture (258 B). 
The positivity and existence of these “negatives” in Plato’s phi-
losophy should therefore no longer be questioned.  
7. Conclusions 
I ignore how many (if any) readers (freely and unfettered by ex-
ams) have had the strength and/or the patience to come this far. 
For the few who have, I think we can close the full circle as my 
critics have pushed us towards playing a while at that “game” that 
Plato wanted to set in motion. And I am sure the readers have made 
other considerations, perhaps more profound still. 
My task lies solely in accepting the implied but fair charge of 
having sallied forth with great confidence in classifying these su-
preme genera. I had to express myself differently, perhaps mapping 
out the game as follows: 
A. I have no doubt there are six genera. 
B. But how can they be six if there is a duplicity of meaning 
with both Being and Not being? They are eight then. 
C. But how can they be eight, since absolute Not-being must be 
rejected outright, and relative Not being is a part of the 
Other? If relative Not being is missing, we can neither admit 
relative Being; in this sense they are five only. 
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Thus they are eight in one sense (for it can and must be said: the 
not being of Not-being that is not), in another they are not and can-
not be eight, so they are six. And perhaps, half spoken in jest and 
half to be on the safe side, they can also be said to be five! 
Just as Plato says in the Sophist! 
